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I.
INTRODUCTION

Air pollution law is complicated. The statutes and regulations
are based on technical knowledge, and educated guesswork,
drawn from various fields of environmental and health science
and engineering. The complexity and frequent uncertainty of
that information contribute to legal mandates which are laden
with technical jargon and are often reevaluated and changed.1
The complexity of these laws is compounded in California by
this state's unique, multilayered division of governmental author
ity over air pollution. Another complicating factor is the unre
lenting political sensitivity of the topic. The political stakes are
high for many reasons, with the economic implications of pollu
tion control topping the list. Despite this complexity, or perhaps
because of it, there is no doubt that a lot has been accomplished
to improve air quality in California, both before and since the
federal government assumed its heavy role in air pollution regu
lation. There also is no doubt that much more needs to be done.
There is recurrent doubt, however, about whether California's
regulatory system is fair, especially in its treatment of air pollu1. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
318 (4th ed. 2003) ("Chemistry, engineering, medicine, and meteorology in
teract with law to produce modem air quality control policy. S cientific understand
ing of air pollution is constantly in flux, which challenges air quality management
schemes to stand ready for change.").
POLICY
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tion sources and the specific communities they affect. This arti
cle examines California's air pollution hearing boards, an
important regulatory forum with direct bearing on this question.
These boards are unique in many respects, for they are not quite
the same as anything else in California environmental and land
use regulation. One of their most striking characteristics is that
the hearing boards are predominantly composed of individuals
who are not air pollution experts, even though the decisions they
make usually involve technical questions, often of an extraordi
narily sophisticated nature. Most significantly, the hearing
boards are a key feature-indeed the key feature-of Califor
nia's attempt to ensure that fairness is a consistent component of
government efforts to clean and protect the air.
Regulation of air pollution from stationary sources in Califor
nia is primarily the responsibility of local and regional air pollu
tion control districts (APCDs) .2 In contrast, state government,
principally through the California Air Resources Board (ARB ) ,
regulates air pollution from most types of motor vehicles.3 The
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39002, 40000 (West 2006). See Beentjes v.
Placer County Air Pollution Control Dist., 254 F. Supp.2d 1159, 1162-63 (E.D. Cal.
2003) ("The California Legislature has determined that local and regional authori
ties have the primary responsibility for control of air pollution from all sources other
than emissions from motor vehicles."); Sherwin-Williams Co.v.S. Coast Air Quality
Mgmt.Dist., 104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 288, 293 (Ct. App.2001) ("The SCAQMD conducts
the primary planning, rulemaking, and enforcement activities at the local level, and
adopts regulations to control sources of air pollution in Los Angeles, Orange, River
side, and San Bernardino Counties."); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 777 P.2d 157, 162 (1989) ("Air pollution control
districts are provided with the primary responsibility for the control of nonvehicular
air pollution."); People ex reI.Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 36 204 Cal.
Rptr.897, 903 (1984) (holding that local regulation of aerial application of phenoxy
herbicides was not prohibited by state or federal statute.) ("Local and regional au
thorities have the primary responsibility for the control of air pollution from all
sources other than emissions from motor vehicles."). See also Nicholas C. Yost, En
vironmental Regulation - Are There Better Ways?, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 564, 572 (1999);
William Simmons & Robert H. Cutting, Jr., A Many Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular
Air Pollution Control Law in California, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 109, 125 (1974).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39500 (West 2006). See Beentjes, 254 F. Supp.
2d at 1168 ("This general framework suggests that the State recognizes that certain
aspects of air pollution control are necessarily a highly localized function."); Western
Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist., 534 P.2d 1329
(1975); 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P.SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMEN.
TAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE § 41.01 (2005). ("Local and regional authorities
have primary responsibility for controlling air pollution from nonvehicular sources,
while the control of vehicular sources is the [Air Resources] Board's responsibil
ity.") See also JAMES E. KRIER AND KENNETH URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A
CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE
AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975 (1977).
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ARB also plays an important oversight role in stationary source
control, but major responsibility there still rests with the
APCDs.4
There are thirty five APCDs in the state, now called either "air
quality management districts" (AQMDs) or "air pollution con
trol districts." Most of the published literature on their functions
emphasizes their rulemaking or enforcement powers or unusual
policy initiatives.s This article instead examines their adjudica
tory authority, for most of the major conflicts between regulatory
authorities and stationary sources in California are brought into
4. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42362 (West 2006) (ARB authority
to revoke or modify an APCD variance which does not require compliance as expe
ditiously as practicable or otherwise meet statutory requirements); Stauffer Chern.
Co. v.California Air Res. Bd., 180 Cal.Rptr. 550 (Cal. App.1st Dist. 1982) ("The
statutory scheme empowers the Board to oversee the effectiveness of local programs
and regulations .... ). For fuller discussion of the functions of the ARB relative to
hearing boards, see infra Section VI. See also CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ENFORCEMENT PRO
GRAMS (Apr. 1982) [hereineafter ARB REpORT]; CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, EVALUATION OF THE SAN DIEGO COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIS
TRICT'S AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM (2000); CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, EVALUATION OF THE ANTELOPE V ALLEY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIS
TRICT'S AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM (1999); CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD, EVALUATION OF THE NORTHERN SONOMA COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CON.
TROL DISTRICT'S PROGRAM (1991); CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD and U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A JOINT EVALUATION OF THE BAY AREA
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT PROGRAM (Mar. 1988); Simmons & Cutting,
supra note 2, at 124-25, 141.
5. See, e.g. , Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went
Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141 (1998); Daniel P. Selmi, Transforming Economic
Incentives from Theory to Reality: The Marketable Permit Program of the South
Coast Air Quality Management District, 24 ENVTL.L. RPTR.10695 (Dec. 1994); Lisa
Trankley, Comment, Stationary Source Air Pollution Control in California: A Pro
posed Jurisdictional Reorganization, 26 UCLA L. REv. 893 (1979); Thomas H.
Crawford, The Bay A rea Air Quality Management District: Air Pollution Control at
the Local Level, 19 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 619 (1979); Eli Chernow, Implementing
the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve The Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 537 (1975); Simmons & Cutting, supra note 2; Daniel L. Willick & Timothy J.
Windle, Rule Enforcement by the Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control District,
3 ECOLOGY L.Q.507 (1973); Jan Stevens, Air Pollution and the Federal System: Re
sponses to Felt Necessities, 22 HASTINGS L.J.661 (1971); Vernon McDade, Note, Cal
ifornia Code of Civil Procedure Section 731 (a): Denial of Private Injunctive Relief
from Air Pollution, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1403-06 (1971); Ellyn Adrienne Hersh
man, Comment, California Legislation on Air Contaminant Emissions from Station
ary Sources, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1474 (1970); Doug Haydel, Comment, Regional
Control ofAir and Water Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, 55 CALIF.L.REV.
702 (1967); Harold W. Kennedy, The Legal Aspects of Air Pollution Control with
Particular Reference to the County of Los Angeles, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1954);
and Robert L. Chass & Edward S. Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S.CAL. L. REv.
349 (1954).
"
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the administrative adjudication process, that IS, to the APCD
hearing boards.
Although the hearing boards are little known to the public,
they have tremendous importance for air quality throughout the
state. The significance of their work begins with the obvious, di
rect effect of their decisions on actual air pollutant emissions.
Less obvious, but also critical, is that most hearing board cases
fundamentally are efforts to make sure that pollution laws are
applied fairly. 6 Each category of hearing board cases represents
an opportunity for air quality to be protected while ensuring that
other, competing interests are fully considered. Without such op
portunities, air pollution control could be dangerously over
whelmed by its esoteric, technical details, and justice could be
ignored. It should be reassuring to the California public that the
law provides the hearing boards as forums for the mitigation of
this danger. Just how strongly reassured we should be, however,
is less clear, for alongside the many strengths of the hearing
board process, there are undeniable weaknesses.
This article is an update of my earlier article, "Administrative
Adjudication of Air Pollution Disputes: The Work of Air Pollu
tion Control District Hearing Boards in California."7 Because
basic features of the law governing California's air pollution
hearing boards have remained in place over the years, the origi
nal article reportedly continues to be useful for lawyers and
others. Nonetheless, some important aspects of the law have
changed, and so have many of the practices hearing boards fol
low. Furthermore, in many parts of the state, hearing boards
now often face cases of far greater technical and legal complex
ity, and environmental and economic significance, than in the
past. This article adds new material to address these develop
ments, while retaining previous text that still has validity. My
aim is to offer a work of continuing usefulness to government
and private attorneys, hearing board members, enforcement per
sonnel, businesses and other regulated entities, citizens groups,
6. Although this article will not attempt to systematically analyze different con
cepts of fairness, or justice, served by hearing boards, some of these concepts will be
discernible. It will be seen that in a variety of ways hearing boards promote a blend
of ideas of fairness. A more systematic presentation of concepts of justice may be
found at KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE 2137 (2d ed. 2000) (distinguishing among distributive justice, corrective justice, and
procedural justice).
7. 17 V.c. DAVIS L.REV. 1117 (1984).
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and technical experts and other types of witnesses-in sum, to
anyone involved with the work of hearing boards.
Initially, basic aspects of hearing boards will be discussed, in
Section II. Then the three types of hearing board cases will be
examined in turn:
The first type, applications for variances, will be addressed in
Section III. This is by far the kind of case the boards face most
frequently.8 The key elements of all hearing board work appear
most clearly in variance proceedings.
The second category is abatement order requests, another well
established aspect of hearing board activities. As will be shown in
Section IV, abatement cases usually share many of the characteristics and objectives of variance cases.
.
The third category, one that has grown in importance and variety
in recent years, is the resolution of permit disputes, to be discussed
in Section V. These often controversial cases include appeals by
individual companies, citizens groups, and others from APeD deci
sions on construction and operating permits for air pollution
sources.
•

•

•

In Section VI, a host of problematic issues will be addressed
under the catch-all heading of changes, controversies, and confu
sions. Major changes in recent years in key aspects of hearing
board operations will be explored, along with aspects that have
provoked sharp controversy. Overlapping with these changes
and controversies are issues on which there has been, and may
inevitably continue to be, confusion in hearing boards' ap8. A total of 657 variances and 3 abatement orders were granted during the pe
riod from July 1, 1980 through June 30, 1981.This number reflects only the variance
orders received by the ARB. . . . Out of the 660 [sic] variances granted, the [South
Coast] AQMD issued 410 orders or 62 percent of the total (which seems reasonable
since the SCAQMD has the most sources), the San Joaquin County APCD issued 59
or 9 percent, [San Diego County] APCD and [Kern County] APCD issued 7 percent
each, and the [Bay Area] AQMD issued 6 percent of the total. Fifteen of the 45
districts issued 1 percent or less of the total number of variances in the State and 25
districts, or 56 percent of the districts, issued no variances during the noted time
period. ARB Report, supra note 4, at IVA7. IV-60
See also Herbert V. Walker, The Air Pollution Control Hearing Board - Functions
and Jurisdictions, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 400 (1954). Surprisingly, recent ARB
figures on total variances issued are similar to the numbers reported over 20 years
earlier, although the number of districts in existence is different. For example, in
2002 there were approximately 660 variances granted, with the five principal districts
issuing them being the South Coast AQMD, San Joaquin Valley Unified APCD, San
Diego APCD, Santa Barbara APCD, and Bay Area AQMD. Generally the total
number of variances and abatement orders issued annually is about 700. Email from
Judy Lewis, Associate Air Pollution Specialist, California Air Resources Board, to
author (June 24, 2004, 04:39 PDT; July 7, 2004, 05:46 PDT) (on file with author).
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proaches to their tasks. Section VII will offer concluding per
spectives on the current and future importance of California's
hearing boards.
II.
HEARING BOARD BASICS

Each of the 35 APCDs is directed by statute to have "one or
more" hearing boards.9 The only district that has more than one
is the San Joaquin Valley APCD. When it came into being in
1992, it was to have a single board, but the legislature soon di
rected the appointment of three hearing boards, each serving a
different region within that geographically expansive district.1o
A.

The Members

A hearing board consists of five members appointed by the
district governing board to staggered, three year terms. l l Ordi9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40800 (West 2006).
10. Section 1(b)(5) of S.B. 124, enacted on October 14, 1991, as Chapter 1201,
Statutes of 1991-1992, created "a single hearing board." Section 6(b)(5) of A.B.
3400, enacted on September 21, 1992, as Chapter 765, Statutes of 1991-1992, and
now codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 406oo(a)(4), amended this re
quirement and created three hearing boards, each to serve a separate region of the
district "as defined by the unified district board. " See also See also S.B. 1267, 1994
Reg. Sess. § 5 (Cal.1994).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40800, 40804 (West 2006). Section 40800
also allows for the appointment of "one alternate member for each member" and
specifies that the alternate "may serve only in the absence of the member, and for·
the same term as the member. " Alternates, however, may not conduct single mem
ber hearings on matters such as interim variance and emergency variance requests.
In many APCDs, no alternates have been appointed because no need for them has
been found. In at least one district, alternates were appointed but "due to the infre
quency of meetings and the necessity of filing FPPC Conflict of Interest forms the
alternate positions have all resigned and they have not been refilled by the Gov
erning Board. " Letter from Karen Nowak, Counsel for Antelope Valley Air Quality
Management District, to author (May 2, 2004) (on file with author). In the Bay
Area AQMD, the hearing board alternates "are called upon very infrequently to
participate in Hearing Board activities whenever the regular member is unable to
attend any of the hearings (once or twice a year for one or two categories). " Letter
from Neel Advani, Deputy Clerk of the Boards, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, to author, (Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with author). In the three regional hear
ing boards of the San Joaquin Valley APCD, "[t]he frequency of participation for
alternate members is low. " Letter from Sissy Smith, Clerk to the Boards, San Joa
quin Valley Air Pollution Control District, to author (Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with
author). In contrast, the El Dorado County AQMD Hearing Board alternates have
"participated frequently" in the board's activities. Letter from Thomas R. Fashinell,
Acting Chairperson, El Dorado County Air Quality Managemem District Hearing
Board, to author, (Apr. 27, 2004) (on file with author). In the busiest hearing board,
"[i]n general, alternates sit for the regular member around five to ten days per year."
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narily three members are required for a quorum. The statute
also specifies that "no action shall be taken by the hearing board
except in the presence of a quorum and upon the affirmative vote
of a majority of the members of the hearing board." (Emphasis
added.) The underlined language means that the agreement of
three members is needed for action, even if only three or four
members are present to constitute the quorum.12
Three of the members are required by statute to meet certain
qualifications for the position. One member must be admitted to
practice law in California, one must be a registered professional
engineer, and one must be "from the medical profession" with
"specialized skills, training, or interests . . . in the fields of envi
ronmental medicine, community medicine, or occupational/toxi
cologic medicine." The other two members are simply
designated as "public members. "13
The medical member usually is a doctor, although the statutory
language does not limit this category to that segment of the medi
cal profession. The statute does require the medical member to
have some "specialized skills, training, or interests" pertinent to
the types of health issues often arising in air pollution disputes.
No such specific skills are required of the lawyer and engineer
members, nor of the public members. Thus, with the possible
exception of their medical members, hearing boards are not le
gally required to be composed of experts in any aspect of air pol
lution, and they usually are not.
There are, however, two variations on this statutory approach
to the composition of hearing boards. First, in a district with a
population of less than 750,000, if the governing board "is unable
to appoint a person with the qualifications specified in Section
40801 who is willing and able to serve," then a vacancy on the

South Coast Air Quality Management District Hearing Board, Response to Au
thor's Questionnaire 5 (July 30, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter SCAQMD
Questiontionnaire].
12. CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40820 (West 2006). This section also identi
fies a few appropriate exceptions from the quorum requirement in proceedings, for
example, involving interim, short term, or emergency variances. See, e.g., California
Energy Co., Inc., Nos.BG 92-1, 92-2, 92-3 (Hearing Board, Great Basin Unified Air
Pollution Control District, Findings and Order Granting Modification of Schedule of
Increments of Progress) (Aug. 13, 1992) (modification of schedule of increments of
progress issued by hearing board chairman, pursuant to Sections 40825(c) and
42357).
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40801 (West 2006).
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hearing board may be filled by the appointment of "any
person."14
Second, in contrast with this pragmatic provision allowing
lesser expertise in smaller districts' hearing boards, there are pro
visions specifying greater expertise requirements for South Coast
AQMD (SCAQMD) Hearing Board members. In October,
1991, the legislature enacted a set of provisions specifically ad
dressed to that hearing board.1s These enactments resulted from
controversy that had developed regarding its practices and mem
bership.16 One unusual provision directed the SCAQMD board
of directors to "retire the current hearing board and appoint in
its place a new hearing board."17 This section also added greater
specificity to the required qualifications for the new lawyer, engi
neer, and medical appointees to the South Coast hearing board.18
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40802 (West 2006).
15. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40501, 40501.1, 40501.3 (West 2006).
16. See HAMILTON, RABINOVITZ & ALTSCHULER, INC., THE SOUTH COAST AIR
.

QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT HEARING BOARD:

FINDINGS, ANALYSES AND

(Feb. 1991) [hereinafter HR&A STUDY].
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40501.1(a) (West 2006). Another unusual
attempt to change a hearing board's membership occurred in 2001, when the board
of directors of the Bay Area AQMD sought to terminate the membership of two
hearing board members. This controversial effort was abandoned as it quickly was
determined that the board of directors had not followed lawful procedures and that
there were inadequate legal grounds for ending the members' service prior to the
expiration of their three year terms. See Noam Levey, Air Board Illegally Ousts Two
Members in Secret, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001, at 1B; Michael J.
Coren, 2 Reinstated as Air Board Admits to Breaking Rules, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Aug.16, 2001, at lB.
18. An exhaustive study of the South Coast Hearing Board by outside consultants
in early 1991 had noted some concern that "one or more of the current statements of
requirements [in Section 40801] were too general to assure that the appointee to the
seat would have the specialized skills and experience necessary to exert the signifi
cantly more expert perspective on matters coming before the Board that was pre
sumably sought by the Legislature when it attached special professional
requirements to these seats." HR&A STUDY, supra note 16 at 130. In essence, the
consultants seemed to be opining that in the statute the legislature had not said all
that it really meant. Under the more specific requirements in effect since October
1991, and now codified in Section 40501.1 of the Health and Safety Code, the lawyer
member is to have "two or more years of practice, preferably with litigation experi
ence." The engineer me�ber must be someone with "a bachelor's degree from an
accredited college in chemical, mechanical, environmental, metallurgical, or petro
leum engineering, with two or more years of practical experience, and preferably
who is a professional engineer registered pursuant to the Professional Engineers
Act." Although the first part of this statement of the engineer's credentials is more
demanding than the requirements stated in Section 40801 for the engineer member
in other districts, ironically the latter part is less so. Section 40801 requires that the
member be a registered professional engineer, while Section 40501.1(a)(2) only
states a preference in that regard. Lastly, the medical member in the South Coast
RECOMMENDATIONS
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In all districts, the members are "part-timers" on the hearing
board; that is, they have other work or endeavors to which they
devote more time each week than they normally spend on hear
ing board matters. The only exception is the hearing board in the
South Coast Air Quality Management District, which often has a
sufficiently heavy caseload that it must function on nearly a full
time basis.19
District must be "a licensed physician, with two or more years of practical experi
ence, preferably in the fields of epidemiology, physiology, toxicology, or related
fields. "
19. In some districts, there are so few air pollution sources that the board rarely
meets at all. See, e.g. , Letter from Lakhmir Grewal, Deputy Air Pollution Control
Officer, Calaveras County Air Pollution Control District, to author (Apr. 6, 2004)
(on file with author) (the hearing board "has not been convened in more than three
years "); Letter from Karen Nowak, Counsel for Antelope Valley Air Quality Man
agement District, to author (May 2, 2004) (on file with author) ("The Mojave Desert
AQMD Hearing Board has not seen any significant cases over the last 5 years. . ..
The AVAQMD Hearing Board has only heard 1 official petition in its entire exis
tence (since 1997). "); E-mail memorandum from Harry Krug, Colusa County Air
Pollution Control District, to author (Apr. 14, 2004; 1:18 PDT ) (on file with author)
("The Hearing Board has met 3 times in the last 16 years. It has not met in the last
few years."); Telephone interview with Kate Haas, Modoc County Air Pollution
Control District (Feb. 9, 2004) (reporting that the hearing board has never been
used in that district); Letter from T homas R. Fashinell, Acting Chairperson, El Do
rado County Air Quality Management District Hearing Board, to author (Apr. 27,
2004) (on file with author) ("Last year we met about 4 times, but that is quite unu
sual. I would estimate an average frequency of 1-2 times/year . . . ."); and Letter
from Robert L. Reynolds, Air Pollution Control Officer, Lake County Air Quality
Management District, to author (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with author) ("The Hearing
Board conducts hearings approximately 1 or 2 times a year."). See also E-mail mem
orandum from Gary Bovee, Tehama County Air Pollution Control District, to au
thor (Apr. 5, 2004; 10:17 PST ) (on file with author) ("The Tehama County Air
Pollution Control District is a small rural district and the hearing board hasn't had to
meet in five or six years."). In August 2005, however, a complex permit appeal was
filed with the Tehama County board, which held numerous hearings on the matter in
succeeding months. InEnTec Medical Services LLC, No. 05-001 (Hearing Board,
Tehama County Air Pollution Control District, Request for Hearing and Appeal)
(Aug. 12, 2005). The author served as one of the attorneys for the permittee in that
proceeding.
In other districts, the hearing boards meet much more often. In 1983, the South
Coast District Hearing Board typically heard about 30 to 40 cases per month and
met three times per week. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRIcr,
AIR QUALITY DIGEST 2 (July 1983). The situation was similar as of 2004: "The
SCAQMD Hearing Board is scheduled to meet three days per week, Tuesday
through Thursday. . .. The calendar may have up to five cases in a single day. ...
The Hearing Board is always dark on Mondays since the SCAQMD is on a four-day
work schedule, Tuesday through Friday. On occasion, the Hearing Board will con
duct a hearing off site and evenings or weekends when there is an expectation of
great interest by a large number of people who might not otherwise be able to tes
tify." SCAQMD Questionnaire 4, supra note 11. The hearing board at the Sacra
mento Metropolitan AQMD in 2003 was meeting about once a month, although not
long before then it was meeting much more frequently and in 2004 its case load eased
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"Getting Through" to the Members

These basic facts about the composition of hearing boards are
significant for anyone, especially attorneys, appearing before
hearing boards. In each case counsel deals with an assortment of
from three to five board members who pose a number of possible
problems. One problem arises from counsel's inability to know
just how much or how little relevant background each member
brings to a given case. At one extreme is an actual conflict of
interest, in which the board member has active involvement with
a party to the case. For example, the member might be a stock
holder or employee of the air pollution source or a consultant to
it, or the member might be associated with another party to the
case, such as a citizens group which is challenging a source's per
mit. Such a member should not participate in the case at all. The
member presumably knows at least one of the parties too well,
has a stake or at least an extra level of interest in the outcome,
actually is or at least appears to be biased in favor of one party,
and perhaps also knows too much already about the facts.20
to require meetings only about every other month. Telephone interview with Sacra
mento Metropolitan Air Quality Management District Hearing Board Clerk (Aug.
12, 2003); Letter from Donna Fielstra, Clerk, Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality
Management District, to author (Apr.30, 2004) (on file with author). Often there is
an upsurge in variance case filings in a district when a new regulation is about to
come into force. After initial difficulties in compliance with the new regulation are
sorted out, the hearing board's caseload returns to a less active level.
Occasionally, when a hearing board is faced with a complex case requiring multiple
hearing days, the board may schedule two or three consecutive days of sessions,
although this may be difficult to coordinate with the members' other commitments.
The need for such heavy scheduling is increased when an external deadline-such as
an imminent effective date for a regulation or impending action by another govern
ment agency---creates pressure for hearing board action before the deadline arrives.
For example, the Bay Area District Hearing Board scheduled three consecutive
hearing days in order to resolve an emission credits dispute shortly before the regu
latory deadline for which the challenged credits were needed. Appeal of Southeast
Alliance for Environmental Justice, No. 3304 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Transcript of Proceedings) (June 14-16, 2000).
20. Some hearing boards have included provisions in their procedural rules that
address this difficulty. SEE, e.g., Bay Area AQMD Hearing Board Rule 5.14 [here
inafter Bay Area Rules] ("A Hearing Board member shall disqualify himself or her
self and withdraw from any case in which he or she cannot accord a fair and
impartial hearing or consideration."); Monterey Bay Unified APCD Regulation VI,
Rule 7.5.1 ( A Hearing Board member shall disqualify himself and withdraw from
any case in which, in his opinion, he cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or
consideration. "); and South Coast AQMD Rule 1217 ("A hearing officer or District
Board member shall voluntarily disqualify himself and withdraw from any case in
which he cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or consideration."). With or
without such a rule, hearing board members commonly recognize that at times their
participation in a specific case would be inappropriate. For example, in 2003 the
"
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At the other extreme is the wholly untainted member, who has
no prior contact with any of the parties and no relevant expertise
to bring to bear on the particular kind of source at issue. Obvi
ously there are many gradations of interest and expertise be
tween these two extremes.
The challenge faced by the attorney for a pollution source, for
APeD staff, or for an interested party such as a local citizens
group, is to communicate effectively with-to get through to
these people. Presumably the board is prepared to hear the case,
but its members have widely varying degrees of pertinent back
ground. To meet this challenge, counsel should attempt to be
come familiar with the areas of interest and knowledge of board
members as demonstrated in prior proceedings. It can be very
helpful to the attorney and client, as well as to the board itself, if
counsel is ready to respond to specific areas of likely concern of
the board members, such as the medical professional's concern
about the possibly toxic character of emissions; the engineer's
wish to clearly understand technical aspects of the polluting pro
cess or available abatement technology; or the lawyer's concern
about whether proper public notice of the proceedings has been
given21 or about the possible impact of other pending legal pro
ceedings related to the issues before the hearing board.
Santa Barbara County APCD hearing board considered a permit appeal filed by
The Boeing Company concerning emissions from marine vessels associated with a
regulated stationary source and used to deliver rocket assemblies to Vandenberg Air
Force Base in that county. "Of the 5 Hearing Board members, two recused them
selves. One member was an ex-Boeing engineer who was receiving a pension from
Boeing.The second was a retired Air Force Colonel who works for an environmen
tal consulting company that works directly for VAFB. A third Hearing Board mem
ber who works at VAFB(M-F, 8-5) did not recuse himself from the matter." SANTA
BARBARA COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT, MEMORANDUM RE CASE
No. 4O-03-P (June 19, 2003), at n.
1.See also City College of San Francisco, No.3409,
at 1-2 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting
Variance) (Dec. 5, 2002) (Prior to hearing, board informed parties that "a member
of the Hearing Board had previously served as a part-time faculty member of the
Astronomy Department at applicant's campus.... Both Counsel for applicant and
APCO voiced no objection to the member participating in the hearing."); and In the
Matter of the Appeal of Citizens for Review of Medical and Infectious Waste Im
ports into Tehama County, No.05-001 (Hearing Board, Tehama County Air Pollu
tion Control District); Email memorandum from William Murphy, Tehama County
Counsel, to John T.Hansen, Counsel, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP (Oct.
24, 2005; 3:22 PDT) (on file with author) (Lawyer member recused himself because
his son was employed by the law firm representing the company to which the permit
under challenge was issued). A fuller discussion of pertinent legal requirements
concerning conflict of interest problems is presented infra at Section VI (B).
21. The public notice requirements are set forth in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 40823-40827 (West 2006).
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Conversely, if the attorney overlooks the fact that some board
members know a lot less than others about technical issues, a
presentation of proof and argument at a technically sophisticated
level may go over the heads of the lay people on the board.
Counsel might hope to rely on the board members themselves to
take the initiative to point out their own areas of ignorance, but
this may be embarrassing for a member to do when counsel, wit
nesses, and fellow board members �eem perfectly at ease with the
technical jargon. Counsel is thus challenged to present evidence
and argument at levels of sophistication suitable to the various
abilities and interests of the board. Counsel should not talk
down to hearing board members, nor should counsel waste time
by talking over the members' heads.
A constructive approach to preparing for hearing board pro
ceedings is to gather advance information about the board's
practices and predispositions, perhaps by observing prior pro
ceedings, reading earlier decisions if possible,22 or inquiring of
22. "A hearing board shall announce its decision in writing." CAL.HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 40860 (West 2006).
In the HR&A study of the South Coast AQMD Hearing Board, it was recom
mended that future attention be given to the question of whether that Board should
"apply some form of the rule of stare decisis, so that the same question cannot be
repeatedly raised and re-raised." HR&A STUDY, supra note 16 at Appendix I, p.2.
Plainly no consistent reliance on precedent is possible unless a reference tool is
available that presents prior decisions in a systematic and accessible format. Hardly
any such tool exists, however, so it is virtually impossible for current hearing board
members in any district to systematically research prior decisions of their own or
other districts in order to identify relevant precedents that might be applicable to a
case under consideration. Instead, ad hoc reliance on the anecdotal memories of
members, district staff personnel, or parties seems to be the only recourse. As the
HR&A Study of the South Coast board perceptively noted:
Unlike an appellate court or most regulatory bodies, there is no composite written
public record of Hearing Board decisions. Consequently, neither Board members
nor students of Board operations can review such a record for consistency [among
decisions] except by laboriously creating a new record from the minute orders and
other decision documents and tapes that are available at the Board.
The operational effect of the absence of a written public record is that the individ
ual memories of Board members constitute the sole institutional memory of the
organization. The Board staff is not looked to for citations or other information on
substantive precedents ... . Counsel for petitioners and for the District now and
then cite some prior Board action in a similar case in the course of making their
arguments, but this is quite sporadic and no such argument can be closely docu
mented because there is no standard record to present or cite.
HR&A STUDY, supra note 16 at 44-45.
Similarly, there is hardly any way for an outside attorney or other person to under
take methodical research into precedents in preparation for hearing board cases or
for identification of prior decisions that could be cited usefully in papers or briefs in
current cases. To the author's knowledge, the only systematic research tool devel-
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attorneys-such as the APeD's attorneys-with experience
before the particular board. The goal is to know the board as
well as possible, to develop an awareness of the types of issues
with which the various members are prepared to deal comforta
bly. On those issues, counsel can proceed at a fairly rapid pace,
and the board members will welcome the effort.
On the other, unfamiliar issues, counsel must not hesitate to
offer fundamental, explanatory information. The parties also
should not hesitate to inquire, at suitable junctures during a hear
ing, about whether some of the board members would like to
hear such basic testimony and whether any aspects of the case
are unclear. The offer will be appreciated, especially by those
lacking experience in technical areas such as chemistry and engi
neering that frequently arise in air pollution cases. Similarly, vis
ual aids such as photographs of equipment or line diagrams of
processes can be quite informative for the board.
It is common for easels, flip charts, and overhead projectors to
be used by parties, and it usually is helpful to the board to sup
plement these large displays by providing each member with a
smaller, hard copy of what is being depicted. It is to be expected
that there will be increasing use of electronic presentation tools
before hearing boards, particularly in complex cases. For exam
ple, the installation of computer screens at each member's seat in
some APeD h�aring rooms, along with larger wall screens,
opens up new possibilities for presentation of evidence.
Even in preparing for hearings, the advent of the Internet and
computer resources has made life easier for the attorney or party
preparing to go before an APeD hearing board. For many years,
of course, some districts have published small pamphlets about
variance applications and procedures.23 As of 2005, however,
about three-fourths of the districts have websites, and most of
those present, in addition to district rules and regulations, other
material specifically related to hearing boards.24 Thus, it now is
not unusual to find on-line information such as a hearing board's
oped for this purpose exists at the Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP law firm in
San Francisco. It has developed a voluminous, proprietary database of decisions of
the Bay Area AQMD Hearing Board; this system covers that board's decisions since
1973, organizing and summarizing them according to a comprehensive index of sig
nificant issues addressed. The author is counsel to that firm.
23. See, e.g. , BAY AREA AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, VARIANCES AND
THE HEARING BOARD § 2 (Sept. 2004).
24. Additional assistance available through the California Air Resources Board
and its website will be discussed in Section V I (A) infra.
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procedural rules, schedule of meetings, roster of members, ad
ministrative support personnel contacts, fee schedules, guidance
about how papers are to be filed and hearings are conducted, and
minutes and orders from previous cases. The South Coast Hear
ing Board has even prepared an informative CD-ROM disk enti
tled "Understanding the Variance Process," which is distributed
by that board as well as by hearing boards elsewhere in the state.
In considering these observations and the analysis that follows,
it should be kept in mind that the procedures followed by hear
ing boards in some APCDs are rather formal, in the nature of
judicial proceedings.25 Others are much more informal,26 and
25. See, e.g. , Letter from Neel Advani, Deputy Clerk of the Boards, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, to author, (Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with author) ("All
hearings are conducted formally in the manner of a courtroom trial."); and
SCAQMD Questionnaire 2-3, supra note 11 ("Our hearings are conducted some
what like a semi formal courtroom trial. Testimony is presented under oath through
direct- and cross-examination. An audio-taped record of the proceedings is re
corded. The witnesses are subject to questioning by Hearing Board members. At
the close of testimony, the Hearing Board deliberates, a motion is made and voted
on, and the decision is rendered on the record."). See generally David P. Currie,
State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CHI: L. REv. at 27, 60 ("It seems clear that in general a
quasi-judicial hearing is a helpful means of ascertaining the facts relevant to the
grant or denial of a variance. )" . In the San Diego APCD hearing board, and per
haps in others as well, in one respect the proceedings are even more formal than in
virtually all courts. Not only is all testimony by witnesses required to be under oath,
but so are statements by attorneys.
26. See, e.g. , Letter from Sissy Smith, Clerk to the Boards, San Joaquin Valley Air
Pollution Control District, to author (Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with author) (reporting
that the hearing boards' meeting "setting is somewhat informal" and that "[d]uring
the hearing, the board members freely ask questions of either party and there is
often interaction between all parties present. It is common for the boards to allow
District staff and the petitioners to ask questions, offer rebuttals, and to make unso
licited statements outside of their formal presentations."); Letter from Robert L.
Reynolds, Air Pollution Control Officer, Lake County Air Quality Management
District, to author (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with author) ("If the hearing is contested
by the public, applicant, or AQMD, the hearings are extremely formal and include a
court reporter and attorneys. If it is not contested then it is less formal but witnesses
are sworn in, the hearing is tape recorded with minutes and a formal order fol
lows."); Letter from Thomas R. Fashinell, Acting Chairperson, El Dorado County
Air Quality Management District Hearing Board, to author (Apr. 27, 2004) (on file
with author) (reporting that more complex cases are conducted "in a quite formal
manner (Board of Supervisors meeting room)" while others "have been held in a
more relaxed atmosphere (conference rooms). "); Letter from Karen Nowak, Coun
sel for Antelope Valley Air Quality Management District, to author (May 2, 2004)
(on file with author) ("The MDAQMD Hearing Board tends to utilize a cross be
tween a formal process and an informal process. The petitioner [in a variance case]
is required to give a presentation regarding the necessity and reasons for the vari
ance. The Hearing Board members then ask questions and quite often a discussion
ensues. '" After the Hearing Board questions and any discussion the District staff
presents its position. . ,. The Hearing Board then discusses making the six findings
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some rely heavily on written documentation of parties' positions
rather than on live testimony. Although most of the discussion in
this article pertains to the formal approach, which the statute
generally contemplates, the differences among hearing boards
should not obscure their broader similarities. The objectives of
this type of administrative adjudication probably can be achieved
equally well through both formal and informal approaches.
III.
VARIANCES

A.

Variance Applications

The major statutory provisions governing variance cases are
sections 42350 through 42364 of the Health and Safety Code.
The first of these provisions states, "Any person may apply to the
hearing board for a variance from Section 41701 or from the
rules and regulations of the district. "27 Most variance applica
tions are filed by private industrial, agricultural, and commercial
operations seeking temporary protection from district rules and
regulations. In some instances, the statutory ban on excessive
visible emissions-section 41701 's "Ringelmann 2" limitation28and usually agrees by consensus. Then a rather formalized motion is made and the
Hearing Board votes on whether to grant the variance. )
In at least one district, the San Joaquin Valley APCD, many hearings are conducted
through video teleconferencing. This is done consistently by the Northern Region
and Southern Region boards, in order to avoid the extensive travel time-and asso
ciated automotive emissions-that would be involved if District personnel from the
central office in Fresno were regularly required to travel the great length of the
District to hearings in the other two offices. Telephone interview with Sissy Smith,
Clerk to the Boards, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District (Sept. 9,
2004). For example, on June 4, 2003 the Northern Region Hearing Board of the San
Joaquin Valley Unified APCD convened in Modesto to conduct variance hearings
and other business. Participating through video teleconferencing were an assistant
district counsel, two inspectors, and the board's clerk from the Central Region Of
fice in Fresno. See SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY UNIFIED AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Drs
TRIer, AerION SUMMARY MINUTES FOR THE NORTHERN REGIONAL HEARING
BOARD MEETING (June 4, 2003).
Government Code Section 54953, part of the Ralph M. Brown Act's requirements
for open meetings by local agencies, permits "the legislative body of a local agency
[to] use teleconferencing for the benefit of the public or the legislative body of a
local agency in connection with any meeting or proceeding authorized by law."
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54953(b)(1) (West 2004). As will be discussed below with re
spect to other Brown Act provisions, it is generally accepted that APCD hearing
boards are covered by the Act. See infra at Section VI (B).
27. CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42350(a) (West 2006).
28. The easiest, oldest, and most economical method of measuring opacity is with
the naked eye aided by the Ringelmann Chart. The Ringelmann Chart is a graph
"

.

containing various shades of grey coinciding with a dark plume of particulate emis-
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will also b e a subject of the applicant's request for variance
protection.
In addition to private applicants, variances are often sought by
public institutions and government agencies, such as municipal
sewage treatment plants, electric power generators, federal mili
tary29 and research installations, and hospitals. Procedurally and
substantively there is nothing different in the treatment of these
cases, other than some allowances for filing fee reductions or
exemptions.30
One requirement from which a variance may not be granted is
Health and Safety Code Section 41700, the statutory public nui
sance provision.3l This important limitation on hearing board
power must be considered in every case in which there is some
evidence of nuisance-type effects on persons living, working, or
traveling in the vicinity of the source in question. Neither the
applicant nor APCD personnel involved in the case should at
tempt to persuade the hearing board to grant a variance when
operation under the variance probably would create a nuisance.
sions of an indicated denseness or opacity. . . . The state standard of Ringelmann 2
or forty percent opacity applies in those districts that have not enacted a more
stringent regulation.
Crawford, supra note 5, at 624-25 (footnotes omitted).
The constitutionality of § 41701's predecessor was declared in People v. Plywood
Mfrs. of Cal., 127 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 859, 291 P.2d 587 (1955). But see People v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968)
(application of statutory Ringelmann limits to railroad locomotive emissions held
constitutionally impermissible as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce).
Enforcement of this section through criminal proceedings was upheld in People v. A
I Roofing Serv, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 151 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1978).
29. See California ex reI. State Air Res. Ed. v. U.S. Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271, 127576 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (confirming federal installations' duty to comply with "state im
plementation standards" under federal Clean Air Act), aff'd, 624 F.2d 885, 887 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980).
30. The statutory authorization for variance filing fees requirements is CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42364 (West 2006), with a partially redundant provision
at § 40510(b) covering the South Coast AQMD.
31. [N]o person shall discharge from any source whatsoever such quantities of air
contaminants or other materials which cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoy
ance to any considerable number of persons or to the public, or which endanger
the comfort, repose, health, or safety of any such persons or the public, or which
cause, or have a natural tendency to cause, injury or damage to business or
property.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41700 (West 2006).
The constitutionality of this section was upheld against a void for vagueness chal
lenge in People v. General Motors Corp., 116 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 172 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1980). Section 42353 expressly provides that "no variance shall be granted if
the operation, under the variance, will result in a violation of Section 41700." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42353 (West 2006).
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Similarly, the legislature has forbidden the granting of a vari
ance from a district permit system's "requirement for a permit to
build, erec;t, alter, or replace" polluting equipment.32 In other
words, a variance may not excuse a source, even temporarily,
from obtaining a permit to construct. This provision, however,
does not preclude the granting of a variance from some of the
specific terms of a permit to construct that already has been ob
tained, or even from the requirement to have a permit to oper
ate.33 Apparently the legislative conclusion was that · equities
sufficient to justify granting a variance might be proved by a
source which already has been given permission to construct new
facilities or alterations, but that the variance device would be in
appropriate absent the initial permit to build. If a source has
sought a permit to construct but the district staff has declined to
issue it, a challenge to the staff's action should be pursued not
through variance proceedings but through the source's prompt
appeal from the denial of the requested permit.34 For a source
32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42350(b)(I) (West 2006). The basic statu
tory authorization for district permit systems is found at § 42300, which covers per
mits that are needed "before any person builds, erects, alters, replaces, operates, or
uses" any contrivance which may cause the issuance of air contaminants. Permits to
build are commonly referred to as "permits to construct" or "authorities to con
struct," and permits to use are usually called "permits to operate." See, e.g. , Sacra
mento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Rule 201, §§ 301-02, available at http://www.
airquality.orglrules/rule201.pdf (amended Apr. 26, 2001); Mariposa County Air Pol
lution Control Dist. Rule 401, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/mpa/curhtmll
r401 .htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) ("An Authority to Construct shall remain in
effect until the Permit to Operate for that source for which the application was filed
is either granted or denied . . . . "). Other, newer restrictions on variance relief are
found in Section 42350(b)(2) concerning sources holding permits under the federal
Clean Air Act's Title V program and Section 42350(b)(3) concerning emission
capped trading programs. The former limitations are discussed infra note 155.
33. A legal opinion issued by the ARB interpreted Section 42350 to evidence "a
clear legislative intent that hearing boards are not precluded from issuing variances
from permit to operate requirements in appropriate circumstances." Memorandum
from W. Thomas Jennings, Staff Counsel, California Air Resources Board, to James
J. Morgester, Chief of Compliance Division, California Air Resources Board 3(Apr.
8, 1986) (on file with author).
34. See discussion infra at Section V(A). A statutory provision added in 1994
does afford limited variance relief to a permit applicant, even an applicant for a
permit to construct, when there is "a delay in the approval of the permit" despite the
applicant's "due diligence . . . in the permit process." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 42301.3(g)(I) (West 2006). This provision was carefully drawn to avoid sug
gesting that it undermines the prohibition of Section 42350(b)(I) against variances
from the requirement of a permit to construct. Indeed Section 42301.3(g)(4) ex
pressly declares that no such legal effect is to be found. Additional discussion of
§ 42301.3(g)(I) is presented infra at note 88.
The ARB has explained this provision as follows:

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 18 2005-2006

2006]

FAIRNESS IN THE AIR

19

that has not even attempted to obtain a permit to construct, but
nonetheless has gone ahead and built some polluting equipment,
the legislature offers no sympathy and the hearing board can of
fer no variance.
In the ordinary variance case, whether the applicant is a pri
vate or public entity, the goal of the application is the same: to
buy time for the source to be able to continue operating more or
less normally despite being in violation of a district regulation or
the statutory Ringelmann provision. Usually the applicant will
urge that it needs this period of time to complete corrective ac
tion to solve the problem. Given this objective, it might be sus
pected that variance applicants are trying to accomplish
something improper, to obtain a privilege contrary to the objec
tives of air pollution control. Such a perspective would be erro
neous. If the statutory criteria are satisfied, the applicant is
entitled to a variance. It might even be apt at that point to de
scribe the variance as a matter of right.35 The legislature de
signed this process to benefit and protect air pollution sources
that have good reasons for needing time to continue operating
without being subject to enforcement penalties. If an applicant
can demonstrate such reasons, it deserves a variance because
fairness calls for it and the statute demands it.

What HSC 42301.3(g) does allow is a variance to be granted from the underlying
rule requirement to install air pollution control equipment or meet a more strin
gent emission standard or limitation. It is not a variance from a permit, but rather
a variance issued to a source when there has been a delay in the permitting pro
cess, and this delay has resulted in the source's inability to comply.
ARB COMPLIANCE DIVISION, AMENDED ADVISORY No. 117(A), V ARIANCES FROM

THE REQUIREMENT TO INSTALL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT OR
ACHIEVE EMISSION STANDARDILIMITATION (Mar. 14, 1995).
35. See Currie, supra note 25, at 60-61:
[I]f a pollution statute creates a substantive right in the polluter to obtain relief
upon meeting prescribed criteria, contemporary Supreme Court opinions strongly
suggest that the polluter has a property interest within the protection of the due
process clause, and that he is entitled to a quasi-judicial hearing if his allegations
state a claim on which relief can be granted.

See also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLAN
NING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 176 (2d ed. 1986) ("The issuance of
a [zoning] variance is largely discretionary. . .. [However], when standards are clearly
met, there may be a right to a variance. . . . ) ; DANIEL P. SELMI AND KENNETH A.
MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8:24 (1989, 2003) ("One or more of the
legal requirements . . . deserve to be temporarily 'varied' or relaxed.").
"
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The Questions to be Answered

Since the application for a variance is ordinarily submitted by
the pollution source operator,36 which is in the best position to
explain its need for relief, the burden of proof should rest upon
the applicant.37 In the formal, trial-type procedures followed by
some hearing boards, the applicant thus presents its argument
and evidence first, followed by the APCD. The general question
the parties should attempt to address, and the hearing board
must answer, is simply this: Does the proof presented by the ap
plicant and the district in the case demonstrate that the applicant
satisfies the six statutory criteria for variance protection? These
statutory criteria, which will be discussed here in the order in
which the statute presents them, are listed in section 42352(a).
That section requires the hearing board to make "all of the fol
lowing findings. "38
The first three findings have been in the Code and essentially
unchanged since at least 1972.39 Generally they concern the ap
plicant's past circumstances and its justifications for claiming en
titlement to variance protection. The last three findings entered
36. Occasionally an application is presented by a third party, such as a contractor
constructing new sewage treatment facilities for a public agency, or a manufacturer
of a product on behalf of retail vendors subject to APCD regulations regarding sales
of the product. See State Indus., Inc., No. 2890 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Fmdings and Decision) (Mar. 23, 1983) (manufacturer
of water heaters); and BSP Division Envirotech, No. 613 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Variance) (Jan. 19, 1978) (con
tractor installing incineration equipment at sewage treatment plant). In 1994 the
legislature acknowledged the fairness and efficiency of variance relief under some
circumstances for a product itself. Accordingly, it enacted Sections 42365-42372 al
lowing "product variances" to be granted at the request of "any person who manu
factures a product" and who can make the required statutory showing. See
discussion infra at Section III(F)(1).
37. Customary legal considerations also lead to this conclusion. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 500 (West 2006) ("a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the exis
tence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief'). See also
MICHAEL ASIMOW & MARSHA N. COHEN, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 88
(2002). ("Generally the proponent of an order has both the burden of producing
evidence (that is, to come forward with evidence or suffer dismissal of the case) and
the burden of persuasion (often called the burden of proof).").
38. Narrowly drawn exceptions to the requirement that all of the findings must be
made are found in Code Section 42301.3(g) regarding permit applications that are
delayed in the permit approval process, as discussed supra at note 34, and also are
found in the Code sections pertaining to product variances, as discussed infra at
Section III (F) (1).
39. See Assem. B. 549, 1972 Reg. Sess. §§ 5, 12 (Cal. 1972). Earlier versions of
these statutory provisions, as applied by the Hearing Board of the original Los An
geles County APCD, are noted in Walker, supra note 8, at 401.
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the law in 1989.40 Their collective emphasis is on the future, i.e.,
on the applicant's capability and willingness to mitigate the air
pollution that would be created by its activities during the period .
of requested variance relief.
(1) That the petitioner for a variance is, or will be, in violation of
Section 41 701 or of any rule, regulation, or order of the district.41
This requirement is usually the easiest to prove and least debata
ble of the six. Ordinarily the applicant has received notification
from the APeD that it is in violation, or it may have become
aware on its own that it is not currently in full compliance or will
not be in the foreseeable future. If the hearing board is not
shown that the violation requirement is met, no variance can be
granted because none is needed.
The critical responsibility of the parties on this issue is to make
sure that the hearing board is properly advised as to exactly
which provisions of the district's regulations are violated. If this
is not done, it becomes extremely difficult for the board to issue
an order which clearly limits the variance coverage to the appli
cable provisions. With increasingly complex and occasionally
overlapping regulatory provisions on the books, it is important
that all parties to these cases, and the board as well, understand
exactly what the violations are. Often the APeD staff and its
attorney are in the best position to bring out this information.
This is especially true when the applicant is unfamiliar with dis
trict powers and is either unrepresented by an attorney or repre
sented by an attorney unfamiliar with APeD regulations.
(2) That, due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of the
petitioner, requiring compliance would result in either (A) an arbi
trary or unreasonable taking of property, or (B) the practical clos
ing and elimination of a lawful business.42 This second
requirement is often the most difficult issue the hearing board
must resolve. It is best understood as having two areas of em
phasis-hardship and diligence.
40. See Assem. B. 2595, 1988 Reg. Sess. § 30 (Cal. 1988).
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(a)(1) (West 2006); see als o CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41703 (applications to hearing board for schedule of
increments of progress for compliance with new regulation having a future effective
date or for modification of new regulation's schedule of increments of progress).
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(a)(2) (West 2006). The quoted lan
guage is the core of this subsection and has been in the statute since 1972. The two
additional sentences that were added to this subsection in 1992, by Section 1 of S.B.
1728, enacted September 29, 1992 as Chapter 1025, Statutes of 1992, are discussed
below.
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First, the board must determine whether requiring present
compliance would impose a serious hardship on the applicant.
This hardship is addressed by the phrases "an arbitrary or unrea
sonable taking of property" and "the practical closing and elimi
nation of a lawful business." In order to evaluate the alleged
hardship, the board is likely to be interested in evidence on such
questions as the nature of the applicant's goods or services, the
extent to which others could provide those goods or services if
the applicant temporarily could not do so, the size of the appli
cant's labor force and payroll, the amount of the applicant's capi
tal investment in the facility in question, and the ability of the
applicant to stay in business if uninterrupted compliance were
required.43 On the basis of this kind of information, the board
43. Santa Fe Enameling & Metal Finishing Co., No. 2536-1, at 3 (Hearing Board,
South Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Mar. 9,
1983) ("Failure to grant the variance would harm petitioner in that petitioner would
lose approximately 40 percent of its sales which would ultimately result in the clos
ing of the business which has taken the family 22 years to establish."); Oliver Rub
ber Company, No. 3141 , at 4 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Order Granting Variance) (Mar. 6, 1997) ("[D]ue to a backlog of customer
orders, Applicant cannot cut back on production during the lO-day period in ques
tion without incurring a significant financial burden, the need to lay off its employ
ees and without suffering a serious loss of business."); Darling International, Inc.,
No. 4061-7, at 4 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District.
Findings and Decision) (Dec. 16, 1998) ("Failure to grant the variance would cause
harm to petitioner by the loss of business if petitioner's customers are forced to take
their business to other processors in the basin resulting in the closing of its facility
and the layoff of approximately seventy-five employees."); Herman Goelitz Candy
Company, Inc., No. 3260, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Order Granting Variance) (July 1 , 1999) ("Applicant would experience a
hardship, because Applicant would be forced to curtail its operations and would
suffer approximately $27.8 million in lost sales and would be required to cut its pay
roll by $5.7 million which would significantly impact employees and the commu
nity."); Vertis, Inc., No. 3358, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Order Granting Variance) (Dec. 11, 2001) ("Applicant would
experience a hardship, because 60 employees would lose their jobs since operations
would need to be shut down. Also, there is the threat of possible loss of long-term
contracts, which would not allow for all of the 60 employees to be rehired.); Aera
Energy LLC, No. 752 (Hearing Board, Ventura County Air Pollution Control Dis
trict, Order Granting Variance) (May 17, 2003), at 6 ("Immediate compliance would
require Petitioner to shut in approximately 120 wells . . . This action would result in
production losses of at least 800 barrels of oil. Ceasing production would result in
revenue losses of approximately $18,000 per day from oil."); and Southern Califor
nia Edison Co., No. 1262-81, at 5 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment District, Findings and Decision) (Aug. 18, 2004) ("Denial of the variance
would cause economic harm to petitioner if Unit No. 15 is shut down and blackouts
occur in violation of the California's [sic] Public Utility Commission (CPUC) order.
Petitioner is required by the CPUC to provide power to the island and to minimize
blackouts and power failures.").

2006]

FAIRNESS IN THE AIR

23

can determine whether compliance would be a hardship. A vari
ance cannot be granted unless such hardship is proven.
The view of hardship just suggested is much broader than a
strict reading of the twin phrases on this point might suggest.
The strict view, allowing variance relief only when something
akin to an unconstitutional taking of property can be shown,
would drastically narrow the availability of variance relief. Hear
ing boards throughout California, however, for many years have
found the more expansive interpretation consistent with an or
derly and fair regulatory scheme for air pollution contro1.44
More recently, language was added to the Health and Safety
Code to confirm this view. Section 42352.5(a)(2) now broadly
directs hearing boards to supplement their inquiry into the hard
ship question by considering "whether or not an unreasonable
burden would be imposed upon the petitioner if immediate com
pliance is required. "45
Hardship alone is not enough to justify this second statutory
finding. There is also the area of emphasis indicated by the
words "due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of the
petitioner." This language requires the hearing board to make a
finding of some minimum level of past diligence on the appli
cant's part before variance protection is justified.46 If the appli44. See, e.g. , FMC Corp., No. 1166, at 5-6 (Hearing Board: Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Order Granting Variance) (Jan. 5, 1984) ("Applicant would
be forced to shut down a substantial portion of its . . . [f]acilities . . . , pending the
development of suitable complying replacement coatings. Approximately 4100 of
Applicant's 5800 employees would be laid off as a consequence of such a plant shut
down."); National Can Corp., No. 1080, at 3-4 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Qual
ity Management District, Order Granting Variance) (July 7, 1983) ("Requiring
compliance with the District's rules at this time would force the Applicant to curtail
operation . . . on the weekends, curtailing a substantial portion of its operations and
subjecting the Applicant to loss of income, loss of customer goodwill and possibly to
contractual liability."); Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. 842, at 4 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Emergency Variance) (May 27,
1982) ("Such a shutdown would also cause Applicant to lose a substantial amount of
business and deprive Applicant's customers of the products they need and utilize
. . . . ); see also Western Can Co., No. 1 148, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, Order Granting Variance) (Oct. 27, 1983) ("[W]ithout
the relief prayed for, Applicant would be forced to shut down permanently after
providing jobs and serving the community for some 64 years. ). A systematic analy
sis of this type of equitable discretion may be found in Peter H. Schuck, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Pol
icy Through an Exceptions Process, 1 984 DUKE L.J. 163, 182-92.
45. This provision was added by A.B. 3790 in 1992. See Section 5 of ch. 1126,
Statutes of 1992.
46. "It has been the practice of the [Los Angeles County] Hearing Board to grant
variance petitions when the petitioner is exercising 'due diligence' in bringing his
"

"
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cant's present and predicted violations, and the hardship
compliance would impose, are due to conditions beyond its rea
sonable control, a variance is warranted. If, in contrast, the ap
plicant's predicament is one which has been within its reasonable
control and which diligence on its part could have avoided, no
variance should be granted.47 The legislature has not offered va
riance protection for negligent, dilatory pollution sources.
operation into compliance . . . . " Willick & Windle, supra note 5, at 529. See also The
Sherwin Williams Co., No. PV005, at 6 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality
Management District, Findings and Decision) (Jan. 28, 1998) ("Petitioner worked
diligently to develop compliant marine antifouling coatings."); Jefferson Smurfit
Corp., No. 3212, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Order Granting Variance) (Mar. 26, 1998) ("Applicant showed that it had acted rea
sonably . . . . The company applied for a variance before doing the testing; the
applicant discussed the testing with the District staff; and Applicant did the testing
in an efficient manner, taking less time than initially requested."); Raychem Corp.,
No. 3216, at 2-3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order
Granting Variance) (June 11, 1998) (applicant's discovery of fugitive emissions from
coating line "was a surprise," and ensuing noncompliance, despite cessation of pro
duction and development of phased schedule for construction of abatement equip
ment, was beyond applicant's reasonable control); and Southern California Edison
Co., No. 1262-81, at 4 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management Dis
trict, Findings and Decision) (Aug. 18, 2004) ("Petitioner could not have anticipated
the equipment malfunction because petitioner followed established engineering pro
tocols . . . and has worked closely with the manufacturer to ensure that the equip
ment is operated and maintained as recommended by the manufacturer.").
47. City of Davis, No. 83-002, at 1 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano Air Pollution
Control District, Order Denying Variance) (July 26, 1983) ("The petitioner has
failed to correct equipment deficiencies under a previous variance."); James W.
Crawford, No. 2545 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District,
Findings and Decision) (Jan. 5, 1982) ("Petitioner has been aware of District Rules
and Regulations and has made no effort to come into compliance."); Mariana Pack
ing Co., No. 3047, at 2 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Order Denying Variance) (Jan. 18, 1996) ("[B]ecause of Applicant's own administra
tive neglect or contracting error, Applicant failed to purchase the NOx retrofit kit in
time to meet the January 1, 1996 deadline established by Regulation 9-7-301.");
Micrel, Inc., No. 3206, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Order Denying Variance) (Feb. 5, 1998) (Applicant failed to demonstrate
"that it has acted and is acting with reasonable diligence to comply with the regula
tions;" applicant "operated its semiconductor facility . . . without first obtaining per
mits from the District; conducted photoresist operations continuously for more than
one year without abatement equipment; and exceeded its permitted [12 months]
limit for combined POC and NPOC emissions by 1.3 tons in a period of 8 months.");
Vernon Textiles Industries Inc., No. 4933, at 5 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (July 1 , 1998) ("the delay in
achieving compliance was due to petitioner's failure to act with sufficient dili
gence"); Tosco San Francisco Area Refinery, No. 3268, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, Order Denying Variance) (June 17,1999)
(applicant, which failed to isolate leaking connections to stop the leaks and delayed
repairs until a scheduled shutdown, had not proven the leaks were due to conditions
beyond its reasonable control); Supertex, Inc., No. 3324, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, Order Denying Variance) (Nov. 30, 2000)
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Occasionally hearing boards have heard a contrary argument
about the meaning of the "reasonable control" language. They
have been urged to find that, regardless of an applicant's past
history of inattention to its air pollution control obligations, vari
ance relief is justified if immediate abatement of the pollution is
beyond the source's reasonable control. Similarly, they have
been urged to find diligence when the source addressed the emis
sions problem soon after the APeD cited it for a violation or did
testing which showed a violation, even though the regulation had
been in force long before then.
These kinds of arguments have been rejected, as they should
be.48 To have accepted them would make variance relief availa
ble to a polluter who chooses to wait until the APeD's enforce
ment efforts focus on it. If the polluter cannot then immediately
comply, because of obstacles such as control equipment construc
tion and installation delays, it would have a period of exemption
from enforcement. This is not what the legislature has told the
hearing boards to allow.
The inquiry into diligence can be immeasurably aided by the
readiness of district inspectors, engineers, and lawyers to provide
pertinent information. They should present in the hearing the
relevant district records about the past history of the source's ac
tivities, especially its history of contact with APeD enforcement
staff which should have alerted it to its responsibilities. It is im
portant that the attorneys for both the applicant and the ApeD
make clear to the hearing board precisely when the pertinent
regulations came into force or were amended into the version at
issue in the case. It may seem troubling to the board, for exam
ple, that the applicant has done nothing at all to control its emis("Applicant failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to this finding because
Applicant repeatedly failed to follow its consultant's advice regarding the proper
operation of its abatement equipment."); and Kushwood Manufacturing Inc., No.
4989-3, at 3 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Find
ings and Decision) (Mar. 25, 2002) ("the problems with product finish quality exper
ienced by petitioner were the result of inconsistent coating application procedures,
inadequate housekeeping measures, and inadequate quality control procedures at
petitioner's facility. . . . Petitioner's anticipated violation of the permit condition is
not due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of petitioner.").
48. To understand the rejection of these arguments, it may be helpful to think of
the metaphor of the purported marathon runner who only enters the race near the
finish line. That runner should not be declared a winner. See Malcolm Moran,
Doubts Rise on Woman's Feat; '/ Ran Race, ' She Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1980, at
B15 (questioning Rosie Ruiz's victory in Boston Marathon); Neil Amdur, Backtalk;
20 Years Later, the Legend of Rosie Ruiz Endures, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 16, 2000, § 8,
at 1 1 .
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sions over a five year period, but if the applicable regulation was
promulgated only one year ago and went into effect six months
ago, then the applicant's position on the diligence question is not
as weak as it might first appear.
As with the hardship inquiry, the legislature more recently has
elaborated on the factors bearing on diligence. . Section
42352.5 (a)(1 ) now mandates consideration of "the extent to
which the petitioner took actions to comply or seek a variance,
which were timely and reasonable under the circumstances."
This provision also calls for consideration of "actions taken by
the petitioner since the adoption" of the requirement for which
variance protection is sought. These clarifications confirm the
sensible, retrospective approach to diligence which hearing
boards already were employing.
District legal and enforcement personnel-in variance cases
and generally-have an obligation to aim their efforts toward the
quickest possible compliance, but the variance process also
should encourage them to have compassion for the applicant that
genuinely is in a bind "due to conditions beyond its reasonable
control." On the other hand, variances are not free passes for
irresponsible polluters harboring the notion that hearing boards
merely serve the convenient function of restraining zealous en
forcement personnel from making polluters' lives difficult. The
responsibilities of APeD staff members and lawyers to engage in
thorough inquiry into the "reasonable control" issue thus are
considerable, and attorneys for variance applicants should pre
pare their witnesses for this important area of concern.
Presumably the quickest compliance efforts by irresponsible
pollution sources will be forthcoming if they must face the ongo
ing prospect that the district's enforcement machinery can be
used against them.49 Fortunately it is seldom that highly negli
gent or irresponsible sources come before hearing boards; never
theless, the statute requires the boards to examine whether an
applicant's hardship is largely self-imposed and therefore not to
49. The principal enforcement and penalties provisions are found in CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY COD E §§ 42400-42400.6, 42402-42410 (West 2006). See, e.g. , A-J
Roofing Serv., 151 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (misdemeanor conviction under Section 42400
for violation of APCD regulations). To the extent that the risks and burdens im. posed by the enforcement machinery are small-either because the courts hesitate
to impose full penalties or because enforcement personnel do not press vigorously
for penalties in court or for substantial settlements-the incentives for corrective
efforts will be diminished.
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be relieved, or whether it is due to circumstances beyond its rea
sonable control and therefore deserving of official mitigation.
In 1992 the legislature added two sentences to Section
42352(a)(2). They supplement the traditional hardship and dili
gence inquiries with language tailored to public agencies, a cate
gory of variance applicants not usually concerned about their
"property" or "business" in the conventional sense. The new
language first clarifies that for an applicant that is a "public
agencY,"50 the inquiry pertinent to the hardship and diligence
finding is "whether or not requiring immediate compliance
would impose an unreasonable burden upon an essential public
service. "5 1 This latter phrase then is defined by a list of govern
ment functions that may at times need variance relief from air
pollution restrictions, i.e., "a prison, detention facility, police or
firefighting facility, school, health care facility, landfill gas control
or processing facility, sewage treatment works, or water delivery
operation, if owned and operated by a public agency."
This clarification is helpful, for hearing boards have long strug
gled to shoehorn the circumstances of these types of public activ
ities into the private business-oriented language of the Section
42352(a)(2) finding. 52 Nonetheless, the problem is not com
pletely solved by this amendment. There remain other critical
public activities which are not included within the "essential pub
lic service" definition but which can and do occasionally submit
variance applications, e.g., military bases, postal service facilities,
forest or wildlife management agencies, and even the Federal
Reserve Bank.53 Presumably hearing boards must continue to
50. Section 42352(b) offers an expansive, straightforward definition of "public
agency."
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(a)(2) (West 2006). The bill adopting
this new language is identified supra at note 45.
52. Compare University of California, San Francisco, No. 3344 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Variance) (Dec. 14,
2001) (applicant performs an "essential public service" in operating its Medical
Center and performing medical research there) with California State University,
Hayward, No. 3018 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Order Granting Variance) (Jan. 18, 1996) (requiring immediate compliance "would
result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or closing of a lawful
business") and San Quentin State Prison, No. 3006 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District. Order Granting Variance) (Dec. 21, 1995) (requiring
immediate compliance "would result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of
property or closing of a lawful business.")
53. See, e.g. , Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, No. 501 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, Order Granting Variance) (July 17, 1974);
The U.S. Postal Service, San Francisco Division, No. 505 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
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contort the pre-existing language of the ( a)(2) finding in order to
grant worthy applications covering these functions, even though
the new language omits them from the "essential public service"
category. The contortions are less painful now, however, because
of the above-mentioned gloss on the hardship issue offered by
Section 42352.5 ( a) (2 ) for all types of variance applicants. It too
focuses attention on the "unreasonable burden" that could be
imposed on the petitioner, regardless of whether it is a public
agency or provides an essential public service.
Another category of variance applicants which has received
special legislative attention is small businesses. The addition of
Section 42350.5 to the Code in 1992 emphasized the importance
of helping small business operators through the variance pro
cess.54 That section requires districts that offer forms "for use in
filing an application for a variance" to include in such forms a
notice to small businesses that the district's assistance is available
"in filling out the form and developing compliance schedules."
More substantively, Section 42352.5 (b ) charitably expands the
scope of factors the hearing board is to consider in evaluating a
variance application from a small business which emits ten or
fewer tons per year of air contaminants. These factors bear on
the hardship and diligence finding under Section 42352( a)( 2) , as
elaborated on in Section 42352.5 ( a) . They now are to include the
extent and timeliness of the applicant's attempts to comply or
seek a variance, the reasons for "any claimed ignorance of the
requirement from which a variance is sought," the applicant's "fi
nancial and other capabilities to comply," and "the impact on the
petitioner's business and the benefit to the environment which
would result" if immediate compliance were required. Although
these considerations are mostly redundant with other, longstand
ing statutory provisions, the reference to "timely actions to . . .
seek a variance," and the mention of "claimed ignorance" of re
quirements, suggest a more lenient reception is to be given to
Air Pollution Control District, Order Denying Variance) (Oct. 10, 1974); U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, No. 1987 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Order Granting Variance) (Dec. 1, 1988); California Department of For
estry and Fire Protection, No. 2801 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Manage
ment District, Order Granting Variance) (Oct. 27, 1993); Travis Air Force Base, No.
3061 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting
Variance) (May 2, 1996); and Onizuka Air Force Station, No. 3339 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Variance) (July 12,
2001).
54. This section, as well as Section 42352.5 which is discussed next, were added by
A.B. 3790, enacted on September 29, 1992 as Chapter 1 126, Statutes of 1992.
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small business applicants. Presumably the small operator whose
limited resources and expertise impeded its understanding of ap
plicable requirements, or delayed its filing for variance relief, has
a better chance of obtaining variance protection than a larger or
more heavily polluting applicant would have.55
(3) That the closing or taking would be without a corresponding
benefit in reducing air contaminants.56 This third factor calls the
hearing board's attention to the actual character and level of the
applicant's emissions. One way of interpreting this provision is
to say that it calls for a balancing of the hardship to the applicant
if compliance is required against the benefit to the public if the
pollution is curtailed by compliance. This is the classic type of
balancing of competing interests that courts have performed in
nuisance cases for centuries. 57 It is also very similar to the task
that Section 42354 requires the hearing board to perform in
drawing up the conditions of each variance order. Under that
section the board "shall exercise a wide discretion in weighing
the equities involved and the advantages to the residents of the
district from the reduction of air contaminants and the disadvan
tages to any otherwise lawful business, occupation, or activity in
volved, resulting from requmng compliance with such
requirements. "58
Since most of the job of evaluating hardship takes place under
the second statutory criterion, as discussed above, this third crite55. See, e.g., Cal West Equipment Co., Inc., No. 3044 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Product Variance) (Mar. 7, 1996)
(variance granted to small business applicant which "claimed ignorance of the re
quirement from which a variance is sought because the District had used Applicant's
product as the basis for the VOC standard and Applicant believed it was in compli
ance with the District's regulations."). More generous treatment of small business
applicants, however, should not be so unrestrained as to resuscitate the "Rosie
Ruiz" argument whose rejection is discussed supra at note 48.
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42352(a)(3) (West 2006).
57. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1325-1330 (2000) (describ
ing factors typically weighed by courts in determining unreasonableness in nuisance
cases); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 110-121
(1977) (describing the factors analyzed in balancing harm and utility that apply to
nuisance cases); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 116-122 (2d ed.
1994) (comparing rights theories of nuisance law to economic theories); and 1 KEN
NETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
LAND USE PRACTICE § 1.06 (2005). See also City College of San Francisco, No.
3409, at 1-2 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order
Granting Variance) (Dec. 5, 2002) ("If applicant shuts down its Boiler #2, the main
campus of City College of San Francisco would suffer major disruption affecting
32,350 students and 1,800 some employees. Students may drop classes.")
58. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42354 (West 2006).
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rion largely adds the mandate that the board take a hard look at
the actual air pollution involved in the case. The board needs
answers to questions such as these: Exactly what are the pollu
tants in question? In what quantities are they being emitted?
Over what time periods are they being emitted? In what kind of
neighborhood is the source located and what effects of the emis
sions are experienced there? What do we know about the health
effects of these emissions? Even apart from health effects, are
these emissions annoying or offensive, either by themselves or in
combination with emissions from other sources in the area?59
What is the nature of air quality in the area already? Will opera59. As noted above, such emissions might well constitute a violation of § 41700,
thus barring any variance relief. See supra text accompanying note 31.
Also, the ARB has examined the possible significance of banked or traded emis
sion reduction credits (ERCs) with reference to the balancing of interests under the
(a)(3) finding. The ARB concluded, "Regardless of the benefit that may derive
from the use of ERCs, the hearing board is not authorized to require the source, at
this stage of the proceedings, to purchase ERCs in order to enable the source to
provide evidence [for] the findings." Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff
Counsel, California Air Resources Board, to James Morgester, Chief, Compliance
Division, California Air Resources Board 7 (Jan. 27, 1999) (on file with author).
The possible relevance of ERCs to the (a)(5) finding is discussed infra at note 66.
ARB's view rested on the language of Section 42353 and the clear statutory plan
that only after the specific variance findings are made is the board authorized to
"prescribe requirements" applicable to the variance recipient's operations. Section
42353 is discussed infra at Section III(C). In at least one APCD, however, ARB's
position has not been followed, and the provision of emission offsets-either
through surrender of ERCs or through financial contributions to district emission
reduction incentive programs-has been expressly relied on by hearing boards in
making various statutory findings. See, e.g., Big West of California, LLC, No. S-0504R, (Southern Region Hearing Board, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control
District, Order Granting Variance) (Mar. 9, 2005), at 4-6 «a)(3) and (a)(5) findings
supported by determination that if applicant is "unable to implement a mitigation
approach during the variance period, they [sic] shall fully offset the excess NOx
emissions by funding local emission reduction activities under a District emission
reduction incentive program" with the funding to "occur at the rate of $15,000 per
ton of excess NOx emissions"); Pastoria Energy Facility, LLC, No. S-04-48R (South
ern Region Hearing Board, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, Order
Granting Variance) (Oct. 13, 2004), at 4 «a)(5) finding supported by determination
that applicant "has proposed to mitigate the project's impacts by surrendering ERC
to offset a portion of the excess NOx emissions, over one ton, released during the
variance period"); Spreckels Sugar Co., No. C-01-16S (Central Region Hearing
Board, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, Order Granting Variance)
(June 7, 2001), at 3 «a)(4) finding supported by determination that applicant "will
provide to the District ERCs equal to 20% of the excess NOx, SOx, and PMlO
generated from firing the boiler on #6 fuel oil.") In each of these instances, the
variance order also includes the offsets among the order's required conditions; in
other instances, the offsets are not identified with reference to the statutory findings,
but only are included as required, mitigating conditions. See orders cited infra at
note 92.
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tions under a variance make the air quality any better or worse
than it already has been?
The answers to these and related questions must come largely
from the presentation of detailed testimony by district witnesses
and the applicant's own technical personnel and consultants. In
some instances, this type of information has been presented in
connection with federal Clean Air Act requirements that a find
ing be made of noninterference with the attainment and mainte
nance of national ambient air quality standards so that a variance
can qualify as a revision of the State Implementation Plan
(SIP).60 As will be discussed below, 61 there has been serious con
fusion and conflict over this and other aspects of the linkage be
tween the federal Clean Air Act and California's variance
process. Whatever the correct interpretation of federal law may
be, it does seem that fundamentally the same type of information
as may be federally required is also called for if the hearing
board is to have a basis for answering the third statutory question
under California law.
(4) That the applicant for the variance has given consideration to
curtailing operations of the source in lieu of obtaining a variance.
This criterion requires the variance applicant to demonstrate that
it has considered solving its noncompliance problem through lim
ited operations and without a variance. This requirement thus
explicitly authorizes hearing boards to reject a variance request
when there has been no such consideration by the applicant. Re
alistically, however, it is hard to imagine an applicant that has not
at all considered-and would admit to this inattentiveness-how
it might alter its activities in order to come into compliance and
thereby avoid the expense and inconvenience of a variance
proceeding.
More importantly, the boards would seem to be authorized im
plicitly to reject applications even when there has been such con
sideration and feasible, not overly burdensome means of
eliminating the violation have been identified but have not been
adopted.62 An additional reason for rejecting variance relief
under these circumstances is the possible cost advantage the ap60. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); U.S. EN·
IX ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, VARl·
ANCES, VARIANCE ORDERS, WAIVERS, AND CONDITIONAL PERMITS AS
COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE REVISIONS TO THE SIP (July 1979) (on file with author).
61. See discussion infra at Section III(F)(2).
62. See, e.g., Supertex, Inc., No. 3324, at 4 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Order Denying Variance) (Nov. 30, 2000) ("[T]he Applicant
VIRONMENTAL PROTEcrJON AGENCY REGION
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plicant could enjoy as compared to competitors that already are
in compliance because they are quietly bearing the burden of
curtailed operations or increased pollution controls which this
applicant has not yet shouldered.63 This finding's main signifi
cance thus is that an applicant that somehow reasonably can cur
tail operations, and thereby eliminate its violation, simply does
not need a variance and should not be granted one.
(5) During the period the variance is in effect, that the applicant
will reduce excess emissions to the maximum extent feasible. This
requirement seems conceptually simple: The applicant must
prove that its noncomplying emissions during the variance period
will be reduced as much as is "feasible." Stated conversely, ex
cess pollution allowed by the variance must be as little as possi
ble.64 This seemingly clear message, of course, must be read in
statutory context if this finding is to have sensible meaning.
Emissions reductions "to the maximum extent feasible" are not
simply whatever reductions are technologically possible. The
feasibility limitation must be understood in conjunction with the
hardship and curtailment findings discussed above. The excess
emissions reduction finding thus focuses on emissions from oper
ations that are allowed to continue according to the "unreasona
ble burden" criterion of hardship under (a)(2) and that need not
be further curtailed pursuant to the (a)(4) finding.
The question, in other words, is whether reasonable emissions
reductions are possible jVhile the noncomplying operations con
tinue under the variance. To answer this question, the hearing
board has to closely scrutinize specific, and usually temporary,
mitigation measures that the applicant can employ during the va
riance. Such measures might include changes in fuels or producfails to meet this requirement because there is evidence that Applicant could comply
by curtailing its operations.")
63. See CALIFORNIA AIR" RESOURCES BOARD, FUNDAMENTALS FOR HEARING
BOARD MEMBERS 11 (March 28, 2003) available at www.arb.ca.gov/enflvariance/
boardmem.htm ("It should also be determined that the variance will not give the
petitioner an unfair competitive advantage over other businesses of the same
type. "). Cf Kushwood Mfg. Inc., No. 4989-3 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Mar. 25, 2002) (order deny
ing variance relief and stating "compliant topcoats, including the same topcoats be
ing used by petitioner, are being used successfully by other wood furniture
manufacturers within the District. The evidence indicates that the problems being
experienced by the petitioner are the result of improper application of the coatings
by petitioner, rather than with the compliant topcoats.").
64. Excess emission fees are discussed infra at Section III(C).
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tion schedules, shifting of raw materials from one storage tank to
another, or use of portable abatement devices.
As will be discussed below,65 hearing boards have long had the
power to impose emissions restrictions within the conditions of
variance orders pursuant to Health and Safety Code Sections
42353 and 42354. Excess emissions reduction is therefore not a
new factor in variance cases, or at least in variance orders. What
is new with Section 42352 ( a)( 5 ) , however, is imposition of the
burden of proof on the applicant on this factor. Essentially the
addition of ( a)(5 ) to the Code in 1989 emphasized the impor
tance of continued emissions reductions during variances. It also
eased the hearing board's task on this point by facilitating the
creation of an evidentiary foundation for an order requiring such
reductions. Now the applicant who fails to carry its burden-of
proving how great, or small, feasible reductions are-simply
should not be granted a variance because this finding then could
not be made.66 Rarely, of course, should this unproductive result
65. See Section III(C), infra.
66. Similarly, the curtailment finding of (a)(4) emphasizes a long-standing vari
ance consideration, rather than adding a new one. The applicant who was found
capable of reasonably curtailing operations as a means of coming immediately into
compliance did not deserve a variance because it did not need one. That applicant
could be deemed not necessarily in violation of the law as required by (a)(l), or its
claim of hardship beyond its "reasonable control" could be found unpersuasive
under (a)(2). The same result also would be compelled for a source that is allowed
by district rules to use ERCs as a compliance alternative, and thus is able to substi
tute the surrender of ERCs for compliance with ordinary emissions limitations. See
Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Resources
Board , to James Morgester, Chief, Compliance Division, California Air Resources
Board 7 (Jan. 27, 1999) (on file with author).
The ARB also notes that when district rules do not allow the ERCs option, a vari
ance applicant can satisfy the (a)(5) finding, as the legislature intended, only by min
imizing "the source's own emissions, since it is the source's emissions which are
'excess.' " The offering of emission reductions achieved earlier or elsewhere, and
then embodied in banked or traded ERCs, would not seem to be an acceptable
alternative method of making the (a)(5) showing. As ARB says, the (a)(5) finding
"requires an inquiry into the efforts the source will make to reduce its own excess
emissions." [d. at 8. ARB contradicts itself, however, by then stating that "nothing
in Section 42352 would prevent [ERCs] from being taken into account" by the hear
ing board "either with respect to the findings or to the terms of the variance," if the
source proposes "this method of reducing emissions if reductions at its own facility
were infeasible." [d. at 7-8. The better view-in terms of consistency with ARB's
own analysis of (a)(5) and with the overall statutory scheme-is to consider uses of
ERCs not as possible support for the variance findings but only as part of the vari
ance order's conditions, as discussed infra at note 92. Nonetheless, as earlier men
tioned, some hearing boards in recent years have incorporated ERCs into both
portions of their orders. See orders cited supra note 59.
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be reached, for the applicant's chore on this point is, as stated
earlier, fundamentally not a difficult one.
(6) During the period the variance is in effect, that the applicant
will monitor or otherwise quantify emission levels from the source,
if requested to do so by the district, and report these emission
levels to the district pursuant to a schedule established by the dis
trict. This finding, like the previous two, relates to the applicant's
performance during the variance term, rather than- to the ad
vance circumstances that precipitated the variance request. It
also confirms, rather than creates, the hearing board's power to
issue an order requiring the variance holder to keep close track
of its emissions and provide that data to APeD staff personnel.
Nonetheless, the applicant now must take the initiative to declare
its willingness to comply with a staff request for emissions moni
toring or other quantification methods and reports. Implicitly
this statutory section confers power on the district to make such a
request, to establish a schedule for the emissions reporting, and
to have the hearing board enforce the request through its vari
ance order.
Generally, any sensible applicant should be entirely willing to
express a cooperative attitude and provide a basis for this find
ing. However, there may be instances in which honest differ
ences of view may arise as between the applicant and the district.
For example, the district may request monitoring and reporting
on a schedule the source operator considers needlessly burden
some because of the frequency of the prescribed activities. The
source also might consider the requested monitoring equipment
and analytical methods to be excessively costly and unjustified by
the limited utility of the information they would generate. These
are the types of disputes the hearing board would have to resolve
before it could make the (a)(6) finding and write a fitting order.
C.

Orders

If the hearing board concludes that it can make the six statu
tory findings in favor of the variance applicant, the board's re
maining task is to issue an order granting the relief. That chore
has two principal aspects. First, the order must explain the bases
for the findings. Second, the board must set out the duration and
conditions of the variance protection, i.e., it must "prescribe re
quirements other than those imposed by statute or by any rule,
regulation, or order of the district board, not more onerous, ap
plicable to plants and equipment operated by specified industry
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or business or for specified activity, or to the operations of indi
vidual persons." 67 This provision empowers the board to devise
tailor-made requirements for the individual variance recipient.
1.

Explaining the Findings

The Health and Safety Code directs each hearing board to "an
nounce its decision in writing" in each case, and to "immedi
ately" file copies with the board's clerk and to mail copies to "all
of the parties or their attorneys. "68 The statute also mandates
that the decision "shall include the reasons for the decision."69
In past years, there was uncertainty among California's various
hearing boards as to the practical meaning of this requirement.
If the basic statutory obligation in variance cases is that the hear
ing board "make" the six findings, is it enough to declare each
finding in a conclusionary manner or must a much fuller state
ment of "reasons for the decision" accompany each one? The
better practice, now the nearly universal practice, is for the hear
ing board to explain in at least moderate detail the facts and eval
uations that underlie each finding.
A major impetus for the widespread acceptance of the neces
sity and value of such explanations has been pronouncements on
this subject by the ARB . As early as 1987, the ARB issued a
legal opinion which concluded:
The mere citation of Health and Safety Code Section 42352 in a
decision on a petition for a variance is not legally sufficient. Appli
cable statutes and case law require that the hearing board's written
decision must include a statement of facts, application of the facts
to the findings required by Health and Safety Code Section 42352,
and a conclusion granting or denying the petition . . . .
The mere recitation of the statutory findings will not be sufficient,
because the recitation of the findings does not provide the reason
the findings were made. The record must show that an adequate
analysis of the circumstances involved in each petition for a vari
ance occurred.7°
In addition to basing its conclusion on interpretation of the Code
provisions, the ARB also borrowed heavily, and appropriately,
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42353 (West 2006).
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE at § 40860.
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE at § 40862.
70. Memorandum from Margery Knapp to James Morgester (Nov. 10, 1987) (on
file with author). This internal ARB legal opinion was transmitted to hearing
boards in an ARB Advisory, dated February 18, 1988, entitled "Legal Requirements
for Variance Orders."
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from judicial decisions calling for local agencies' land use deci
sions to be supported by explanations of findings in sufficient de
tail to allow effective judicial review.?l Apart from these legal
bases for the conclusion, it obviously makes strong policy sense
for a hearing board to explain its decision welL This written ex
ercise helps to maximize the likelihood that the board really has
thought through all of the pertinent issues and reached a sound,
defensible result. Also, the parties will be enabled to understand
the bases for the resolution of their concerns, and any interested
members of the public will have a better opportunity to under
stand what has been done.
The ARB has added muscle to its opinion by occasionally re
minding hearing boards of ARB's power to revoke or modify any
hearing board's variance order. This authority derives from
Code Section 42362, which broadly authorizes such ARB action
"if, in its judgment, the variance does not require compliance . . .
as expeditiously as practicable, or the variance does not meet the
requirements of this article." This provision has been in the
Code since 1975, but the power it confers has hardly ever been
exercised.?2 Nonetheless, the state board often brings its author71. The most important of these decisions was Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Com
munity v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974). More
recently, ARB has found further support for its conclusion in judicial decisions
under the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et
seq., such as Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, 110 Cal. App. 4th 362, 365, 1
Cal. Rptr. 3d 726 (2003) ("CEQA has very specific requirements regarding what
findings must be in the record. Do not ignore the requirements or . . . you will find
yourself in the unenviable position of having your judgment reversed . . . . )
72. The ARB official with principal responsibility for variance oversight reported
in 2004 that "as long as I've been in the program (about 12 years) [we] have never
had to 'revoke' a variance." Email memorandum from Judy Lewis, Associate Air
Pollution Specialist, California Air Resources Board, to author (June 24, 2004) (on
file with author).
On December 14, 2005, the ARB did exercise its statutory authority, at the request
of district staff, and held a "rehearing" pursuant to Sections 42362 and 42363 on a
variance order granted by the Hearing Board of the North Coast Unified AQMD.
See Petition for a Variance by Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. 2005-3A (Hearing Board,
North Coast Unified Air Quality Management District, Findings and Order) (July
15, 2005); and CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
ON EVERGREEN PuLP, INC. PETITION AND VARIANCE (Dec. 10, 2005), stating,
"[T]he California Air Resources Board has scheduled a Public Hearing . . . to con
sider the following: A Rehearing of the Petition and Variance . . . . " See also John
Driscoll, State Air Quality Official Listens About Pulp Mill, EUREKA TiMES STAN.
DARD, Dec. 15, 2005 ("The hearing office with the California Air Resources Board
. . . was originally to consider whether to overturn a variance the regional air quality
hearing board issued Evergreen Pulp . . . . But an agreement reached between
North Coast Unified Air Quality Management District and the company asked in
stead that the term of the variance be cut short by four months.").
"
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ity to hearing boards' attention. More concretely, ARB fre
quently indicates that specific orders need fuller explanation, in
order to avoid exercise of the state agency's authority to override
or change them.73
As earlier noted,74 three hearing board members must agree
before a variance application can be granted or denied. It is not
unusual, of course, for there to be disagreement among hearing
board members as to whether there is a basis for making all of
the requisite findings. In those situations, the written decision
virtually always records how each member has voted. AdditionARB has characterized the language in Section 42362 regarding compliance "as ex
peditiously as practicable" as, in effect, creating an additional, "implicit finding" re
quirement for variance orders. ARB similarly labels the prohibition on variance
relief from the statutory public nuisance provision, discussed supra at note 31. See
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., FUNDAMENTALS FOR BOARD MEMBERS, availa
ble at http://www.arb.ca.gov/enflvariance/boardmem.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) .
Whether or not these two considerations are called "findings" of one sort or an
other, they are important enough that · the hearing board should address them in
each variance order.
A fuller discussion of ARB's various functions relative to hearing boards is
presented infra at Section VI(A).
73. See, e.g., Letter from James Morgester, Chief of Compliance Division, Califor
nia Air Resources Board, to author (Mar. 17, 1989) (on file with author) ("As you
are aware, ARB reviews each variance order your Hearing Board issues to deter
mine whether the provisions of the HSC are met. In reviewing variances issued after
January 1, 1989, we found the following variance does not make all six findings now
required under Section 42352. ) . See also CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD,
ARB VARIANCE REVIEW POLICY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE SECIlON 42352 (Mar. 8, 1991 ) ("[T)he ARB reviews each variance order
granted. It has been our policy to return variance orders that do not comply with
the requirements of Health and Safety Code (HSC) Section 42352. . . . If the vari
ance order does not provide the findings and the reasons, we will return it to you
with the recommendation that the order be reheard or that appropriate corrections
to the order be made . . . . ); Letter from James Morgester, Chief of Compliance
Division, California Air Resources Board, to Hearing Board Chairman (name and
district redacted) (Sept. 12, 2001 ) (on file with author) ("As part of our oversight
responsibility, the Air Resources Board reviews variance orders granted by hearing
boards throughout the state. It has come to our attention that a variance order
recently submitted by your Board . . . does not adequately address part two of
Health and Safety section 42352(2) [sic) . . . . Please note, future variance orders
submitted to ARB that are missing any portion of a required finding or with any
other deficiency will be returned by the ARB to you for modification or rehear
ing."); and Letter from Paul Jacobs, Acting Chief of Enforcement Division, Califor
nia Air Resources Board, to Hearing Board Chairman (name and district redacted)
(Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with author) ("Variance order #02-02 does not contain state
ments which specify the . . . reason for the decision as required by H&SC Section
40862. These statutory requirements are in keeping with the decision of the Califor
nia Supreme Court in Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles.")
74. See text supra note 12.
"
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ally, in some hearing boards it has become the practice for dis
senting members to append to the decision an explanation of the
grounds of their disagreement with the majority.
There are many good reasons for dissenting views to be ex
pressed in writing. These reasons have been explored by numer
ous scholars and judges with respect to the purposes of judicial
dissents. For example, United States Supreme Court Justice
John Paul Stevens has said:
[I]t actually facilitates the fair adjudication process if everyone
states his own conclusion as frankly as he can. 1 think it also serves
the purpose to let the litigants know that . . . their arguments were
understood and they were persuasive to some, even though not to
all. . . . 1 think preserving in the record of the opinion of the case
itself, the fact that there was a diverse point of view . . . may make
a record that will help at a future date when the same issue may be
again presented for reexamination.75
Justice Stevens's last point is of particular salience with respect to
the challenge faced by the attorney preparing to go before a
hearing board, as discussed above.76 If the attorney is to commu
nicate effectively with the board members, he or should must be
as familiar as possible with how they approach hearing board
matters. Dissenting views can be as informative in this regard as
explanations of majority views.
From this perspective, there is little or no reason for members
to hesitate to write dissents. There is, of course, some potential
for lengthy, inaccurate, and even intemperate dissents to be writ
ten, which may contribute to inefficiency or friction in the hear
ing board. In an apparent overreaction to such abuses, the
Hearing B oard of the Bay Area AQMD (BAAQMD) added to
its procedural rules in 2002 a provision indicating that " [s]eparate
dissenting or concurring opinions of individual Hearing Board
members will not be included in the Hearing Board decision/Or
der on any matter."77 No other hearing board has this prohibi
tion, which is both unnecessary and unwise.
Quoted in KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF
STEVENS 272-273 (2001). Justice Stevens has also
written, "If there is disagreement . . . about how a case should be resolved, I firmly
believe that the law will be best served by an open disclosure of that fact, not only to
the litigants and their lawyers, but to the public as well." /d., Foreword by Justice
Stevens, at xii.
76. See text supra note 21.
77. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 10.5, available at
http://www.baaqmd.gov/brd/hearingboardlhb_fllles.pdf (effective Dec. 5, 2005). If
this restriction were to be interpreted to allow concurring or dissenting members to
75.

1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN PAUL
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Duration

Both the attorneys for a variance applicant and those repre
senting district staff have important roles to play in helping the
hearing board develop effective and lawful variance orders. Be
cause of its expertise and enforcement responsibilities, the dis
trict staff almost always should have a position on whether a
variance is j ustified.78 Even in those occasional instances when it
does not, the staff still should be able to provide the board with
its views on the suitable duration of variance relief, if any is
granted. The district's air pollution engineers and testing ex
perts, as well as the applicant's personnel, consultants, and equip
ment suppliers, should be able to offer opinions as to the amount
of time needed to obtain, install, and bring into operation any
control measures the source will use to come into compliance.
Equally desirable is the staff's opinion as to whether the pro
posed control approach is likely to work. The hearing board
should not have to rely solely on the applicant's witnesses for this
information.
The duration of variance relief at times has been a point of
contention additionally because of uncertainty about hearing
boards' power to grant retroactive variance relief. There are two
types of variance retroactivity. First, it has been argued that vari
ance relief can be granted retroactively to a date prior to the date
of filing of the application. Presumably the effect of such an ap
proach would be to invalidate district notices of violation issued
to a source even prior to the filing. Many years ago, a Health
and Safety Code provision allowed a BAAQMD enforcement
proceeding in court to be removed to the hearing board. If the
board then determined that a variance would have been j ustified,
counsel for the district would have been required to dismiss the
court proceeding.79 The legislature's repeal of that provision
strongly implies that hearing boards no longer have any authority
issue written explanations of their votes in some other manner, separately from the
board's written decision, it still would undercut the value of expressed concurrences
and dissents. Not only would it be harder for the parties and public to gain access to
these minority views, but paradoxically their separate presentation could give them
more dramatic significance than a disagreement on the merits-a not unusual occur
rence--ordinarily deserves.
78. The appropriate weight to be given this opinion is addressed infra in Section
VII.
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24369.1 (West 1975), repealed by Act of
Sept. 22, 1975, ch. 957, § 10, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2138, 2141; Simmons & Cutting, supra
note 2, at 121-22.
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to determine in variance cases the merits of violations antedating
sources' submission to hearing board jurisdiction.
The second, more common retroactivity concern arises when a
hearing board is asked to make its variance order effective as of
the date the initial variance request was filed, even if that had
occurred weeks or months prior to the hearing and decision. The
BAAQMD hearing board adopted this practice in the 1980s, but
it was criticized a few years later by the ARB in correspondence
regarding specific cases. The ARB stated, " [W]e know of no
other districts which have adopted rules allowing variances to be
retroactive to the date of application."Bo In late 1993, the ARB
formalized its disagreement, explaining to all districts that even
though the Code "does not specifically address the issue of retro
activity," various practical and policy considerations led ARB
staff to conclude "that a variance shall be effective prospectively
only."Bl
Subsequently, ARB softened its position, recognizing that
under some circumstances it is fair and sensible to allow variance
protection to extend as far back as the date of initial filing.B2
ARB still emphasizes that "retroactive variances should not pro
vide a safe harbor for violators who belatedly apply for vari
ances,"B3 but it also recognizes that occasionally a considerable
period of time elapses before the hearing or resolution of a vari
ance application. Such delay can occur for reasons-such as the
board's difficulties in scheduling a heavy caseload or in assem
bling a quorum-having nothing to do with the efforts of the ap80. Letter from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Resources
Board, to Thomas Ferrito, Chairman, Bay Area Air Quality Management District
Hearing Board 2 (Jan. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
81. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, ADVISORY ON RETROACTIVE VARI
ANCES (Dec. 13, 1993), at 2, 4.
82. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, ADVANCED HEARING BOARD
WORKSHOP MANUAL 5 (Mar. 2003). See also Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk,
Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Resources Board, to Hollis Carlile, Chairman,
Southern Region Hearing Board, San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
District 10 (May 5, 1997) (on file with author) ("We believe the better view is that
variances are effective prospectively only, with any additional enforcement relief to
be afforded by the District in accordance with its exercise of 'prosecutorial discre
tion.' However, it is accepted hearing board practice in some Districts to designate
the effective date of the variance as the date the petitioner filed the application for a
variance.") See, e.g., Monterey Bay Unified APCD, Reg. VI, Rule 4.5, available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbu/cur.htm (last revised Dec. 13, 1984) ("If a variance
is subsequently granted . . . , it may become effective no earlier than the date and
time of the initial written filing.")
83. [d.
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plicant itself. There is little justification for leaving a variance
applicant in protracted jeopardy of district enforcement action
when administrative factors such as these prevent prompt com
pletion of the matter.84
Indeed, in recognition of the fairness of retroactive variance
relief in many cases, and to avoid unnecessary burdens on en
forcement staff, at least one district has adopted a sensible rule
suspending the issuance of notices of violation "during the period
between the date of filing for the variance application and the
date of decision by the Hearing Board." During that time, how
ever, "evidence of additional violations shall be collected and
duly recorded," and violation notices may thereafter be issued if
the variance is denied. If it is granted, however, no notices are to
be issued "except in extraordinary circumstances as determined
by the Air Pollution Control Officer."85
3.

Conditions

Beyond the important question of what a variance's duration
should be, another major aspect of variance orders is the operat
ing conditions to be imposed during the variance period. As
noted earlier, Health and Safety Code section 42353 requires the
hearing board to prescribe alternative requirements that will gov
ern the source's operations while it works toward compliance
with its normal regulatory obligations. Also, Section 42354 gives
84. In response to ARB's original objections to the BAAQMD board's practice,
the District's counsel wrote a point-by-point rebuttal to each of ARB's arguments.
Memorandum from John Powell, District Counsel, Bay Area Air Quality Manage
ment District, to Thomas J. Ferrito, Chairperson, Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District (Jan. 11, 1993) (on file with author). That document
concluded:
The net effect of the ARB view . . . would require applicants in many cases to first
seek an emergency variance . . . , then to seek an interim variance . . . and then to
seek a regular variance. Such an approach would be unduly burdensome and
costly for the applicant, for the District Staff, and for the Hearing Board. It seems
highly unlikely that such an unwieldy arrangement was contemplated by the
Legislature.

Id. at 3.
At about the same time, a member of that Hearing Board cogently outlined a com
mon variance application scenario in which, "even in the case of a diligent Appli
cant, the Hearing Board may not have sufficient evidence to justify the granting of a
variance until some months after the commencement of a violation." Memorandum
from Gail McCarthy, Member, Bay Area Air Quality Management District Hearing
Board (Jan. 1993) (on file with author).
85. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Rule 1-402, "Status of Violation Notices
During Variance Proceedings" available at http://www.baaqmd.gov/dst/regulations/
index.htm#regl (last amended May 2, 2001).

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 41 2005-2006

42

JO URNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

the hearing board considerable discretion to evaluate the equities
of the case in drawing up these requirements.86
Many questions arise at this point, and the parties should be
prepared to suggest answers. What emission limitations should
the source observe during the variance? Should specific altera
tions in production processes, schedules, or equipment be re
quired? Exactly what schedule of increments of progress should
the applicant be required to follow in order to come into compli
ance by the end of the variance period? These and other ques
tions must be resolved by the board as it issues its variance order,
and the district's expertise, and the applicant's intimate knowl
edge of its operations, should be brought to bear on them.
The statute explicitly requires any variance for a period ex
ceeding one year to have "a schedule of increments of progress
specifying a final compliance date."87 Additionally, variance or
ders may require the payment of excess emission fees, which are
statutorily authorized.88 These fees are linked to the quantity
and type of emissions discharged during the variance period in
excess of what regulations ordinarily allow. The setting of fee
schedules in any APCD is, of course, a statutory function en
trusted to the district's governing board, pursuant to Code provi
sions such as Section 42311; only if that board has established
86. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 67.
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42358(b) (West 2006).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 40506(b) and 40510 (West 2006) authorize
an emissions-based addition to permit and variance fees in the South Coast AQMD.
Although the Code is less clear about the authorization for such fees in other dis
tricts, it was held in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution
Control Dist. , 203 Cal. App.3d 1 132, 250 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1988) that emissions-based
fees were allowed elsewhere by the broad permit fees provisions in Section 42311.
The court stated, "The express reference to the possibility of using emissions as a
basis for the south coast district board's fees in section 40510 is not sufficient to
overcome the strong indications of legislative intent in the legislative analysts' re
ports pertaining to section 42311." ld. at 1 144. Implicit statutory confirmation of
the power to impose excess emission fees is found in Section 42301.3(g)(1), dis
cussed supra at notes 34 and 38. That provision allows limited variance protection
for an applicant for a permit to construct when there is a delay in the permit ap
proval process. It also declares, "The hearing board shall not impose any excess
emission fees in connection with the grant of the variance." Obviously this state
ment would be unnecessary if no such power already existed. It also has been sug
gested that excess emission fees are authorized by Sections 42353 and 42354, which
establish hearing board power to impose extensive variance conditions, including
requirements that would mitigate the impact of operations during the variance pe
riod. Interview with Judy Lewis and Leslie Krinsk, California Air Resources Board,
Sacramento, California (June 16, 2004).
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such fees, may the hearing board impose them in appropriate
cases.89
As noted above,90 the ARB has considered whether hearing
boards have the power to require the surrender of emission re
duction credits CERCs) as a condition in variance orders. In ef
fect, ERCs would be used as a means to actually mitigate excess
emissions in the air, rather than just mitigating them monetarily
through fee payments. The ARB has observed that, pursuant to
a hearing board's power and "wide discretion" under Sections
42353 and 42354 to prescribe requirements in a variance order,
"a hearing board could require a source to purchase ERCs as a
condition of receiving a variance as long as the hearing board
determined that this condition was not 'more onerous' than com
pliance with the underlying rule which led to the variance re
quest. "91 Assuming that somehow the comparative onerousness
of ERCs versus ordinary emissions requirements can be calcu
lated rationally, ARB's view seems warranted by the breadth of
the statutory authority granted to hearing boards in drafting vari
ance orders. In some districts, such as the South Coast AQMD
and the San Joaquin Valley APCD, it has become a common
89. For examples of district rules implementing these fees, see Bay Area Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist. Regulation 3, Section 3-301, Schedule A, available at http://
www.baaqmd.gov/dstlregulations/index.htm#reg1 (last amended June 15 2005); El
Dorado County Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Rule 606.3(C), available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/drdb/ed/cur.htm (adopted June 20, 2000) (a variance petitioner may be
required "as a condition of granting a variance . . . , to pay excess emission fees to
mitigate excess emissions"); Kern County APCD, Rule 305.1 ; and South Coast
AQMD, Rule 301(d)-(h).
90. Supra notes 59, 66.
91. Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Re
sources Board, to James Morgester, Chief, Compliance Division, California Air Re
sources Board 8 (Jan. 27, 1999). An additional observation offered by ARB
regarding ERCs and variances is misguided. The ARB says that generally ERCs
"do the most good for air quality when left in the bank." Therefore, it says, a hear
ing board may conclude in a particular case that certain types of ERCs-such as
"interchangeable ERCs"-"will not result in actual reductions in air contaminants,
and will not benefit air quality." [d. ARB's position on this point amounts to an
invitation to hearing boards to disregard or override st�te law, district regulations, or
both. If there are statutory provisions or district regulations authorizing the issuance
and use of ERCs, it is not within a hearing board's power to determine that this
policy has been written into law unwisely and to diminish the economic value of
lawfully created ERCs by selectively disallowing their use. ARB seems to be sug
gesting that the only good ERC is an unused ERe. If that view were to prevail,
there probably would be no ERCs created at all because there would be no incen
tive to do so if they could never be used. In any event, that is not the law, and
hearing boards do not have the power, in an individual case or more broadly, to try
to make it so. The author appeared as counsel for the holder of interchangeable
ERCs in the hearing board proceedings discussed supra at note 19.
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practice for hearing boards to require-or at least cajole-vari
ance applicants into surrendering ERCs. In the latter District,
for example, it is a fairly common practice in variance cases in
volving large quantities of excess emissions for ERCs to be sur
rendered in amounts usually equaling 20% of the excess
emissions.92
Another possible type of condition, the requirement of a per
formance bond pursuant to section 42355, should also be consid
ered in appropriate cases. The statutory purpose of a bond is "to
assure performance of any construction, alteration, repair, or
other work required by the terms and conditions of the vari
ance."93 A bond provides an added incentive to stay on schedule
toward compliance, especially when there is some reason to
doubt the future diligence of the applicant. A bond has been
imposed, however, only rarely in hearing board orders.94
92. Telephone interview with W. Clark, Compliance Manager, San Joaquin Valley
Air Pollution Control District (Apr. 11, 2005). See, e.g. , Sunrise Power Co., No. S01-16S (Southern Region Hearing Board, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control
District, Order Granting Variance) (May 9, 2001), at 4 ("To mitigate the excess NOx
and CO emissions, the Petitioner shall obtain and surrender ERCs equal to 20% of
the excess NOx and CO emissions generated during the variance period above the
noted variance levels. "); Hanford LP, No. C-04-06S, at 5 (Central Region Hearing
Board, San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, Order Granting a Short
Variance) (July 21, 2004) (" . . . Hanford shall obtain and surrender ERCs equal to
100% of the actual excess SOx emissions generated during the variance period.")
See also orders cited supra at note 59. In one instance, the Bay Area AQMD hear
ing board's inclination to require both excess emission fees and the surrender of
ERCs wa& objected to as unauthorized and illogical overreaching. The board then
recognized that although one or the other measure made sense, the imposition of
both would be inherently contradictory and, in effect, would impose requirements
more onerous than permissible. Only the excess emission fees were ordered. Chev
ron Products Co., No. 3382 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Order Granting Variance) (May 23, 2002). Telephone interview with John
T. Hansen, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, counsel for Chevron Products
Co., (May 5, 2005).
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §42355(a) (West 2006).
94. Davis Walker Corp., No. 520 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Pollution Control
District, Order Granting Variance) (July 7, 1975); Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., No.
509 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, Order Granting Vari
ance) (Dec. 23, 1974); see James Abercrombie, Performance Bonds (Apr. 25, 1980)
(paper presented at California Air Resources Board, Air Pollution Enforcement
Symposium, on file with author).
Occasionally a bond is required by an abatement order, although this too is rare.
This was done in a 1991 case before the B utte County AQMD hearing board. See
Louisiana Pacific Corp., No. 91-26 (Hearing Board, Butte County Air Pollution
Control District, Conditional Order for Abatement) (May 24, 1991). This order in
corporated a Stipulated Settlement Agreement which required the respondent to
deposit $100,000 into a specified bank "as collateral against meeting the increments
of progress set forth in the Order for Abatement." The Agreement provided that a
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specified portion of the deposit was to be forfeited to the District as a civil penalty
"for each increment of progress date or goal that is not met" and that the full
amount would be forfeited for other, more substantial failures. Although this provi
sion appeared to be more in the nature of an advance deposit against future penalty
assessments, rather than a means "to assure performance," the parties at times did
label it as a "performance bond." [d. (Release of Order for Abatement Perform
ance Deposit entered January 4, 1993) ("the performance bond on deposit . . . is
hereby released . . . .") .
In an extremely contentious abatement case in the early 1980s, the SCAQMD hear
ing board required the respondent to post "a bond or other financial security . . . in
the sum of two million dollars ($2,000,000) to ensure performance of the terms of
the Order for Abatement as modified and to ensure availability of funds to operate
and maintain air pollution control measures after closure of the landfill." Operating
Indus., Inc., No. 2121-2, at 13 (Hearing Board, South Coast AQMD; First Modifica
tion of Order for Abatement entered Aug. 2, 1983). Although the statutory author
ity for requiring a bond in an abatement order is not as clear as it is for variance
orders, such a provision was judicially upheld in the Operating Industries case. The
dispute and its resolution were described by SCAQMD counsel as follows:
[Olur hearing board issued the order for abatement requiring OIl to undertake
remedial actions at its landfill . . . . District inspectors subsequently discovered
numerous violations of the order and the hearing board thereupon required the
company to post a performance bond in the amount of 2 million dollars. The bond
was intended to create an added incentive for the company to comply and to en
sure availability of funds for installation and operation of emission controls . . . .
OIl filed a petition for a writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1094.5 seeking to
overturn the bond requirement. The company argued that the board has no au
thority to issue such a requirement in the context of an order for abatement . . . .
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge John L. Cole determined . . . that the hearing
board does have authority to require posting of financial security in connection
with an order for abatement and that such a requirement was properly imposed in
this case. Judge Cole reasoned that the general grant of authority to issue orders
requiring compliance with District rules provided adequate authority to require
posting of financial security, when there was evidence that such security was rea
sonably necessary to assure compliance with District rules. The court determined,
however, that there was evidence that OIl could not obtain a bond or immediately
post cash security in the sum of 2 million dollars due to its poor fmancial condition.
The court therefore commanded the hearing board to reconsider the form of finan
cial security which should be posted.

Letter from Peter Greenwald, Senior Deputy District Counsel, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, to author (Aug. 12, 1986).
See also South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. Operating Indus., Inc., Case No. C
466 425 (Los Angeles County Superior Court, Peremptory Writ of Mandamus) (Jan.
18, 1984). Thereafter OIl and the District agreed that the company would create a
trust fund with an initial deposit of $200,000 and would place a $1.8 million dollar
deed of trust on certain other real property OIl owned. The hearing board could
order use of the initial deposit for the emission controls required by the abatement
order if OIl defaulted on any of the order's requirements. 011 would use best ef
forts to sell the mortgaged property and deposit the sale proceeds, up to $1.8 million,
in the trust fund as well. "In addition, the District could force a sale of this property
if OIl was found to be in default of obligations under the order for abatement."
Thereafter most of the initial deposit was directed by the District for use in ensuring
"continued operation of the gas gathering and control systems at the landfill." Also,
in the summer of 1986, the other property was sold and the full $1.8 million was
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In short, close attention must be paid to the specific terms of
the variance order. For the particular source covered by the or
der, the terms of the variance are the law. Since the ordinary
regulations do not apply, the specific regulatory provisions in
volved in the case must be brought out with complete clarity.95
District enforcement personnel will have to treat the terms of the
variance as the law applicable to the variance holder for the pe
riod of the variance. These personnel cannot do their jobs, and
the source cannot know what is expected of it, unless the vari
ance conditions are clear and complete. The statutory responsi
bility for drawing up such orders ultimately rests with the hearing
boards themselves,96 but they cannot do it well without the active
assistance of the parties and their lawyers during the hearings.

deposited in the trust fund for further use in remediation of the site. Letter from
Peter Greenwald to author, at 3.
95. See supra text accompanying note 4l.
96. See supra note 22. The procedures employed for the drafting of orders vary
widely among hearing boards, and even a single board will alter its practices from
one case to another. In many districts, initial drafting of orders is commonly done
by a member of the district staff who has participated in the proceeding. Often the
drafting is undertaken first by the prevailing party's attorney or other representa
tive. In many instances, of course, a hearing board member or the board's clerk will
perform this task. Interview with Judy Lewis and Leslie Krinsk, California Air Re
sources Board, Sacramento, California (June 1 6, 2004). Ultimately, of course, the
board itself must edit, approve, and issue the final order.
For examples of pertinent hearing board rules, see, e.g. , Antelope Valley Air Quality
Management District, Rule 515 (d)-(e) ("Findings and Decision"):
Formal written Findings and Decision of the Hearing Board shall be prepared by
the Hearing Board unless otherwise directed by order of the Hearing Board.
Whenever parties are directed to prepare the Findings and Decision of the Hear
ing Board, the Findings and Decision shall be submitted to the Hearing Board
within fifteen (15) days after the date of the hearing. . . . Prior to submittal, the
Findings and Decision shall be approved by the opposing party. When parties can
not agree to the form of the Findings and Decision, a hearing may be requested to
determine the form of the Findings and Decision.

This rule tracks the language of South Coast Air Qualtiy Management District Rule
515. In response to the high volume of cases it has faced for many years, the Hear
ing Board of the South Coast District has developed many procedural rules which
subsequently have been adopted or adapted by hearing boards elsewhere in the
state.
See also Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 1 0.3 available at
http://www.baaqmd.govlbrd/hearingboard/hb_rules.pdf (effective Dec. 5, 2005):
,

Formal written Findings and Decisions of the Hearing Board shall be prepared by
the Hearing Board, unless the Hearing Board directs a party to prepare such find
ings and decision. Failure of any party to prepare a draft written Order upon di
rection of the Hearing Board Chair may be subject to sanctions as per Article 1 1 of
these Rules.
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Interim Variances

As with other aspects of air pollution law in California, the
statutory provisions on variances have become more complex
over the years. An example of this development is the splinter
ing of the variance concept into a variety of categories. One such
refinement is the interim variance. Another is the emergency va
riance. The presence of these phrases in the Health and Safety
Code has prompted the coining of names for other kinds of vari
ances not so clearly labeled by the legislature. For example, Sec
tion 40825, part of the batch of statutory requirements for notice
of hearings, identifies variances that are "to be in effect for a
period of not more than 90 days." These are now commonly
known as "short" or "short term variances." The phrase "short
variances" even now appears in one statutory section.97 Longer
variances, the main area of variance work, are usually called
"full," "regular," or "ordinary" variances.98 The lack of consis
tency in use of these labels is not a serious problem, for usually
people involved in a case agree on what they are talking about.
Section 42351(a) declares that a variance applicant "who
desires to commence or continue operation pending the decision
of the hearing board on the application, may submit an applica
tion for an interim variance."99 Section 4235 1(b) then states that
an interim variance may be granted "for good causes stated in
the order" and may not last longer than either the date of deci
sion on the underlying variance application or ninety days,
whichever occurs first. This preliminary period of variance pro
tection is granted on the basis of an abbreviated, initial inquiry
into "good causes." "Good causes" seems to contemplate a pre
liminary examination of the likelihood that the applicant will be
able to make a persuasive case for the requested, underlying va97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY C ODE § 40501.3 (West 2006).
98. See, e.g. , Mendocino County Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Rule 1-620(c), (e), avail
able at http://www.co.mendocino.ca.us/aqmdiRegulations.htm (last revised May 6,
2003) ("short term variance" and "regular variance"); Great Basin Unified Air Pol
lution Control Dist. Rule 602(E)(3)-(4), available at http://www.gbuapcd.org!
rulesandregulations/index.htm (adopted Sept. 5, 1974) ("short term variance" and
"regular variance"); Moj ave Desert Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Rule 503(e)(3), availa
ble at http://www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/moj/cur.htm (adopted Aug. 1, 1975) ("short vari
ance"); and Yolo-Solano Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Rule 5.1(402.5) available at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/ys/cur.htm (adopted Feb. 23,1994) ("general variance - 90
days or less" and "general variance - greater than 90 days").
99. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42351 (West 2006).
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riance protection when the full hearing is held.l Oo A court en
gages in an analogous inquiry when a preliminary injunction is
sought, focusing predominantly on the likelihood that the appli
cant ultimately will prevail on the merits, and also assessing the
relative hardships to the parties and the public if preliminary re
lief is or is not granted.101
Hearing boards occasionally provide explanations of the
meaning of "good causes." The Bay Area AQMD Hearing
Board did so in a 2004 decision, using language which reflects the
preliminary injunction analogy:
[A] finding of Good Cause is requisite to the granting of an In
terim Variance. An Application for an Interim Variance will typi
cally be set for hearing on an expedited schedule, one consequence
of which is the preclusion of a more considered review of the Ap
plication by both the District and interested members of the public.
Because of this, the granting of an Interim Variance . . . based upon
such a truncated procedure, should occur only when Applicant can
demonstrate both 1 ) that there is a likelihood that the six regular
variance criteria will be met, and 2) that significant adverse conse
quences will result if the granting of variance relief is delayed until
a hearing on a regular variance Application occurs.102

The board then denied relief on the basis that no showing at all
had been made by the applicant "regarding adverse conse
quences from delayed consideration by the Hearing Board." The
board rejected the argument that adverse consequences were
shown simply because "the Applicant will be subject to addi
tional penalties for noncompliance. " Even though the applicant
may be uncertain about the ultimate outcome of its variance re100. See Delta Energy Center, LLC, No. 3438 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, Order Granting Interim Variance) (Oct. 30, 2003);
Ray Nisson Warehouse, No. 83-003 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano Air Pollution
Control District, Order Granting Interim Variance) (July 26, 1983); Peter Kiewit
Sons' Co., No. 83-001 (Hearing Board, Yolo-Solano Air Pollution Control District,
Order Granting Interim Variance) (Apr. 12, 1983).
101. See generally D. Riesel, Preliminary Injunctions and Stays Pending Appeal in
Environmental Litigation, SI101 ALI-ABA 107, 111 (2004) ("Traditional analysis
has required the movant to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable harm unless the prelimi
nary injunction is granted, that the threatened injury if the injunctive relief is denied
outweighs the possible harm to defendants if relief is granted, and that issuance of
injunctive relief will serve the public interest. Indeed this is still the law being ap
plied by many courts."); and John D. Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Envi
ronmental Cases: A Primer for the Practitioner, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639 (1977).
102. Ox Mountain Landfill, No. 3463, at 3 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Order Denying Interim Variance) (Apr. 28, 2004).
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quest, the board said, "the granting of variance relief through the
truncated procedure of an Interim Variance hearing must be
based upon a more compelling cause." 103
On its face, this approach to interim variances seems flawed,
though on closer examination of its context, it probably is not.
The board says that satisfaction of the six statutory criteria-or
an initial showing of the likelihood of satisfying them-is not
enough. However, if an applicant can indeed satisfy the six statu
tory criteria, and especially the hardship and diligence criterion
of Section 42352(a)(2) , then it is contradictory at the interim vari
ance stage to conclude that no adverse consequences will flow
from delayed consideration of the regular variance request. The
same adverse consequences will flow at that stage as would flow
from denial of the regular variance. The most obvious such con
sequence is the imposition of monetary penalties, as the board
recognizes. Under the statutory language of Section 42352(a)(2),
the threat of penalties must be understood as creating serious
pressure for precisely the types of hardship that variances are in
tended to ease, i.e., operational and financial burdens on busi
nesses and similar activities.104 It is these burdens that interim
variances are supposed to promptly mitigate for protection of an
applicant whose ultimate position on the full variance request
looks promising. Accordingly, to require "compelling cause" to
be shown, including specific burdens beyond the usual burdens of
compliance, is incorrect. There is no evident reason to make it
extra hard for interim variance relief to be obtained by an appli
cant who otherwise is likely to prevail at the full hearing. lo5
Of course, as earlier mentioned,106 the Bay Area AQMD hear
ing board has long followed the practice of making its variance
orders effective as of the initial filing of the variance request. A
regulation in that District also protects the variance applicant
from enforcement action pending ultimate resolution of the vari
ance proceeding. Under those practices, if a hearing board
103. [d. at 4.
104. See text supra at note 42.
105. In Aera Energy LLC, No. 751, at 5 (Hearing Board, Ventura County Air
Pollution Control District, Order Granting Interim Variance) (Mar. 1 , 2003), the
board "found that there was good cause to grant an interim variance because there
is a substantial probability that at the noticed hearing in this matter the petitioner
will be able to prove" the six statutory criteria as well as the unlikelihood that a
nuisance or immediate public health threat would be created and the reasonableness
of the increments of progress.
106. See text supra at notes 80-85.
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grants regular variance relief and makes it retroactive to the date
the application was filed, then the denial of an interim variance
ultimately creates no unfair outcome. The Bay Area Hearing
Board's 2004 decision was based on the understanding of these
practices by the parties and the board. 107 Therefore, in that con
text, the seeming harshness of the interim variance denial ulti
mately could be avoided. However, in a district that does not
follow such practices, the "compelling cause" approach would be
neither lawful nor fair.
In most districts, the hearing board gives greatest attention in
interim variance cases to the reasonable control or diligence is
sue, the second area of emphasis under Section 42352(a)(2). 1 08
The board tries to ascertain preliminarily whether the applicant
has been diligent in discovering its noncompliance with district
regulations and taking steps to eliminate the problems . 1 09 If such
a showing of diligence is made, an interim variance can be
granted. At the later hearing on the regular application, pro
posed corrective measures and all other aspects of the case can
be explored in detail. Often the interim variance hearing pro
vides a good opportunity for the board to identify questions the
parties should research further so they can make thorough
presentations at the full hearing. 11 O
Despite the straightforward purpose of interim variance hear
ings, there are a few problems associated with them. One diffi
culty is the scheduling of interim variance hearings. Because
hearing boards are not in session full time, this may be a difficult
107. Telephone interview with Adan Schwartz, Senior Assistant District Counsel,
Bay Area Air Quality Management District (May 6, 2005).
108. See text supra at note 46.
109. The South Coast AQMD Hearing Board emphasizes that "good cause" must
be based on "persuasive evidence" that the circumstances leading to the violation
"could not reasonably have been avoided by Petitioner, or anticipated in sufficient
time to provide for public notice of the variance hearing" and that the petitioner
"exercised diligence in petitioning for the interim variance and scheduling the in
terim variance hearing." HEARING BOARD, SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGE·
MENT DISTRICT, GOOD CAUSE GUIDELINES 2.
110. The South Coast AQMD Hearing Board has stated, with regard to both in
terim and emergency variances, "Since it is sometimes the case that the Petitioner
does not yet know the cause of the event necessitating the variance, and/or the steps
that will be required to bring them back into compliance, the Petitioner is only re
quired to present the information that has been gathered by the date of the emer
gency or interim variance hearing. Complete evidence supporting the six findings,
however, should be developed and presented by the time of the short or regular
variance hearing." Id.
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matter.1ll In smaller districts, those with a population of fewer
than 750,000, the problem is less acute, for an interim variance
hearing may be held by a designated, single board member. 112
This further suggests that an interim variance hearing is to be
abbreviated and preliminary in character. Where this expedient
is not available, however, a question remains as to how long a
gap between an interim variance hearing and a regular variance
hearing justifies even holding the separate interim variance
hearing.
If the board's calendar is so crowded that it cannot schedule an
interim variance hearing until a date very close to the regular
variance hearing, it is not efficient to hold a separate, initial hear
ing, especially because the hearing board could later combine the
two hearings into one.113 It then could issue a regular variance
order, making it retroactive to the date of original filing of the
application. That would give the applicant the complete legal
protection it wishes, although it would not have given the appli
cant the interim peace of mind that the statute contemplates. As
earlier discussed, district regulations or discretionary enforce
ment policies may provide some such reassurance to an applicant
by suspending or deferring enforcement measures while a varI
ance application is pending.H4
1 1 1 . Cf. Willick & Windle, supra note 5, at 531 n. 137.
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40824(c) (West 2006). This provision also
broadly requires the interim variance request to be reheard by "the full hearing
board" within 10 days of the decision "[i]f any member of the public contests a
decision made by a single member." It is difficult to imagine that this requirement
would be frequently invoked, at least by anyone other than an unsuccessful interim
variance applicant. That applicant probably would not even need to rely on this
section, however, because of the rehearing right specifically afforded to "a party" by
Section 4086l.
A single member hearing is similarly allowed in the smaller districts on a request
for an "interim authorization," a temporary modification of a schedule of incre
ments of progress in a variance order. Interim authorizations can be granted to
allow continued operation of the source when the applicant "is unable to notify the
hearing board sufficiently in advance to allow the hearing board to schedule a
public hearing on the application." Whether issued by a full board or a single
member, no more than one interim authorization per application can be granted
and it cannot extend for more than 30 days. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
42351.5 (West 2006).

113. The Hearing Board of the Bay Area AQMD at times has combined the in
terim and regular variance hearings in a case if calendar constraints made it impossi
ble to set the interim variance request more than 30 days ahead of the regular
variance hearing. This approach sought to minimize unnecessary duplication of
hearings, recognizing that it is difficult to avoid repetition of information when the
same case is heard in these two stages.
114. See text supra at notes 80-85.
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Attorneys and parties in an interim variance hearing should
assist the hearing board in keeping the focus of the proceedings
limited to a preliminary survey of issues, and the diligence issue
in particular. Some applicants have a difficult time compre
hending this two-step process, which is understandable since they
are interested in getting as much variance protection as they can
as soon as they can. It is therefore often incumbent on the
APeD's attorney to assist the applicant and the hearing board in
keeping the interim variance hearings directed toward the useful,
but limited, protection the legislature designed the interim vari
ance device to provide.
E.

Emergency Variances

Since 1975, Section 42359 has contained a vague reference to
the possibility of dispensing with ordinary notice and hearing re
quirements for variances "in the case of an emergency."115 A
few years later, section 42359.5 expanded hearing board powers
in all districts to deal with emergencies.116 That section now re
fers to "an emergency variance" which may be granted by a des
ignated single member of a board "without notice and hearing."
Such an emergency variance may be issued for "good cause, in
cluding, but not limited to, a breakdown condition."117 The max
imum length of an emergency variance, however, is thirty days.
Under these provisions each district now has flexibility to cre
ate an efficient and simple process for dealing with emergencies,
especially breakdowns.11 B An approach followed in some dis1 15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359 (West 2006) was added in 1975. Act
of Sept. 22, 1975, ch. 957, § 12, 1 975 Cal. Stat. 2138, 2186.
1 16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359.5 (West 2006) was added in 1976,
Act of Sept. 6, 1976, ch. 773, § 1 , 1976 Cal. Stat. 1814, but originally only applied to
the San Diego County APCD. It was amended in 1979 to apply to all districts. Act of
July 10, 1979, ch. 239, § 5, 1979 Cal. Stat. 494, 495.
1 17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42359.5 (West 2006). As mentioned supra
note 1 1 , alternate hearing board members are barred by Section 40800 from holding
single member emergency variance hearings.
1 18. "Breakdown condition" is not statutorily defined. District regulations, how
ever, often provide a definition. See, e.g., Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Regu
lation 1-208, available at http://www.baaqmd.gov/dsUregulations/index.htm#regl
(last amended May 2, 2001) (defining "breakdown" as "[a]ny unforeseeable failure
or malfunction of any air pollution control equipment or operating equipment which
causes a violation . . . where such failure or malfunction" is not the result of intent,
neglect, or improper maintenance, and is neither a nuisance nor an "excessively re
current breakdown of the same equipment."). On May 25, 2001 , Section 42359.6
was added to the Health & Safety Code as an urgency measure to clarify and
broaden the ability of facilities to receive emergency variances during the electrical
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tricts is to allow an applicant to "file" its request for emergency
relief by telephone.119 An immediate series of telephone calls,
involving the applicant, district staff, and a designated hearing
board member, can produce a decision within a few hours. In
this process, the pivotal importance of the hearing board clerk
and other administrative personnel in facilitating, and keeping an
accurate record of, telephone deliberations and decisions on
emergency variances cannot be underestimated.
The telephone procedure has been used in a great variety of
cases. For example, it was resorted to frequently by gasoline ser
vice station operators who experienced difficulties with compo
nents of vapor recovery systems and would have been subject to
stringent, immediate sanctions in the absence of variance re
lief.120 One advantage of this approach is that it allows for the
possibility of imposing immediate conditions on a source while
the emergency is still occurring. Other districts, while recogniz
ing the importance of swift action on emergency variance re
quests, choose not to hear them by telephone, but instead make
sure that a board member is available on short notice to conduct
a hearing in person and render a prompt decision. This is the
practice, for example, followed by the San Diego APeD Hearing
Board.121
In emergency variance cases in which a swift decision turns out
not to be critical, or necessary information cannot be obtained
from district staff and the applicant to enable the designated
member to make an informed decision immediately, hearing
energy crisis then facing California. The section emphasized that "a breakdown con
dition includes" the startup or shutdown of a facility operating under an inter
ruptible power program contract, or the failure of a facility to operate air emission
control equipment, if either situation was caused by a power interruption or curtail
ment initiated by the state's Independent System Operator or a public utility. By its
terms, the section expired on January 1, 2003.
1 19. See, e.g., Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 2.5.d, avail
able at http://www.baaqmd.govlbrdlhearingboardlhb_rules.pdf (effective Dec. 5,
2005) ("An applicant may convey a request for an emergency variance to the Clerk
by telephone or in person."); and San Diego APCD Hearing Board Rule 10(d) ("A
request for an emergency variance shall be initiated by calling or contacting the Air
Pollution Control Officer. A petition shall be filed . . . not later than the second
working day following the initial contact.").
120. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41960.2(d) (West 2006).
121. See San Diego Air Pollution Control District Rule 97 (1995), qvailable at
http://www.sdapcd.orgirules/rules/Reg5pdflR97.pdf.; and SAN DIEGO AIR POLLU·
TION CONTROL DISTRICf HEARING BOARD, MINUTES OF THE EMERGENCY V ARI
ANCE HEARING, (June 8, 2004) (regarding Petition for Emergency Variance of Duke
Energy South Bay LLC, No. 3919). The author appeared as counsel for the appli
cant in that proceeding.
.
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board procedures may allow for an initial telephone filing, a writ
ten filing soon thereafter, and a deferred decision. Within a few
weeks of the initial request, the full board can review the matter
and hold a hearing just as it would in any short term variance
case.122 The whole incident then can be thoroughly examined by
the board, and retroactive variance relief can be granted if
warranted.
Some districts have adopted regulations that deal in two steps
with emergencies based on breakdowns. The first step allows the
source to promptly notify district staff of the breakdown problem
and to have a short grace period-usually no more time than the
sooner of the end of the production run or a specified number of
hours such as 24 or 48-in which to eliminate the problem with
out enforcement action being taken by the district.123 If, how
ever, the problem cannot be resolved within the designated
breakdown allowance, the emergency variance process then can
be used.124
Although emergency variance procedures are a marked depar
ture from the notice and hearing requirements that traditionally
have characterized hearing board work, they are a useful supple
ment to the administrative adjudication format the boards usu
ally follow. The legislature has directed the hearing boards to
stand ready to promptly listen and respond to the needs of air
polluters encountering sudden noncompliance circumstances.
The legislature apparently understands the wisdom and fairness
in the adage "Justice delayed is justice denied."125

122. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40501.3 (West 2006), added in 1981, autho
rizes single member hearings in the South Coast AQMD in emergency, interim, or
"short variances" cases on the stipulation of the parties. Because of the unique fre
quency with which that hearing board meets, it would seem that much of its emer
gency variance work can be handled in prompt hearings.
123. Occasionally it is asserted that this approach improperly creates an "adminis
trative variance."
124. See, e.g. , Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Rule 602, §§ 301-04,
available at http://www.airquality.orglrules/rule602.pdf (amended Dec. 6, 1978); and
San Luis Obispo County Air Pollution Control District Rule 107 (1995), available at
http://www.arb.ca.govIDRDB/SLO/CURHTMLlR107.htm.
125. JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 472 (Justin Kaplan
ed., 17th ed. 2002) .
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Variance Variations
1.

Product Variances

Occasionally hearing boards receive variance requests filed by
one person on behalf of others. As earlier noted,126 some of
these requests have been made by a manufacturer of a product
on behalf of its customers, usually distributors or users of the
product. The basis for the request is that sale or use of the prod
uct would constitute a violation of APeD regulations governing
pollution-causing characteristics of the product. The most com
mon types of products have been paints, coatings, and adhesives,
which are the subject of numerous, increasingly stringent limita
tions on their ingredients.u7 In view of the large numbers of af
fected-often small business-customers, the financial and
logistical burdens of the variance process, and the damage to
good will suffered by a manufacturer which is distributing prod
ucts that jeopardize its customers' legal status, it is not surprising
that manufacturers have taken the initiative to try to obtain vari
ance protection for others affected by their noncomplying
products.
Prior to 1994, hearing boards relied on the basic statutory cri
teria for variances in order to grant such relief at the behest of
manufacturers. In September of that year, however, an urgency
measure removed any doubt about whether hearing boards have
the power to grant variances to manufacturers of noncomplying
126. Supra Section III(B) n. 36.
127. See, e.g. , International Paint, Inc. (Interlux Division), No. 3431 (Hearing
Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Extension of
Product Variance) (Aug. 9, 2004) (fiberglass sOlvent). Cf State Industries., Inc., No.
2890, at 4 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Order
Granting Regular Variance) (Mar. 23, 1983) ("Said variance is granted to wholesal
ers, retailers and installers which offer State, Rheem or American water heaters for
sale in the District, whether or not such wholesalers, retailers or installers appeared
in these proceedings.") With respect to the gas-fired water heaters at issue, which
violated restrictions on nitrogen oxides emissions, the discerning hearing board
which granted relief to the manufacturers' customers soon denied relief to one of the
manufacturers itself. Rheem Manufacturing Co., No. 2887-9, at 4 (Hearing Board,
South Coast Air Quality Management District, Order Denying Variance) (Apr. 19,
1983) ("At least three water heater manufacturers other than Rheem (American
Appliance Corp., State Industries and Amtrol) claim to have developed full lines of
complying water heaters . . . . [P]etitioner has not taken steps in a reasonably expe
ditious manner to achieve compliance. In particular, we note that [its] program for
evaluation of alternate burner designs was not commenced until . . . well over three
years after adoption of the Rule. ).
"
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products.128 Another new variance category, "product vari
ances," was created within a new batch of Health and Safety
Code provisions.129 Although these provisions are not frequently
invoked,13° they offer a more efficient and forthright way of
adapting hearing board functions to the peculiarities and exigen
cies of these types of cases when they arise.
In most respects the statutory provisions are close adaptations
of the basic statutory approach. For example, the petitioner must
demonstrate that the product is or will be in violation, requiring
compliance would impose hardship due to conditions beyond the
128. A.B. 2680, 1994 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). See Memorandum
from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Resources Board, to Hollis
B. Carlile, Chairman, Southern Region Hearing Board, San Joaquin Valley Unified
Air Pollution Control District 28 (May 5, 1997) (on file with author) ("The standard
variance provisions did not quite fit the product situation, but served as the basis for
the findings and conditions for granting product variances.").
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42365-42372 (West 2006). Prior to the
enactment of these provisions, these types of cases occasionally were classified by
hearing boards as "class action" variances or "group variances." Although such
cases can be handled more efficiently now under the product variance category,
some districts still include provisions in their procedural rules for other situations in
which the class or group variance approach may be suitable. See, e.g., Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., Regulation VI, Rule 7.10, available at http://
www . arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbu/cur.htm (last revised Dec. 13, 1984), which states:
Validity of Class Action: As soon as practicable after the commencement of a
proceeding brought as a class action, the Hearing Board shall determine whether it
may properly be so maintained and may, if necessary, hold a hearing with respect
to this determination prior to the initiation of hearings on the merits of the
application.
Bay Area AQMD Hearing Board Rule 2.7 sets forth in considerable detail the pro
cedures to be followed for this type of class action variance filing, although such
cases are labeled as "Group Variances." The latter terminology also is employed in
the South Coast AQMD. South Coast AQMD, Rule 303(j) ("Group Variance
Fees").
130. See, e.g. , The Sherwin Williams Co., No. PV005 (Hearing Board, South Coast
Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Jan. 28, 1998 and Nov.
24, 1998) (marine antifouling coatings); Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,
No. 2937 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order
Granting Product Variance) (June 1, 1995) (adhesive for pavement marking tape,
symbols and legends). The enactment of a new district regulation can prompt the
filing of a flurry of product variance applications by manufacturers facing compli
ance difficulties. See, e.g., TACC, No. 3300 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Order Granting Product Variance) (May 11, 2000) (contact
bond adhesive); Level One Contact Adhesives, Inc., No. 3303 (Hearing Board, Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Product Variance) (May 11,
2000) (contact bond adhesive); Wilsonart International, Inc., No. 3295 (Hearing
Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Granting Product Vari
ance) (Apr. 6, 2000) (contact bond adhesive). As of mid-2005, the South Coast
AQMD Hearing Board reported that it "seldom" received product variance applica
tions. Interview with South Coast Air Quality Management District Hearing Board,
Diamond Bar, California (June 14, 2005).
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petitioner's reasonable control, and the hardship would be with
out a corresponding benefit in reducing air contaminants.131 The
duration of a product variance is generally limited to one year
but may cover two years if a schedule of increments of progress
and final compliance date are included. Extensions also are al
lowed for good cause.132
The most curious and distinctive of these statutory sections
provides that if a hearing board grants a product variance and
specifies that "the only way to achieve compliance will be for the
district to adopt or amend a rule or regulation," then the air pol
lution control officer must set a public hearing before the district
governing board and recommend whether the regulation should
be amended. The governing board then must act within one year
of the variance order, either by amending the regulation or de
termining that a change is not warranted.133 There is a certain
Alice in Wonderland quality to this provision. What the hearing
board is allowed to do obviously is not to specify how "compli
ance" can be achieved. Rather, the board can trigger a process
that could change the regulation so that the manufacturer's prod
uct gets a new chance to comply, but with a different set of legal
requirements.
Although oddly constructed, the provision's basic notion is
sound. If the hearing board has delved into the capability of a
product to comply with a district regulation and has concluded
that compliance is not possible, the governing board should know
about this finding. It also probably should look again into the
wisdom and feasibility of its original enactment.
In fact it is not uncommon in product variance cases for the
possibility of an amendment to the pertinent regulation already
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42368(a)(1)-(3). It also must be
shown that the applicant "exercised due diligence in attempting to locate, research,
or develop a product that is in compliance with district rules and regulations." [d. at
§ 42368(a)(4). The South Coast AQMD Hearing Board has found this provision
particularly difficult to address when "a competitor of the petitioner has appeared or
sent written comments opposing the variance on the ground that the competitor
makes a product that complied with applicable District rules." SCAQMD QUES.
TIONNAIRE, supra note 1 1 , at 7. The challenge the board faces is to determine
whether the competitor's assertions are validated by actual and substantial usage of
the product.
A product variance cannot be granted from a preconstruction permit requirement or
where use of the product would result in a nuisance. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 42367, 42369(a).
132. [d. at § 42372(a)-(b).
133. Id. at 42372(c).
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to be under consideration by the staff, and even the governing
board, while the variance request is pending.134 It is important,
however, as the ARB has stated, that the hearing board not
"usurp the authority of the District governing board by engaging
in rulemaking. "135 It is not the hearing board's function to sec
ond-guess or undercut the legislative enactments of the gov
erning board. If product variances were granted without a clear
demonstration of all the factors required by the provisions added
in 1994, such usurpation of authority might in effect come to
pass. Product variance cases may indeed raise questions about
the ultimate feasibility of compliance more strongly and urgently
than other types of variance requests do, but that does not
change the basic, limited role of the hearing board.
2.

Links to Federal Law

The importance of federal law in air pollution control in
creased dramatically after 1970, when the modern Clean Air Act
was created by Congress. 136 In ensuing years, considerable atten
tion has been given to the relationship between variances
granted by California hearing boards and the requirements of the
federal Act. The fundamental question has been this: What sig
nificance, if any, does a California variance have under the fed
eral Clean Air Act? The answer also has been clear for many
years: A variance has no legal significance under the federal
scheme unless and until it is approved by the U.S. EPA as a revi
sion to California's state implementation plan under the federal
statute.137
134. Cal West Equipment Co., Inc., No. 3044 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, Order Granting Product Variance) (Mar. 7, 1996) (va
riance granted until pending amendment of regulation is adopted or for one year,
whichever is sooner). See also Letter from Curtis Coleman to Jackie Dix, Clerk,
South Coast Air Quality Management District Hearing Board (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file
with author) (concerning the Sherwin Williams Company product variance, supra n.
130). ("The Sherwin-Williams Company no longer requires variance relief under the
above referenced variance. The SCAQMD Governing Board amended Rule 1 106.1
on February 12, 1999 . . . Thus, Sherwin-Williams is in compliance with Rule 1106.1
requirements.).
135. Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Re
sources Board to Hollis B . Carlile, Chairman, Southern Region Hearing Board, San
Joaquin Valley Unified APCD 28 (May 5, 1997) (on file with author).
136. Pub. L. 91-604, December 31, 1970.
137. "Historically, EPA has not recognized variances issued pursuant to state law
and has taken the position that such variances do not shield sources from enforce
ment under federal law. If, however, a variance is submitted to EPA and is found to
meet the substantive requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA) governing SIP revi-
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More concretely, this answer means that even though the re
cipient of a variance is protected from state or APCD officials'
enforcement of specific California air pollution statutes and
APCD regulations, the variance holder remains subject to en
forcement of any applicable requirements of federal law. The
confusing nature of this state-federal scheme is most evident
when the federal requirements include the California statutory
provisions and APCD regulations which are covered by the vari
ance but which also previously have been approved by the EPA
as part of the California SIP. Thus the source covered by a vari
ance is safe from enforcement under state law, but remains sub
ject to enforcement of the very same provisions as a matter of
federal law.
Although the question was posed and the answer given many
years ago, there has been a great deal of confusion and contro
versy regarding details of this linkage between hearing board
variances and the national Clean Air Act. The following sum
mary of the major developments in this ongoing saga may be
helpful for understanding of the present situation and future
developments.
In decisions as early as 1975 and 1976, the U. S. Supreme
Court recognized that a variance granted under state law could
provide protection from enforcement of federal law-including
state requirements federally approved as part of a SIP-only if
the variance was submitted to the EPA and approved as a SIP
revision, 1 38 On the basis of those rulings and similar EPA pro
nouncements, California hearing boards were instructed by the
EPA and the ARB to modify aspects of their hearing procedures
and variance orders so that the orders could be submitted by
ARB to EPA as proposed SIP revisions, 139 Hearing boards folsions, it can be approved as a revision to the SIP, thereby receiving federal recogni
tion." Cal. State Implementation Plan Revision, South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 63 Fed. Reg. 51 ,325 (Sept. 25, 1998).
138. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 421 U.S. 69 (1975) (upholding EPA's
treatment of individual variances as SIP revisions); Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246, 266 (1976) ("[I]f the industry is not exempted from, or accommodated by,
the original plan, it may obtain a variance . . . ; and the variance, if granted after
notice and a hearing, may be submitted to the EPA as a revision of the plan.")
139. See, e.g. , Memorandum from Matthew Walker, Environmental Protection
Agency, to Mabel Harder, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (Jan. 8, 1973) (on
file with author) ("Here are the latest revisions in the regulations for submission of
compliance schedules. For our purposes we treat variances the same as compliance
schedules."); State Implementation Plans, 40 Fed. Reg. 58317 (Dec. 16, 1975) (pro
posed Environmental Protection Agency regulations on issuance of variances to
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lowed this guidance and regularly transmitted variance orders to
ARB for this purpose, and ARB in turn submitted those orders
to EPA.140 Periodically, EPA responded . back to ARB and the
hearing boards with the Agency's evaluation of orders which had
been submitted.141 EPA would state in writing whether the vari
ances were approvable or unapprovable as SIP revisions.142
It was widely assumed, both by hearing boards and variance
holders, that through this process EPA indeed was approving
some variances as SIP revisions, and thus was adding temporary
Clean Air Act Implementation Plans); California Plan Revision - Metropolitan Los
Angeles Intrastate Air Quality Control Region (AQCR), 43 Fed. Reg. 25684, 25687
(June 14, 1 978) ("[E]ach variance still must satisfy the requirements of section 110 of
the Clean Air Act and 40 CFR Part 51 in order to be approved by EPA as a revision
to the SIP. "). See also California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., No. 503, at 2 (Hearing
Board, Bay Area Air Quality Control District, Order Modifying Variance and Com
pliance Schedule) (Oct. 30, 1975) ("[T]he Hearing Board has requested and received
testimony from both parties herein with respect to the question of whether the emis
sions permitted by this variance would have an adverse effect on the attainment or
maintenance of national ambient air quality standards, as required by federal Clean
Air Act as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Train v. National [sic]
Resources Defense Council, 7 E.R.e. 1735 (April 16, 1975).").
140. " [C]opies of the CARB cover letters to EPA were also submitted to the local
districts from which the variances originated. However, . . . these cover letters con
sistently stated that the enclosed variances were being submitted to EPA in accor
dance with former 40 e.F.R. § 51.6(d) and asked EPA for the disposition of the
variances as compliance schedule revisions to the SIP. The letters' reference to
§ 51.6(d) was to the EPA regulation governing submission of SIP revisions for EPA
approval. Any recipient of these CARB cover letters to EPA would logically con
clude CARB was asking EPA to approve the variances." Lawrence J. Straw, Jr.,
"Variance Protection Risks and the Need for State Leadership and Candor," 1992
Cal. Envtl. L. Rep. 117. See, e.g. , Letter from James Morgester, Chief of Enforce
ment Division, California Air Resources Board, to Carl Kohnert, Jr., Environmental
Protection Agency (Jan. 15, 1982) (on file with author) ("In accordance with 40 CFR
51.6( d), I am enclosing for your information hearing board orders . . . . ").
141. See, e.g. , Letter from Thomas W. Rarick, Environmental Protection Agency,
to James Morgester, Chief of Compliance Division, California Air Resources Board
(June 17, 1987) (on file with author). The letter stated, "Pursuant to § 110(a)(3) of
the Clean Air Act, (CAA) as amended, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), shall approve a compliance schedule as a revision to the SIP providing it
meets the criteria required by 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 51. We have
listed the criteria and indicated any deficiencies in meeting each item. Any addi
tional condition included in an order which we feel will prevent or delay approval is
noted (Attachment 1)." The Attachment, entitled "Evaluations as Compliance
Schedule Revisions to the SIP," evaluated 17 variance orders submitted by seven
different APCDs.
142. See, e.g., Letter from Terry L. Stumph, Environmental Protection Agency, to
James Morgester, Chief of Enforcement Branch, California Air Resources Board
(May 26, 1977) (on file with author). This letter stated, using the boiler plate lan
guage employed for many years in these communications, "[W]e find eighteen [vari
ances] to be unapprovable with respect to one or more deficiencies . . . The
remaining forty-four (44) variances are approvable as submitted."
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immunity from enforcement of federal law to the variance's con
ferral of immunity from state law enforcement. 1 43 In the late
1980s, however, it was discovered that the process was not what it
appeared to be. ARB was only sUbmitting variance orders to
EPA for informational purposes, and not as proposed SIP revi
sions. EPA was responding as to whether the orders were "ap
provable" or "unapprovable," but was not actually approving or
disapproving any orders at all. It appeared then, as it still does,
that no California variance order has ever been submitted and
approved as a revision of the California SIP. l44 This means, of
course, that during the period of variance protection provided by
a hearing board, the source remains in jeopardy of enforcement
of federal requirements such as SIP provisions, even if they are
the same requirements for which the variance was granted.
Beyond the seeming unfairness of this disjointed result-when
an APCD hearing board finds good reason to excuse temporary
noncompliance but federal law ignores that conclusion-serious
potential exists for the federal government, or a plaintiff suing
under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, to induce a court
to impose harsh penalties on a source covered by a variance.
Few such cases have been brought, but those which have been
filed have been very burdensome to the variance holders be
cause, in addition to the expenses of litigation, the monetary pen
alties the federal government has sought to extract from sources

143. See Letter from Linda Thornton, South Coast Air Quality Management Dis
trict, to James Morgester, California Air Resources Board (Sept. 12, 1978) (on file
with author) (concerning EPA disapproval of specific variances).
144. Interview with Judy Lewis and Leslie Krinsk, California Air Resources
Board, Sacramento, California (June 16, 2004).
Following the disclosure that no variances were actually being submitted as SIP revi
sions, ARB clarified its practices as of October 1, 1989. ARB also conceded, "In the
past, there has not been a clearly delineated process for handling the possible sub
mittal of hearing board orders in California to EPA for approval as SIP revisions . . .
This may have lead [sic] to some confusion regarding the status of such orders from
a federal perspective." Memorandum from James D. Boyd, California Air Re
sources Board, to All Air Pollution Control Officers (Sept. 14, 1989) (on file with
author) The transmittal language and citations of relevant authority in ARB's sub
mittals of variances to the EPA were changed to make clear that they were only for
EPA's "information" as required by federal grant provisions. See, e.g. , Letters from
James Morgester, Chief of Compliance Division, California Air Resources Board, to
David Howekamp, Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 2, 1989 and Aug. 15,
1991) (on file with author) ("As part of our 1988/89 EPA 105 grant requirements, I
am enclosing for your information Hearing Board Orders submitted to me by the
following air pollution control districts . . . . ").
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in this quandary have been large. 145 Some commentators on this
practice of federal "overfiling" against sources holding California
variances have argued forcefully against the harshness and un
fairness of EPA's use of submitted variances as a "federal en
forcement weapon." 146 Other commentators, however, have
defended the practice on various rationales. 1 47
In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court decided General Motors Cor
poration v. U.S. , a case arising from federal overfiling of an en
forcement action against a Massachusetts air pollution source
protected from state law enforcement through an extension of
the regulatory compliance date-in effect, a variance.148 In con
trast with the California ARB's practice of not submitting vari145. "One of the important factors in EPA overfiling is the discrepancy between
local penalties and EPA penalties. State penalty amounts are dramatically lower
than federal penalties." Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy
Store: EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 233
(1993). Even the settlement of such cases has been costly. As described in the cited
article, United Airlines settled a federal overfiling action with a penalty of over
$200,000; the action had been brought while United was operating pursuant to a
variance issued by the Bay Area AQMD Hearing Board. Id. at 236-241. See also
U.S. v. Mobil Oil Corporation, No. Civ. S-87-0627, U.S. District Court, Eastern Dis
trict of California, Consent Decree filed November 10, 1992 (civil penalty of
$950,000 in settlement of multi-million dollar complaint claims; variances had been
issued by the Kern County APCD Hearing Board). The author assisted defense
counsel in both the United Airlines and Mobil Oil proceedings.
146. Lawrence J. Straw, Jr., California Air Pollution Variances: A Federal En
forcement Weapon, 1991 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 203; Lawrence J. Straw, Jr., Variance
Protection Risks and the Need for State Leadership and Candor, 1992 CAL. ENVTL.
L. REp. 1 17; and Christian F. Kemos, A Not-So-Hot Ticket: Orders for A batement
from Air Quality Management Districts and Their Implications, 11 HASTINGS W.
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 85, 88 (2004). ("[B]ringing a federal enforcement action
in the face of the state's rational determination of whether to grant a variance usurps
the role meant to belong to the states in enforcing air pollution control.") See also
Laurence Chaset, Title V Variances: To Be or Not To Be-The Prospect for Federal
Enforcement of Operating Permits Issued under Title V of the 1990 Clean Air
Amendments, 2000 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 48, stating as follows:
EPA has long taken the position that it will not recognize state-issued variances
from federally enforceable air pollution control requirements. Consistent with this
view, EPA has occasionally taken enforcement action against facilities in the state
which had applied for and had been granted a variance from an applicable regula
tory requirement incorporated into the State Implementation Plan ("SIP"). Such
federal "overfiling" has prompted justifiable outrage when it has occurred, and, to
date, EPA has resorted to this tactic but rarely in California.
147. See W. Thomas Jennings, California Air Pollution Variances and Federal En
forcement: A Different Perspective, 1992 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 111; Melnick & Wil
les, supra note 145. Debate over the propriety of federal overfiling extends beyond

air pollution cases to other realms, such as hazardous waste management violations.
See Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement "Overfiling" in the Federal Courts: Some Thoughts
on the Post-Harmon Cases, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 425 (2003).
148. Gen. Motors Corp. v. U.S., 496 U.S. 530 (1990).
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ances to EPA as proposed SIP revisions, the Massachusetts
extension had been submitted. There was, however, a long delay
between the state's submittal and the EPA's decision on it. The
question presented was whether the EPA was entitled under the
Act to commence enforcement proceedings for violation of the
underlying SIP requirements during the period in which the
Agency itself, at some bureaucratic leisure, was considering the
possible revision of the SIP requirements governing the source.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld this overfiling power,
concluding that "the statute does not reveal any congressional
intent to bar enforcement of an existing SIP if EPA delays unrea
sonably in acting on a proposed SIP revision."149
Subsequent amendments to the Clean Air Act established a
definite time period for EPA action on SIP revisions. I SO None
theless, as a matter of national policy, the risk remains of federal
overfiling of enforcement proceedings which are inconsistent
with the state's treatment of the source whose variance is under
consideration for EPA approval. In California, the risk is magni
fied, for in the absence of submittal of a variance as a SIP revi
sion, the possibility that the EPA or a citizen plaintiff will sue
remains open indefinitely, or at least until expiration of the appli
cable statute of limitations.
In more recent developments, the EPA has taken additional
steps apparently to erase any vestige of doubt about whether var
iances issued by California hearing boards provide protection
from enforcement of federal law requirements. In 1997 and
2004, the EPA officially "corrected" the California SIP-along
with the SIPs of some other states-to delete state statutory pro
visions and APCD regulations that set forth the powers and pro
cedures of hearing boards pertaining to issuance of variances.I S I
This correction seems unnecessary and redundant, in view of the
149. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 U.S. at 540.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(k)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
151. Correction of American Samoa, Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada
State Implementation Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,664 (July 25, 1996) (Proposing the first
of these corrections, EPA referred to the addition of Section 1 l0(i) to the Clean Air
Act and stated, "[T]he variance provisions currently in the SIPs were rendered with
out legal effect by amendments to the Clean Air Act enacted by Congress in 1977.);
Correction of American Samoa, Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada State Im
plementation Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 34,641 (June 27, 1997); Corrections to the Califor
nia State Implementation Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 3045 (Jan. 22, 2004); Corrections to the
California State Implementation Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,062 (Nov. 16, 2004). A peti
tion for judicial review of the 1997 rule was dismissed for lack of standing. Indus.
Envtl. Ass'n. v. Browner, 2000 WL 689518 (9th Cir. May 26, 2000).
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early judicial and EPA statements on the impotence of state vari
ances as shields from federal enforcement, and in view of the
presence of most of these provisions in the SIP for more than two
decades.152
Nonetheless, EPA apparently found it advisable to make the
separation as clear and complete as possible, by cleansing from
the SIP any and all provisions pertaining to variances. 153 The cu
mulative result of this effort, on top of the prior judicial and ad
ministrative pronouncements, is that sources operating under
variances from California hearing boards now should have no
doubt about their status: They are safe from enforcement of Cal
ifornia law and APCD regulations during the variance, but they
are not safe from enforcement of federal requirements.
Ironically, while EPA was taking these actions to seal the di
vorce between California variances and federal law, concerted ef
forts were being made to breathe new life into the relationship.
The catalyst for these efforts, beginning in the mid-1990s, was the
implementation by California APCDs of the federal operating
permits program under Title V of the Clean Air Act.154 Issuance
of these permits, predominantly to large industrial and power
generating sources, carried a renewed prospect for a serious lack
of coordination between APCD functions and federal enforce
ment actions. Under hearing board authority to grant variances
from conditions in APCD permits, 155 the possibility was envi152. EPA seemed to acknowledge this point when it stated, "Moreover, because
state-issued variances require independent EPA approval in order to modify the
substantive requirements of a SIP, removal of these variance provisions from the
SIP will have no effect on regulated entities." Corrections to the California State
Implementation Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 3045, 3046 (Jan. 22, 2004).
153. "EPA's basic argument is that it eliminated the variance and hearing board
provisions in the California SIP because they were confusing, especially to the regu
lated industry. . . . But . . . the Air Resources Board and industry groups responded
that the EPA rulemaking that eliminated the variance and hearing procedures
seemed to indicate that EPA's policy [of rarely bringing enforcement actions against
sources under variance] may change, and that enforcement actions against those us
ing variances to exceed emission caps would be justified. Also, these groups con
tended, why remove a SIP provision after allowing it to exist for years?" INSIDE
CAuEPA (May 15, 1998).
154. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7661-61 (f) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
155. The Health & Safety Code mandates that "Title V sources shall not be
granted a variance . . . from the requirement for a permit to operate or use." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42350(b)(2) (West 2006). This prohibition is an adapta
tion of the long-standing prohibition, discussed supra at Section III(A), against the
granting of variances from permits to construct. Title V sources, now required by
federal law to have permits to operate, cannot be excused from this type of basic
requirement through variances. Nonetheless, hearing board power to grant vari-
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sioned-indeed considered likely-that the holder of a permit is
sued under both California law and the federal Title V would be
granted variance relief under California law but would remain at
risk of federal enforcement proceedings, and burdensome mone
tary penalties, at the instigation of citizen plaintiffs or the
EPA.156 The relatively swift procedures for hearing board vari
ances would stand in stark contrast with the more protracted pro
cedures for modification of Title V permits.
In view of the extraordinary volume of detailed conditions in
many Title V permits, and the highly predictable need for occa
sional variance relief from some of these conditions, the search
for a way to reconcile these two legal regimes began. Thus far,
the most significant product of this effort was the adoption in the
South Coast AQMD of Rule 518.2, which allows Title V sources
to receive a form of variance protection, structured as temporary
alternative operating conditions, which will promptly have effect
under federal law, as well as state law.157 After initial reluctance
ances from specific conditions of permits to operate, whether or not those permits
also serve as Title V permits, remains undiminished. See also Section 42301 (d),
which states, inter alia, "The issuance of any variance or abatement order is a matter
of state law and does not amend a Title V permit in any way."
In Aera Energy LLC, No 752 (Hearing Board, Ventura County Air Pollution Con
trol District, Order Granting Regular Variance) (May 12, 2003 and Sept. 15, 2003), a
variance was granted from conditions of a Title V permit. The variance orders, how
ever, contained no intimation that the variance relief had any federal law signifi
cance whatsoever. A similar order was entered in Petition for a Variance by
Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. 2005-3A (Hearing Board, North Coast Unified Air Qual
ity Management District, Findings and Order) (July 15, 2005), which is discussed
supra note 72. The dispute related to that facility included a strong prospect that a
citizen suit under the federal Clean Air Act would be filed against it. Telephone
interview with George Poppic, California Air Resources Board (Dec. 16, 2005).
The principal thrust of Section 42301(d) is to allow the issuance of a permit to oper
ate to an otherwise qualified Title V source even if the source is operating under a
variance at the time of issuance. The provision also states that variance provisions
that "prescribe a compliance schedule may be incorporated into the permit consis
tent with Title V and this division." For an example of an APCD rule apparently
intended to implement this provision, see Northern Sierra Air Quality Management
District Rule 718 (1991), available at http://www.myairdistrict.comlRe�VII_-_718.
pdf.
156. "[T]housands of companies in the state could be vulnerable to lawsuits that
contend Clean Air Act provisions have been violated because of excess emission
allowed by permit variances. . . . Enforcement against companies that exceed emis
sion limits established in permits likely would be triggered not by EPA itself, but by
outside entities . . . . " INSIDE CALIEPA 2 (Mar. 3, 2000). See also Chaset, supra
note 146.
157. Attempts to develop and secure EPA approval of a model Title V variance
rule, led by the San Diego County APeD and the Bay Area AQMD, had not borne
fruit as of the end of 2005. See Variances Under Title V, Bay Area Air Quality
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by EPA, and subsequent revision of the Rule by the District,
EPA approved the incorporation of Rule 518.2 into the SIP for
the South Coast District. 1 ss
Management District (proposed rule, July 11, 1997) (on file with author). Other
districts may be adopting an informal ad hoc approach, treating appropriate vari
ance orders as minor modifications of the Title V permits.
Additional, similar complications, including the risk that a Title V permit holder will
receive disparate treatment from the APCD and the federal EPA, arise when the
recipient of a permit to operate which also serves as a Title V permit appeals some
of the permit's conditions to a hearing board, pursuant to procedures discussed infra
at Section YeA). See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 3451 (Hearing Board, Bay Area
Air Quality Management District, Appeal) (Dec. 29, 2003); Valero Refining Co.,
No. 3453 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Appeal)
(Dec. 30, 2003); and Valero Refining Co., No. 3454 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, Appeal) (Dec. 30, 2003). The author is one of the
attorneys for the appellant in the latter two cases.
158. Revisions to the California State Implementation Plan, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,954 (Sept. 13, 2002); Revisions to the
California State Implementation Plan, South Coast Air Quality Management Dis
trict, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,626 (June 5, 2002) (EPA's proposed approval of Rule 518.2 as a
SIP revision). EPA described the Rule as follows:
Rule 518.2 is designed to allow federal recognition of variances through a SIP
approved process that provides adequate public and EPA participation and that
will ensure that the substantive requirements of the CAA continue to be met. In
brief, this rule establishes a procedure through which an applicable requirement in
the SIP may be temporarily modified as it applies to a particular source. The rule
accomplishes this by establishing a mechanism for the creation of alternative oper
ating conditions (AOCs), a means by which to offset any emissions in excess of the
otherwise applicable requirements that would result, and provisions for EPA and
public review and EPA veto of proposed AOCs through the title V "significant"
permit revision process rather than through the source-specific SIP revision
process.
Id. at 38627.
Compare Clean Air Act Proposed Interim Approval of the Title V Operating Permit
Programs for Nineteen California Air Pollution Control Districts, 59 Fed. Reg.
63,289, 63,292 (Dec. 8, 1994) (EPA interim approval of Title V permit authority for
19 other California APCDs). In this earlier action, EPA noted that "EPA regards
State and District variance provisions as wholly external to the [Title V permit] pro
grams submitted for approval . . . . EPA does not recognize the ability of a District
to grant relief from the duty to comply with a federally-enforceable part 70 [40
C.F.R. Part 70] permit, except where such relief is granted through procedures al
lowed by part 70."
The South Coast Hearing Board issued its first order under Rule 518.2 in Southern
California Edison Co., No. 1262-81, (South Coast Air Quality Management District,
Minute Order) (July 15, 2004).
An earlier version of the South Coast District's Rule 518.2 is included in the regula
tions of the Antelope Valley AQMD. The Antelope Valley region formerly was part
of the South Coast AQMD, and when the Antelope Valley District was formed, it
"inherited" Rule 518.2. That District does not apply the Rule, nor has EPA ap
proved it under federal law. Telephone interview with Karen Nowak, Deputy Dis
trict Counsel, Antelope Valley Air Quality Management District (Nov. 30, 2005).
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General Observations

This analysis of variances primarily has attempted to delineate
the principal features of variance cases and the kinds of informa
tion attorneys must include in presentations before hearing
boards. Certainly all of the written submissions, testimony, and
argument of the parties in the variance process must be directed
to helping the board resolve the issues the statute requires it to
address and to helping it draw up an effective, intelligible, and
enforceable order if a variance is justified. The key word is "rele
vance." All aspects of the applicant's and the APCD's submis
sions and presentations should be relevant to one or more of the
statutory elements the hearing board must resolve.
Obviously considerable preparation by the parties and their at
torneys is necessary if the presentations are to be efficient and
helpful. As will be discussed below, discovery methods some
times are available to counsel by virtue of hearing board proce
dural rules.159 Such advance discovery, or-more commonly
informal exchanges of information between the parties, should
be used to facilitate early, thorough preparation of the parties'
positions. The hearing itself certainly should not be the first, or
even the principal, forum for the APCD staff and lawyers to find
out about the applicant's problems and proposed solutions. Ad
vance consultations in one form or another should be pursued by
both the district's and the applicant's counsel, so that when hear
ings are held the information presented is comprehensive, clear,
and above all relevant to the job the statute requires the hearing
boards to do in variance cases.
IV.
ABATEMENT ORDERS

An order for abatement is the strongest administrative sanc
tion available to an APCD. An abatement order has been de
scribed as "the ultimate tool available to an air pollution control
district for effecting compliance,"160 something that "would
probably be used . . . only if other, less onerous, enforcement
159. See infra Section VI(C).
160. James Buchert, Chairperson, Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control
District Hearing Board, Tools Available to Hearing Boards - Abatement Orders
(Apr. 29, 1981) (paper presented at California Air Resources Bd., Air Pollution En
forcement Symposium) (on file with author).
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procedures had failed to correct an air pollution problem,"16 1
and a measure to be pursued "when the standard enforcement
procedures, i.e. notices of violation and misdemeanor penalties,
prove inadequate to achieve expeditious compliance. " 162 These
characterizations remain apt, for the uses and purposes of abate
ment orders have changed little. In short, abatement orders have
long been viewed as a remedy of last resort-the heavy artillery
to be brought out when lesser weapons have failed.
Although theoretically available against violators of any regu
lation "prohibiting or limiting the discharge of air contami
nants,"163 abatement orders are most often sought against
violators of the statutory public nuisance provisionl64 or basic re
quirements of district permit systems.165 There are numerous
practical and strategic reasons for this tendency, but the overrid
ing factor is that sources brought before hearing boards in abate
ment order cases are generally those that district staffs believe
are operating farthest from the required procedures and emission
regulations. These most troublesome of polluters face the pros
pect of abatement orders.
161. Letter from John Smithson, Chairperson, Ventura County Air Pollution
Control District Hearing Board, to author (Mar. 17, 1982) (on file with author).
162. Letter from Peter Greenwald, Deputy District Counsel, South Coast Air
Quality Management District, to author (Apr. 6, 1982) (on file with author).
163. The principal statutory provision is CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 42451 (a} (West 2006):
On its own motion, or upon motion of the district board or the air pollution con
trol officer, the hearing board may, after notice and a hearing, issue an order for
abatement whenever it fmds that any person is constructing or operating any arti
cle, machine, equipment, or other contrivance without a permit required by this
part, or is in violation of Section 41700 or 41701 or of any order, rule, or regulation
prohibiting or limiting the discharge of air contaminants into the air.

See also id. § 42452:
The order for abatement shall be framed in the manner of a writ of injunction
requiring the respondent to refrain from a particular act. The order may be condi
tional and require a respondent to refrain from a particular act unless certain con
ditions are met. The order shall not have the effect of permitting a variance unless
all the conditions for a variance, including limitation of time, are met.

164. Id. § 41700. A related provision, Section 42301.7(c}(2}, specifically autho
rizes an APCD to seek an order for abatement under certain circumstances against a
threatened release of air contaminants from a source within 1,000 feet of a school.
By its terms, however, that provision allows such an order to be sought from an
APCD's governing board, rather than its hearing board. See infra note 167.
165. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42300-42316 (West 2006). A dispute over
the application of the terms of an APCD permit system and its exemptions was the
basis of Julius Goldman's Egg City v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 1 16 Cal. App. 3d
741 (2d Dist. 1981).
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Burdens and Penalties

Although abatement orders can be quite constructive and simi
lar to variances, one key difference is that the APCD staff, rather
than the source, chooses to initiate the proceeding.l66 The
agency's filing then creates time-consuming and often costly obli
gations for the source to respond to the charges against it. This
hardship imposed by the process itself is one of the onerous as
pects of abatement cases. It is also a reason why they are not
brought lightly by APCD personnel.

166. The pleading by which an abatement proceeding is commenced is often titled
an "accusation," a term borrowed from the California Administrative Procedure
Act. CAL. GOy'T CODE § 11503 (West 2006). In some districts, procedural rules
describe the basic content of an accusation and of the respondent's "notice of de
fense," often borrowing heavily from the language of that Act. Compare CAL.
GOy'T CODE §§ 11503, 11505-11506 (West 2006) with Monterey Bay Unified Air
Pollution Control Dist. Regulation VI, Rules 5.9-5.11, available at http://www.
arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbu/cur.htm (last revised Oct. 16, 2002), and Bay Area Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § § 4.3-.5, available at http://www.baaqmd.govlbrd/
hearingboardlhb_rules.pdf (effective Dec. 5, 2005). Indeed it is in abatement pro
ceedings that hearing boards choose most closely to follow the terminology and
processes set forth in the California Administrative Procedure Act. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40807 (West 2006) (hearing board's procedural rules to
conform, "so far as practicable," to the California Administrative Procedure Act's
administrative adjudication provisions). Not all districts subscribe to the APA ter
minology. See, e.g. , Tehama County Air Pollution Control District Rule 5:8 (1985),
available at http://www.arb.ca.govIDRDBITEHiCURHTMURS-8.HTM. ("petition
for an abatement order") and Rule 5:11, available at http://www.arb.ca.govIDRDB/
CURHTMUR5-8.HTM ("answer"), and South Coast Air Quality Mangement Dis
trict Rules 803-804 (1988), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg08/r803.
pdf, http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/reg/reg08/r804.pdf ("petition for order for
abatement").
The power to initiate abatement proceedings has remained limited to APCD staffs,
despite occasional attempts to broaden it. For example, in 1983 a bill was intro
duced in the California Assembly that, inter alia, would have expanded the terms of
§ 42451 to make it possible for "any aggrieved person" to make a motion before a
hearing board for the issuance of an order for abatement. A.B. 1638, Cal. Legis.,
1983-1984 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblyman Margolin). The bill died in com
mittee, and when reintroduced in early 1984 did not contain this broad standing
provision. AB. 3298, Cal. Legis., 1983 1984 Reg. Sess. (introduced by Assemblyman
Margolin).
The relationship between APCD regulatory programs and private nuisance reme
dies under California law is discussed in Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 127-31 (1st Dist. 1971). An intensive examination of the rela
tionship between common law nuisance and modern air pollution regulatory systems
is presented in NOGA MORAG-LEYINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR
POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE (2003). Included in that study is analysis of
the protracted abatement proceedings in the Bay Area AQMD Hearing Board con
cerning the Pacific Steel Casting Company in Berkeley. See id. at 153-161, 174-177.
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Another critical feature is the severity of the sanctions for vio
lation of an abatement order issued by a hearing board.167 These
primarily include enforcement of the abatement order by judicial
injunction, 168 civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each day of vio
lation of the order,169 and criminal punishments for commission
of a misdemeanorpo
B.

A Variance By Any Other Name .

A great deal of what has been said above in Section III about
the purposes and processes of variance cases is applicable to
cases in which orders for abatement are sought. This should
come as no surprise, for the issues in both types of cases are fun
damentally the same. The primary difference is that in a variance
case the applicant is trying to prove its good faith and diligence in
eliminating its violations, whereas in an abatement case the
APeD staff is trying to prove that the particular source will un
justifiably continue to pollute unless restrained by a hearing
board order for abatement.
167. Although § 42450 authorizes a district governing board to issue abatement
orders, it would be extraordinary for this legislative body to exercise such adjudica
tory authority. Cf Letter from M. David Stirling, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
State of California, to Assemblyman William Baker 2 (May 14, 1991) (on file with
.
author) stating:
The Board of Directors [of an APCD] is empowered only to issue, after notice and
a hearing, an order for abatement (§42450) . . . . The enforcement and penalty
authority, however, including the power to bring actions seeking civil penalties, is
vested exclusively in the APCO (H ealth & Safety Code, §§ 42400 et seq.) The
Board of Directors is not given any authority to direct the APCO in the exercise of
his enforcement authority. . . .
The Health and Safety Code is clear that the hearing board performs the District's
judicial function (see §§ 40800 et seq.) . . . . Therefore, as due process prohibits the
Board of Directors from attempting to influence the authority exercised by the
APCO, it also prohibits any effort by the Board in the exercise of its judicial
function.
168. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42453-42454 (West 2006); Cf In re Cir

costa, 219 Cal. App. 2d 777 (1st Dist. 1963) (petition for habeas corpus denied and
criminal contempt upheld against violator of injunction issued to enforce Bay Area
APCD hearing board's order for abatement of open burning); Comment, Regional
Control ofAir and Water Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, 55 CALIF. L. REV.
702, 706 n. 43 (1967).
169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42401, 42403 (West 2006) . . Additional
levels of penalties for various types of violations of hearing board orders are in
cluded, along with penalties for violations of other requirements, in Sections 42402
(strict liability), 42402.1 (negligence), 42402.2 (knowing emission), 42402.3 (willful
and intentional emission), 42402.4 (knowing and intentional falsification of docu
ments), and 42402.5 (administrative civil penalties).
170. Id.§ 42400(a). See also id. § 42400.3.5 (misdemeanor for knowing violation
of hearing board order related to toxic air contaminants).
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The inquiry in either type of case nonetheless is very much the
same. It examines the nature of the violations, the burden that
compliance would impose on the source, the diligence or lack of
it which has characterized the operation, and the actual air pollu
tion effects. This inquiry occurs in an abatement case even
though the statutory provision on abatement orders is so succinct
as to be virtually silent regarding the pertinent issues in an abate
ment proceeding.l71 As with hearing boards' rejection of a strict
reading of the hardship criterion in variance cases,l72 the boards
have taken a broad, pragmatic interpretation of the relevant fac
tors in an abatement hearing. 1 73
The correspondence between abatement and variance cases is
highlighted by the statutory allowance for the possibility that a
conditional abatement order may be entered which will have
"the effect of permitting a variance. " This effect is allowed, of
course, only if all the "conditions for a variance, induding limita
tion of time, are met."174 This means that the basic statutory
findings required in variance cases would have to be satisfied and
that the order fundamentally would have to be structured, and
time-limited, in the fashion of a variance order.
C.

Proof

The statute has always required proof of violation as a basis for
abatement, although a newer provision allows for stipulated
abatement orders even in the absence of such proof, as will be
discussed belowPs The traditional requirement means that con
siderable attention ordinarily is focused on the severity of the
violation. This is true also because district resources are most
likely to be brought to bear in an abatement proceeding against
"a persistent and unjustifiable polluter." 1 76 This focus on the du171. See supra note 163.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
173. The South Coast AQMD has set forth three findings that must be made
before an abatement order can be issued. South Coast Air Quality Mangement Dis
trict Rule 806(a) (1988), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/regireg08/r806.pdf.
These findings, which are adaptations of statutory variance findings, are discussed in
Kemos, supra note 146, at 85, 91-94.
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42452 (West 2006). Such dual orders were
issued in Union Oil Co., No. 269-60 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Man
agement District, Findings and Decision) (Mar. 15, 1983), and Louisiana Pacific
Corp., No. 91-26 (Hearing Board, Butte County Air Pollution Control District, Con
ditional Order for Abatement) (May 24, 1991).
175. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42451 (West 2006).
176. Crawford, supra note 5, at 633.
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ration and magnitude of noncompliance is especially appropriate
when the alleged violation pertains to section 41700, the statu
tory nuisance prohibition. In these instances, much of the
APeD's case will rest on the testimony of citizen witnesses,
which must be clearly presented. 1 77
One very effective technique which has been employed in odor
nuisance abatement cases to present the clearest picture of the
situation is the use of a carefully marked map showing the loca
tions of the alleged violator, all major air pollution sources in the
vicinity, and complaining citizens. As each witness testifies, his
or her location at the time of alleged discomfort can be pin
pointed in relation both to the respondent and to the other
sources in the area. Often the respondent's assertion will be that
the other local sources are at least as likely to be the cause of the
problem as is respondent. The use of this kind of visual aid helps
to make attempted proof of the violations, and attempted refuta
tion of the charges, an efficient and clear process. 178
Section 42451 (b) allows a hearing board to issue an abatement
order "pursuant to the stipulation of the air pollution control of
ficer and the person or persons accused. "179 The hearing board
may issue a stipulated order "without making the finding" that
the respondent is in violation of any legal requirement. Even
before the addition of this subsection in 1986, abatement pro
ceedings often were resolved on the basis of a proposed order
agreed to by both parties. Such orders, however, still had to re
cite that the respondent was violating the law, and this recital
often was a stumbling block to securing the respondent's agree
ment. This obstacle has been removed by Section 42451(b), and
stipulated abatement orders are now fairly common.180
177. See Kenneth A. Manaster, Early Thoughts on Prosecuting Polluters, 2 ECOL
OGY L.Q. 471, 489 (1972) ("The testimony of such witnesses should be limited to
their actual observations and the identifiable effects of the pollution on themselves
and their property.").
178. Difficulties experienced by the Bay Area AQMD in developing effective
procedures for responding to citizens' odor nuisance complaints, and confirming
their validity, are discussed in Morag-Levine, supra note 166, at 155-156, 160-161,
174-177.
179. CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 42451(b) (West 2006). This provision was
added by Stats. 1986, ch. 147, § l.
180. In response to a question posed by the South Coast AQMD, the ARB con
firmed that "a current violation is not a condition precedent to the issuance of a
Stipulated Order for Abatement." Memorandum from Kathleen Walsh, General
Counsel, California Air Resources Board, to Nancy Feldman, District Prosecutor,
South Coast Air Quality Management District 2-A-1 (May 3, 2002).
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Terms and Conditions

Another distinctive aspect of abatement cases is the usual
complexity of the orders entered if a violation is found. Al
though the statute seems to authorize abatement simply if a vio
lation is proven, Section 42452's reference to "conditional"
abatement orders confirms the logical suspicion that other, vari
ance-type issues are inherent in these cases as well. It is the rare
case in which the APeD seeks a flat injunctive order requiring
the respondent to shut down operations entirely. 1 81 More com
monly, the district will wish to have an order for abatement
which is, as the statute says, framed in the manner of an injunc-

"The issuance of a stipulated order for abatement is not an uncommon occurrence
under the SCAQMD." Kemos, supra note 146, at 85, 95-96. This commentary also
describes stipulated orders as "a regulatory tool less severe than an order for abate
ment" but " a somewhat more stringent regulatory tool than a variance." Id. at 96.
For examples of stipulated abatement orders, see Air Pollution Control Officer v.
Tosco Corp., No. 2145 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Conditional Order for Abatement) (Feb. 8, 1990) (stipulation for odor reduction
and monitoring measures, despite absence of finding of a public nuisance and re
spondent's denial of responsibility for alleged odors); Air Pollution Control Officer
v. Pacific Refining Co., No. 2052 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Manage
ment District, Conditional Order for Abatement) (Sept. 13, 1 990); Air Pollution
Control Officer v. Integrated Environmental Systems, No. 2971 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Conditional Order for Abatement)
(Sept. 7, 1995); Air Pollution Control Officer v. Unocal San Francisco Refinery, No.
3134 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Stipulated Un
conditional Order for Abatement) (Dec. 19, 1996).
181. "As a general rule it may be said that mandatory relief is always preferable
to negative injunctive relief because the effect of the former is to continue the activ
ity, with its benefits to society, while reducing the polluting byproducts, whereas the
latter does eliminate the pollution but may well eliminate other useful products or
services as well." Manaster, supra note 177, at 478-79. For an example of an uncon
ditional order, see Petition for an Order for Abatement re Louisiana Pacific Corp.,
No. 87-02 (Hearing Board, North Coast Unified Air Quality Management District,
Order for Abatement) (Feb. 26, 1987). In contrast, in APCO v. USS-POSCO Indus
tries, No. 2445 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order
Denying Request for Abatement Order) (Aug. 1, 1991), the hearing board found no
need for an unconditional order and even rejected a proposed stipulated conditional
order for abatement as "unnecessary" in light of the respondent's prior "commit
ment to minimize the emission of air contaminants." Id. at 5-7.
In the South Coast AQMD Hearing Board, "[aJpproximately once a year, the Hear
ing Board issues an order that requires a business to shut down part or all of its
facility. " SCAQMD QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 11, at 1. See, e.g., Zamora Mexi
can Foods, Inc., No. 5344 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management
District, Findings and Decision) (Jan. 30, 2003) ("orders you to immediately cease
and desist operating or allowing the operation of any and all deep fryers, kettles, or
other vessels at the commercial food processing facility located at . . . . ").
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tion requiring the respondent "to refrain from a particular act
unless certain conditions are met. "182
Conditional abatement orders generally require corrective ac
tion to be taken on a specified schedule. The schedule some
times is stated in addition to the command that the violations
immediately cease.183 In other formulations, an order will in
clude provisions stating that conformity with the order's correc
tive measures would be deemed to constitute compliance with
the abatement directive itselP84 Such conformity, however,
would not have the effect of a variance, and the source would
still remain subject to ordinary enforcement penalties for viola
tions of district regulations. 185 In many other instances, the order
declares the corrective measures as an alternative to closing the
source's operations or otherwise abating the violation.186
Even when a stipulated abatement order is proposed, the hear
ing board still has the responsibility to make sure it is entering an
182. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42452 (West 2(06).
183. Richard L. Jones, No. 915 (Hearing Board, San Diego County Air Pollution
Control District, Order of Abatement) (Sept. 24, 1981).
184. See, e.g. , Imperial West Chern. Co., No. 826 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District, Conditional Order for Abatement) (May 13, 1982).
See generally Crawford, supra note 5, at 634-35.
185. With this in mind, some abatement orders specify amounts of monetary pen
alties that the respondents agree to pay for predicted violations during the periods
covered by the orders.
186. Code Welding & Fabrication Co., No. 925 (Hearing Board, San Diego
County Air Pollution Control District, Order of Abatement) (Dec. 3, 1981) ("[A]n
Order of Abatement shall be issued enjoining Code Welding and Fabrication Com
pany, Inc. from continuing to operate abrasive blasting equipment . . . unless the
following conditions are met . . . . "); William G. Seel, No. 917 (Hearing Board, San
Diego County Air Pollution Control District, Order of Abatement) (Oct. 22, 1981)
("[T]he Hearing Board . . . issues an Order of Abatement enjoining Respondent
from continuing to operate this facility unless the increments of progress and condi
tions set out in Exhibit A attached are met."); Air Pollution Control Officer v. Pa
cific Refining Co., No. 1235 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management
District, Conditional Order for Abatement) (May 31, 1984) ("The Hearing Board
Orders, that Respondent . . . abate all odorous emissions from its Hercules facility
forthwith, unless Respondent complies with the following conditions . . . . "); South
Coast Air Quality Management District v. Union Pacific Railroad, No. 4979, at 3233 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and
Decision for Modification of an Order for Abatement) (Sept. 29, 1998) ("[T]o cease
and desist its operations . . . at the location known as the 'Slover' siding . . . or
comply with the conditions set forth below"). See also South Coast Air Quality
Management District, No. 2684 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment District, Order for Abatement) (Nov. 17, 1981) ("The Hearing Board hereby
issues an Order for Abatement of the emissions from Respondent, Los Angeles
County Mechanical Department's non-complying gasoline dispensing facilities. Said
facilities shall comply with Rule 461 on and after October 23, 1981, or cease
operations.").
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effective order. This view is bolstered by Section 424S1(b)'s re
quirement that the board must "include a written explanation of
its action in the order for abatement." The explanation require
ment presupposes that the board has evaluated the proposed or
der and concluded that its terms and conditions are sound and
worthy of adoption, 187 In this regard, the ARB has interpreted
the statutory allowance for stipulated orders as designed to dis
courage district staffs and alleged violators from entering into
agreements delaying or relaxing requirements "without the re
view of an objective Hearing Board and public review and com
ment." The ARB emphasizes the importance of " [i]ndependent
review and explanation of the order by the Hearing Board, [and]
the opportunity for input from [the] public and District staff in an
open forum. "188
A further indication of the hearing board's ultimate responsi
bility for the content of its abatement orders is the long-standing
language in Section 42451(a) that an abatement order can be is
sued on the hearing board's "own motion. " This suggests that
even if the parties do not believe an abatement order is war
ranted, the hearing board may nonetheless issue one on terms it
finds j ustified by the evidence. 189 Even agreed orders are thus
187. In the USS-POSCO proceeding discussed supra at note 181, a hearing board
wholly rejected a proposed stipulated order for abatement.
188. Memorandum from Kathleen Walsh, General Counsel, California Air Re
sources Board, to Nancy Feldman, District Prosecutor, South Coast Air Quality
Management District 2-3 (May 3, 2002). The South Coast AQMD Hearing Board
also exercises the power to modify stipulated orders after their initial entry even if
the parties do not stipulate to the modification; this action will only be taken, how
ever, after a properly noticed public hearing. See South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment District v. Hillman Holdings, LLC, No. 5182, at 10 (Hearing Board, South
Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision of Petition for Stipu
lated Order for Abatement) (Sept. 21, 2000) ("The Hearing Board may modify the
Order for Abatement without the stipulation of the parties upon a showing of good
cause, therefore, and upon making the findings required by Health and Safety Code
Section 42451(a) and DISTRICf Rule 806(a)."). This practice is discussed at
Kemos, supra note 146, at 85, 95-96.
189. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42451 (West 2006). Although the ARB
has interpreted this language to mean that "[t]he hearing board can initiate its own
action to conduct an abatement hearing," this does not appear ever to have been
attempted, nor would it be a feasible or fair way for a proceeding to be conducted.
Memorandum from Leslie Krinsk, Senior Staff Counsel, California Air Resources
Board to Hollis B. Carlile, San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dis
"
trict 29 (May 5, 1997). A hearing board could not function both as prosecutor and
adjudicator, nor would it have the authority to mandate APCD staff to serve in the
former role. Cf supra note 167. A more sound interpretation of "on its own mo
tion" is simply that, after a proceeding has been initiated by the APCD staff and a
hearing has been held, the hearing board has the responsibility to determine

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 75 2005-2006

76

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

subject to scrutiny in a hearing, and to redrafting and modifica
tion by the board members themselves, before the orders can be
entered.190
E.

Approaches to Abatement Proceedings

If the APeD staff and a potential respondent have come to
agreement on a proposed stipulated order for abatement under
Section 42451 (b), their obvious task is to persuade the hearing
board of the proposal's good sense, practicality, and fairness to
all concerned interests, including the public's interest in clean air.
In cases in which there is no such stipulation, attorneys repre
senting an APeD should make clear to the hearing board exactly
what provisions are desired if the agency is seeking entry of' a
conditional abatement order. If APeD attorneys are not clear
about the possible provisions and their preferences among them,
then the hearing board can only conclude that they are seeking
that rare creature, an unconditional abatement order. Techni
cally, under Section 42451(a), APeD attorneys are entitled to
present proof of violations and j ust leave to the hearing board
the entire question of a suitable remedy. This is not the most
efficient or responsible course.
whether an abatement order is warranted, and what its content should be, even if
the staff or respondent takes a different view of what the final resolution of the
matter should be.
190. See South Coast Air Quality Management District v. Operating Indus., Inc.,
No. 2121-1 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Order
for Abatement) (May 18, 1983). The board entered its order on the basis of a stipu
lation of the parties, but with the modification of one deadline to a date earlier than
the parties had agreed. [d. at 3. Other aspects of this complex abatement proceed
ing, including the requirement for posting of a bond, are discussed supra at note 94.
This modification power raises the possibility of entry of an order which no party to
the case finds to its liking and which a party then has challenged in court pursuant to
the judicial review provision in Health & Safety Code § 40864. On a few occasions
this has occurred in the Bay Area AQMD. The hearing board's order then was
defended with the assistance of outside counsel chosen by the hearing board, with
approval and funding provided by the district's governing board under previously
established procedures. In the absence of this ultimate, albeit rare, resort to outside
representation, hearing board orders could amount to little more than a rubber
stamp for district staff positions. See Judgment Granting Motion for Remand to
Hearing Board, Pacific Steel Casting Co. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area Air Qual
ity Management District (Cal. Super. Ct. Alameda County 1983) (No. 569839-4);
Port of Redwood City v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area Air Quality Management
District (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County 1981) (No. 780189). See also Petition
for Writ of Mandate, Glidden-Durkee Div. of SCM Corp. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay
Area Air Pollution Control District (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County 1977)
(No. 729-951). For further discussion of the provision of counsel to hearing boards,
see infra Section VI(A).
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In contrast, attorneys representing respondents must carefully
appraise the prospects of entirely avoiding the imposition of any
form of abatement order on their clients. If those prospects are
dim, counsel's attention should shift to the delineation of con
structive terms and conditions that the client can live with while
promptly solving its compliance problems. Ideally counsel
should seek to minimize the exposure of the source to enforce
ment penalties by obtaining an order that has "the effect of per
mitting a variance."19 1 One way to promote this result is to file a
separate application for variance and to seek its consolidation for
hearing with the accusation. This may tend to shift the inquiry
onto more positive, solution-oriented ground. This option should
only be pursued if there are solid reasons for believing that the
source can satisfy the statutory criteria for entitlement to a vari
ance. Often, however, such reasons will not be available because
abatement proceedings, as discussed earlier, are not usually
brought against diligent sources.
A well-written conditional abatement order, whether devel
oped by advance stipulation or during the course of a contested
hearing, can be an effective tool for compelling a serious of
fender to come promptly into compliance. The full range of ex
pertise and creativity of the APCD, the respondent, and their
respective lawyers should be made available to the hearing board
in each case in the attempt to construct this tool.
v.
PERMIT DISPUTES

The third area of hearing board work is the resolution of dis
putes over permits. Cases in this category are infrequent in al
most all districts, but when they arise, they tend to be complex
and challenging for the boards. Section 42300 authorizes every
APCD to establish a permit system broadly covering the con
struction and operation of any equipment "which may cause the
issuance of air contaminants. "192 Within the elaborate permitting
processes established under this authority, various types of con
troversies come before hearing boards.

191. See supra text accompanying note 174.
192. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 (West 2006).
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Varieties of Permit Disputes

The Health and Safety Code identifies five principal situations
in which an APCD hearing board can be called on to resolve a
permit dispute. First, Section 42302 allows a permit applicant
whose request has been denied by APCD staff to have the hear
ing board determine "whether the permit was properly de
nied."193 Although this statutory phrasing might be read to
indicate that this avenue of redress is only available to a permit
applicant whose permit request has been denied in its entirety,
the provision is widely and sensibly understood to have broader
applicability. Under it, review may be sought by an applicant
who was issued a permit but with some conditions imposed that
the applicant finds objectionable. In that event, the appeal fo
cuses on the district's denial of the permit as requested, rather
than of any permit at all. 1 94
Second, Section 42306 allows a permittee whose permit has
been suspended by the district staff to have the board determine
"whether or not the permit was properly suspended."195 This
193. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42302 (West 2006); see A-I Roofing Serv.,
151 Cal. Rptr. at 529-30; Durochrome Prods., Inc., No. 2143 (Hearing Board, South
Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Mar. 27, 1979);
Rialto Power Corp., No. 3405 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment District, Findings and Decision) (Feb. 1987) (holding district's denial of per
mits to construct was improper). Pursuant to the Air Pollution Permit Streamlining
Act of 1992, C AL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42320-42323, a permit denial based
on certain contested prior violations is subject to appeal under Section 42302 and to
a tailored set of proof requirements regarding those violations. [d. at §§ 42333(e),
42335.
In the South Coast AQMD, "[a]t any point in time there are 20 to 25 pending ap
peals," mostly of this type. However, '[v]ery few of these go to hearing." Instead,
during pre-hearing conferences the Hearing Board encourages settlement of these
disputes, which the parties usually reach. SCAQMD Q UESTIONNAIRE, supra note
11, at 4. Section 4231l(h) authorizes an APCD governing board to set fees "to cover
the reasonable costs of the hearing board incurred as a result of appeals from district
decisions on the issuance of permits." The hearing board may waive all of part of
such fees "if it determines that circumstances warrant that waiver."
194. In many districts, this allowance is spelled out in regulations explicitly pro
viding for appeals from "denial or conditional approval" of a permit. See, e. g.,
Glenn County Air Pollution Control District Rule 1 14 (1999), available at http://
www.arb.ca.govIDRDB; Imperial County Air Pollution Control District Rule 211
(1999), available at http://imperiaJcounty.neUag; and San Joaquin Unified Air Pollu
tion Control District Rule 5060 (1993), available at http://www.valleyair.org/rules/
currntrules/r5060.pdf.
The relationship between variances and appeals by disappointed permit applicants is
addressed supra text at notes 32-34.
195. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42306 (WEST 2006). See Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co. v. Lunche, 367 F. Supp. 106 (CD. Cal. 1973).
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provision is rarely, if ever, invoked. Third, Section 42307 autho
rizes an air pollution control officer to request the hearing board
to determine "whether a permit should be revoked" when the
permittee has been found to be violating district requirements.196
The fourth avenue for permit disputes to come to hearing boards
is Section 40713. It allows appeals from APeD refusals to ap
prove emissions reductions for "banking" and later use as offsets
against future emission increases.197
Fifth, Section 42302.1 allows "any aggrieved person," who pre
viously has participated in some way in the district's permitting
action, to appeal "any decision or action pertaining to the issu
ance of a permit by a district." The hearing board's responsibility
then is to "hold a public hearing and . . . render a decision on
whether the permit was properly issued." Proceedings under
Section 42302.1 are commonly referred to as "citizen appeals" or
"third party appeals."198 In addition to this statutory provision
for such appeals, some districts also have similar rules authoriz
ing third party appeals.199
196. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42307 (West 2006). The most prominent
example of such a proceeding is Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590
(1st Dist. 1980).
197. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., No. 1062 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, Notice of Appeal) (Nov. 10, 1982). See also Kaiser Interna
tional Corp. v. Executive Officer, No. 5110 (Hearing Board, South Coast Air Qual
ity Management District, Findings and Decision) (Oct. 2, 2003). Judicial review of
the Kaiser International decision is discussed infra note 206. Section 40709(a) of the
Health & Safety Code requires every district to establish "a system by which all
reductions in the emission of air contaminants that are to be used to offset certain
future increases in the emission of air contaminants shall be banked prior to use to
offset future increases in emissions."
198. "Although the Hearing Board colloquially refers to these cases as 'appeals,'
the Health and Safety Code does not use the term 'appeal.' " SCAQMD QUESTION.
NAIRE, supra note 11, at 9. Although originally the statutory time period for filing
this type of appeal was 10 days, it was changed to 30 days in 1999. 1999 Stats., ch.
643, § 12. Cf Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. Davis, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1123, 1126
(2002) ("By letter dated July 14, 1999, the [San Joaquin Valley Unified APCD] hear
ing board advised Padres its petition was rejected because it was filed late and with
out the required filing fee.")
199. Even before the enactment of Section 42302.1 in 1988, the Bay Area AQMD
had such a rule, broadly allowing for a permit applicant or "any other person dissat
isfied with the decision" on a permit application to "appeal to the District Hearing
Board for an order modifying or reversing that decision." Bay Area AQMD, Regu
lation 2, Rule 1, § 410 (as amended October 7, 1981). The legality of this provision
was upheld in three superior court rulings. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hearing Bd. of
the Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. 235477 (Contra Costa Cty. Super. Ct.
May 26, 1982); Port of Redwood City v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County 1981) (No. 780189);
Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area Air Quality Management
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The Standard of Review

It is evident from these provisions that permit disputes are not
subject to the type of detailed statutory standards that govern the
decision of variance cases. The issue in permit cases-often re
ferred to as the "standard of review"-is more skeletally framed
as whether a permit was "properly" denied, suspended, or issued;
whether emission reduction credits were "properly refused;" or
whether a permit "should be revoked" if the permit holder is vio
lating some applicable requirement.
In practice, however, the inquiry within these terse standards
should be whether the district staff has made a fair, reasonable
interpretation of the applicable legal requirements in its action
regarding a permit applicant or permittee. The hearing board's
usual function should be to determine whether the staff view in
the permit dispute falls within a sensible application of the lan
guage and purpose of the pertinent regulations or other
requirements.
This perspective is consistent with the traditional legal pre
sumption of the regularity and correctness of administrative ac
tion. 2oo This presumption means that the burden of proof in a
permit dispute should be on the party challenging the district
staff's action or finding.201 It also means that the hearing board
District (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County 1981) (No. 441380). The rule in its
present form now closely tracks the statutory language in Sections 42302 and
42302.1. The rule also adds, "The Hearing Board may reverse or modify the deci
sion of the APCO if it determines that the decision was erroneous." Another exam
ple of a district rule based on Section 42302.1 may be found at Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., Regulation II, Rule 211 (3.2). available at http://
www. arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbu/cur.htm (last revised Oct. 16, 2002).
Section 3.6 of the Bay Area Hearing Board's Rules, which generally covers interven
tion in permit appeals, also declares, "In all cases involving permit regulations, an
Application for Intervention filed by the permit applicant or permit holder shall be
granted as a matter of right." This provision assures that a permittee whose permit
is challenged through a third party appeal will be able to protect its interests as a full
party to the appeal proceeding. Even in the absence of such a provision, as a matter
of fundamental fairness the permit applicant or permittee always should be allowed
to participate fully as the real party in interest when its permit is under challenge.
200. CAL EVID. CODE § 664 (West 2006) ("It is presumed that official duty has
been regularly performed."). See also Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Auth., 40
Cal. 2d 317, 329 (1953); A -J Roofing Serv., 151 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
201. See CAL EVID. CODE § 660 (West 2006); see also A-J Roofing Serv., 151 Cal.
Rptr. at 527.
Even though the burden of proof is on the party challenging the district's decision,
and thus that party presumably should go first with presentation of its case, often a
more efficient course is to allow the district staff to begin the evidentiary hearings
with a brief explanation of the permit action at issue and the introduction into evi-
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should not lightly disagree with the staff's determinations. A
hearing board in permit cases is operating analogously to the role
of an appellate court reviewing administrative agency action.
This is in contrast to the board's function in variance or abate
ment cases, where the better analogy is the work of trial courts
determining matters in the first instance.202 In short, the hearing
board should not substitute its judgment in permit cases for that
of the expert, full-time staff of the APCD.203
This does not mean, of course, that this oversight and review
function of the hearing board should be forfeited through auto
matic, uninformed deference to the staff. It also does not mean
that the hearing board's review of the district's permitting action
must be restricted by barring the introduction of any evidence
other than the documentation that was before the staff when it
considered and made its decision. That documentation, compiled
more or less as an "administrative record" of the staff's action,
should be the evidentiary core of the case. Nonetheless, the
party challenging that action should have an opportunity to predence of the administrative record, as discussed infra text at notes 204-206. In this
manner, the hearing board can be oriented at the outset on basic aspects of the
district action under dispute. Following this introductory testimony, the permit chal
lenger then should be allowed to proceed to demonstrate the alleged impropriety of
the action.
202. But see Memorandum from Michael Strumwasser, Strumwasser & Woocher
LLP, to Edward Camarena, Chair, South Coast Air Quality Management District
Hearing Board (Jan. 22, 2001) (on file with author) regarding Communities for a
Better Environment v. Executive Officer, No. 5031-3, stating:
The function of the Hearing Board is analogous to the familiar administrative-law
function of an administrative adjudicator conducting a hearing on an appeal from
the denial of a permit or license, or on a disciplinary action imposed by an employ
ing agency. . . .
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which this Hearing Board is conducting a "review"
of a decision of an inferior officer.
It appears that at an earlier stage of statutory development, variances could be
granted by either county APCD hearing boards or the courts. See Hershman, supra
note 5 at 1491.
203. Adaptations of the standard of review approach presented here 'may be
found at Appeal of the Southeast Alliance for Environmental Justice et al. from the
Exxon Co., No. 3304 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Order Denying Appeal) (June 29, 2000), at 4-6; Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.
Hearing Bd. Rules §3.5, available at http://www. baaqmd.govlbrd/hearingboard/
hb_rules.pdf (effective Dec. 5 , 2005); and OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, CALIFORNIA
AIR RESOURCES BOARD, LEGAL INFORMATION FOR VARIANCE HEARING BOARD
MEMBERS, at 14-15. See also Letter from Edward Camarena, South Coast Air Qual
ity Management District Hearing Board Chair, to author (Aug. 11, 2004) (on file
with author) (" [T]he Hearing Board . . . would limit its review to whether the Execu
tive Director [sic] applied the relevant statutes and regulations to the application in
a way that was reasonable, fair, and complete.").
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sent additional, extrinsic evidence relevant to the propriety of the
action under the standard of review as described above. Al
though a hearing board may be functioning generally as an ad
ministrative appellate tribunal, it is, after all, a "hearing" board.
Furthermore, the administrative record may not have the for
mality and thoroughness of a record presented to an appellate
court, and the hearing board is not statutorily authorized simply
to read briefs and the agency's documentary record and then
render a ruling.204 Accordingly, the hearing board should hear
relevant evidence in order to give the challenger of the district's
permit action a fair chance in a public forum to demonstrate that
the district has erred. 205
The scope of the evidence is a separate matter from the scope
of the review in permit disputes. Occasionally it is argued that a
hearing board which takes any such additional evidence must
necessarily be prepared to render its own independent j udgment
on the underlying permit questions at issue. That conclusion
does not follow logically or legally. The focus of the case remains
the reasonableness of the district's action. Resolution of that in
quiry must combine examination of the administrative record
with the hearing of further evidence relevant to the reasonable204Thus, upon the request of an applicant whose request for [emission reduction
credits] has been denied, the Health and Safety Code requires the Hearing Board
to hold a hearing, to take testimony, and to consider that testimony in making its
decision. The effect of these directives in the Health and Safety Code is to prohibit
the Hearing Board from limiting its review to the record that was in front of the
Executive Officer at the time he made his decision.
Kaiser International Corp. v. Executive Officer, No. 5110 (Hearing Board, South
Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Oct. 2, 2003), at 4.
See also SCAQMD QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 11, at 11. ("The Hearing Board
review would not be limited to the record created by the air district when it acted on
the application, because the Health and Safety Code requires the Hearing Board to
hold a hearing and to accept testimony.").
205. Cf Memorandum from Michael Strumwasser to Edward Camarena, supra
note 202, agreeing that additional evidence should be heard, but asserting that there
is no administrative record of the district's decision. The memorandum states,
"Cases before the Hearing Board are not limited to the record before the Executive
Officer, and, indeed, there is no such record certified to the Hearing Board." Ad
mittedly the form and content of documentation of a permitting decision probably
will vary considerably from one instance to the next, particularly since permit ap
peals to hearing boards are so infrequent. In that sense, perhaps it is correct to
assert that such documentation cannot be equated with a record on appeal in a judi
cial forum. Nevertheless, as a practical matter it usually is feasible for APCD staff
to compile the major pertinent documents in a fashion that all parties can agree is a
fair presentation of the factual bases for the decision. That compilation should suf
fice as an administrative record, which then becomes the focal point of information
to be considered by the hearing board.
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ness of what the district did on the basis of the information
before it, or otherwise fairly available to it, at the time it acted.206
Permit cases tend to be unusually technical, both scientifically
and legally. The customary variance case emphasis on issues
such as economic hardship, nuisance effects, and reasonable con
trol is replaced in permit cases with much more sophisticated and
time-consuming inquiries. These delve into the details of specific
manufacturing processes, pollution control technology ap
proaches, future emissions predictions, baseline emissions histo
ries and formulas,207 ambient air quality levels, permit review
206. The South Coast AQMD Hearing Board has followed this approach, indicat
ing that "although this Board concluded that the record would not be limited to
documents in the Executive Officer's permit file, the Hearing Board also concluded
that it would consider only documents that are relevant to determining whether the
actions that the Executive Officer took . . . were proper. During the hearing, Peti
tioner would be allowed to allege that there was other information, not contained in
the permit file, which the Executive Officer should have considered in making his
decision." Kaiser Int'l Corp. v. Executive Officer, No. 5 1 10 (Hearing Board, South
Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Decision) (Oct. 2, 2003, at 67). See also SCAQMD QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 11, at 11. ("The petitioner
would be allowed to allege that there was other information that the Executive Of
ficer should have considered, but did not consider, in making his decision.").
Somewhat clouding this sensible approach, however, the Hearing Board chose to
describe it as "a de novo hearing." Id. at 10-1 1. That phrase would seem to carry the
unintended and inaccurate connotation that the Hearing Board would give no defer
ence at all to the District's decision and would consider the permit question as if the
District's determination had not taken place. See Black's Law Dictionary 725 (7th
ed. 1999), defining "hearing de novo" as "a reviewing court's decision of a matter
anew, giving no deference to a lower court's findings" or "a new hearing of a matter,
conducted as if the original hearing had not take place." Indeed, precisely this per
spective was asserted when Kaiser International Corporation pursued judicial re
view of the Hearing Board's rejection of its appeal of the district's denial of emission
reduction credits. Kaiser Int'! Corp. v. Hearing Board, No. B178997, Appellant's
Opening Brief at 14-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d, Div. 3, filed May 17, 2005). Compare id.
to Response Brief for Executive Officer of the South Coast Air Quality Manage
ment District, at 6, filed Oct. 13, 2005, stating:
The Hearing Board ruled that while they would undertake a de novo review, that
review was limited to whether or not the Executive Officer "properly" denied the
application for credits. This meant that the Hearing Board would not set out on a
new fact finding expedition years after the application was filed. This was a task
for the Executive Officer, with a large full time staff of engineers.

The appellant's reply, however, continued to argue "that unfettered de novo (i.e.,
anew, fresh) review . . . is the correct standard of review. Thus, the Hearing Board is
authorized to consider all relevant evidence and argument that petitioner might pre
sent to it in its consideration of whether it should grant or deny Kaiser's applica
tions." Id., Appellant's Reply Brief, at 2, filed Nov. 7, 2005. As of March 2006, the
appellate court had not ruled on this dispute.
207. An exhaustive analysis of the kinds of problems encountered in determining
a past baseline against which to compare future emissions may be found in Standard
Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1st Dist. 1980).
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procedures, and the legislative history of individual regulatory
specifications.208
At times, permit disputes brought before hearing boards have
related to APCD regulations which are in the process of being
changed, especially regulations for new source review of major
projects. In the B ay Area district this has been true in a number
of complex permit cases the hearing board has faced over the
years.209 A hearing board in such instances is being called on to
clarify serious uncertainties that may accompany the evolution
and implementation of any new, substantial environmental regu
lation. This function is particularly sensitive when dealing with
new source review provisions, which may have substantial impact
on economic development.
C.

To CEQA or Not To CEQA

As if these challenging kinds of issues were not enough, in
some districts a new layer of legal and factual complexity has
been added. Hearing boards have allowed citizen appeals under
Section 42302.1 to include claims that the APCD has violated the
requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA),21 0 That lengthy and complex statute-augmented by
the even lengthier and more detailed CEQA Guidelines211-cre
ates detailed processes for environmental review of discretionary
governmental actions which may have significant, adverse envi
ronmental effects. As is widely known, CEQA is the statute that
creates the environmental impact report requirements to which a
208. Complex issues of interpretation of the purposes and operation of permit
schemes can also arise in abatement cases involving permit violations, as illustrated
in Julius Goldman'S Egg City v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 116 Cal. App. 3d 741
(2d Dist. 1981).
209. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Feldstein, 105 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1st Dist. 1980);
Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay
Area Air Quality Management District (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County 1982)
(No. 494183); Citizens for a Better Environment, No. 837 (Hearing. Board, Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, Order Denying Appeal) (Mar. 3, 1983)
(Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Richmond Lube Oil Project); Pacific' Gas & Elec. Co., No.
1062 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Notice of Ap
peal) (Nov. 10, 1982); Citizens for a Better Environment, No. 675 (Hearing Board,
Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order Modifying Authority to Con
struct) (June 19, 1980) (Wickland Oil Co. petroleum products distribution terminal);
Dow Chern. Co., No. 567 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District,
Request for Hearing Following Improper Denial of Permit) (Aug. 20, 1976).
210. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West 2006).
211. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15000 et seq. (2004).
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multitude of state and local government actions are subject each
year.
Hearing boards which have grappled with CEQA claims have
found them extraordinarily difficult to address, which should
come as no surprise. By statutory prescription, the focus of
CEQA is broad, "to consider qualitative factors as well as eco
nomic and technical factors and long-term benefits and costs, in
addition to short-term benefits and costs and to consider alterna
tives to proposed actions affecting the environment."212 There is
nothing in CEQA, however, to indicate that the legislature be
lieved that air pollution hearing boards had the capability, and
should have the authority, to address these broad and diverse
considerations in governmental decisionmaking. In contrast, by
its own detailed procedural and remedial provisions, CEQA
makes clear that review of agency action subject to the Act is to
be sought in court.213 Similarly, there is nothing in the Health
and Safety Code to indicate a specific legislative intention to vest
in hearing boards any jurisdiction whatsoever to hear CEQA
claims.
There is, however, a semantically plausible argument that the
skeletal statutory standard of review, asking whether a permit ac
tion was "properly" taken, opens up alleged CEQA violations
for hearing board consideration. The better view, adopted by the
South Coast AQMD Hearing B oard, is that there is no such juris
diction in hearing boards under the terms of CEQA or the
Health and Safety Code.214 Among the arguments found persua
sive by that board were the following:
212. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21001(g) (West 2006).
213. See, e.g., id. §§ 21167-21168.5 (West 2006).
214. Southern California Pipe Trades District Council, No. 831-256 (Hearing
Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Minute Order) (Dec. 22,
1993). Earlier the South Coast Hearing Board did include CEQA issues within its
jurisdiction in permit appeals. See, e.g., Petition of Rialto Power Corp., No. 3405
(Hearing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Findings and Deci
sion) (Feb. 1987) at 29 ("The District has complied with the requirements of CEQA
as a responsible agency for Petitioner's project, and no additional CEQA documen
tation is required.").
The 1993 case is one of many permit appeals brought in the South Coast and Bay
Area districts by trade unions under the citizen appeals provisions of Section 42302.1
and related district rules. Although there has been criticism that unions have initi
ated these appeals for collateral reasons relating to non-union construction projects,
the breadth of the statutory allowance for citizen appeals has left no doubt about the
unions' right to initiate these proceedings. See Stephen G. Hirsch, Green with En
mity: Organized Labor's Use of Environmentalism as Leverage Has Contractors Cry
ing Foul, But So Far Courts Have Sided with the Unions, THE RECORDER, Aug. 6,
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CEQA analysis requires a review of every area of potential envi
ronmental impact, well beyond air quality issues, and therefore be
yond the level of expertise expected of the Hearing Board. . . .
Clearly, the Health and Safety Code, in vesting the Hearing Board
with only limited authority over environmental matters, did not in
tend that the Hearing Board exercise its jurisdiction over such
comprehensive environmental matters as CEQA challenges.
Without the expertise required to adjudicate CEQA matters, the
proceedings conducted by the hearing board would necessarily be
lengthy and complicated. . . . There simply was no legislative in
tent that CEQA cases be entertained by the Hearing Board and
without the necessary statutory and regulatory tools to govern the
conduct of such a case, the Hearing Board would be seriously com
promised in its ability to do SO.215

Recognizing that the South Coast AQMD Hearing Board is
often and aptly described as the only "full time" and "profes
sional" hearing board,216 it must be concluded that the limita
tions on its capacity to hear CEQA matters would ordinarily be
even more severe for hearing boards elsewhere.
To find CEQA jurisdiction in hearing boards would be to dis
regard, and override, CEQA's finely wrought provisions for ex
pert and expeditious judicial review. As suggested by the South
Coast Hearing Board, such a conclusion also would presuppose a
depth and breadth of legal and technical expertise in hearing
board members which would seldom correspond with reality and
1992, at 1; Reynolds Holding, Bargaining Chip for the 90's: Unions Pressure Firms
on Environment, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 1992, at AI. The scope of these citizen ap
peal provisions has also allowed a company to obtain hearing board review of a
permit issued to a competitor company. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Air Pollution
Control Officer, No. 1437 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management Dis
trict, Order Finding Error) (Jan. 8, 1987) (appeal filed by Kaiser Cement Corpora
tion against permit to construct granted to Lone Star Industries for modification of
existing facility for unloading of cement from ships).
The South Coast's conclusion was rejected, and jurisdiction over CEQA claims was
assumed, in Appeal of Citizens for Review of Medical and Infectious Waste Imports
into Tehama County, No. 05-001, cited supra note 19. The author, as one of the
attorneys for the permittee, assisted in preparing the opposition to this assumption
of CEQA j urisdiction.
215. Southern California Pipe Trades District Council, No. 831-256, supra note
214 (Motion to Dismiss Portions of Petitioner's Appeals) (Dec. 8, 1993) at 9-11 .
216. Email from Judy Lewis, California Air Resources Board, to author (June 24,
2004) (on file with author) (referring to the South Coast AQMD Hearing Board
members "as 'professional' hearing board members - working 3 days per week as
opposed to others who may meet once a year or month"); and Interview with Hear
ing Board, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Diamond Bar, California
(June 14, 2005).
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never correspond with the statutory qualifications for hearing
board membership.217
In short, there is virtually nothing in California statutes to indi
cate that hearing boards are authorized to resolve CEQA dis
putes, and thus the statutes do not confer such jurisdiction.218
Conversely, if an APCD has incorporated CEQA requirements
into its own permitting rules, then the hearing board's basic au
thority to hear appeals of alleged violations of those rules would
seem to encompass CEQA issues covered by the district's own
requirements. This is the view taken in the Bay Area AQMD,
whose hearing board has heard and resolved a series of difficult
cases alleging violations of the district's rules implementing
CEQA.219 There is no reason, of course, to believe that the hear
ing board in a district with such rules is any more qualified to
resolve CEQA matters than a board in a district without them.
217. See text supra at notes 13-18.
218. This conclusion is not undermined by the 1993 addition to Section 42302.1 of
convoluted phrasing related to an uncodified, limited CEQA exemption for permit
ting of certain applications of coatings in existing automotive manufacturing plants.
See Stats. 1993, ch. 1131, § 3. This narrowly focused addition allowed for a permit
appeal under Section 42302.1 to determine only whether the bill's own exemption
criteria were satisfied, and not whether any provisions of CEQA were violated. In
making this narrow expansion of jurisdiction to include specific issues beyond the
Health & Safety Code, and another explicit addition in Sections 42331(a) and
42332(a) of the Code, the Legislature made clear that hearing board jurisdiction
otherwise is confined to issues within the Code. To dispute this conclusion is to
assert that the Legislature engaged in a meaningless act, setting forth power which
already existed.
219. Consolidated Appeals of the Pipe Trades Council et al. from the Authority to
Construct Permit Issued December14,1987 to USS-POSCO Industries, Nos. 18571858 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Final Order Con
cerning CEQA Issues) (June 23, 1988); Appeal of the People United for a Better
Oakland et al. from the Permit to Operate Issued to Integrated Environmental Sys
tems, No. 3165 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Order
Denying Appeal) (Apr. 2, 1998); and Appeal of the Southeast Alliance for Environ
mental Justice et al. from the Grant of Interchangeable Emission Reduction Credit
Certificates, No. 3304 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District,
Order Denying Appeal) (June 29, 2000). In the latter case, the author appeared as
counsel for the holder of the certificates. For one of the Bay Area board's earliest
CEQA-related decisions, see Appeal of Citizens for a Better Environment, Nos. 675
and 677 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Revised Or
der) (Aug. 23, 1979) (denying District's claim of general exemption from CEQA).
In that case, the Hearing Board subsequently found, "It is not undisputed that the
Air Pollution Control Officer has shown that he participated in the preparation of
the Environmental Impact Report prepared under the supervision of the California
State Lands Commission, has reviewed the Final Environmental Impact Report for
the project, and has determined that any significant environmental effects of the
project within the jurisdiction of the District have been mitigated." Id. Order Modi
fying Authority to Construct After Rehearing filed June 19, 1980.
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Nevertheless, if the district's governing board has adopted
CEQA rules, and explicitly or implicitly allowed appeals to the
hearing board regarding them, that would seem to be a choice
within its power to make.220
D.

Approaches to Permit Cases

Because permit cases tend to be individually distinctive, it is
difficult to generalize about suggested approaches to the parties'
presentations of their positions. Usually the greatest challenge in
permit cases is to make sure that the hearing board members
regardless of their various degrees of expertise-understand the
technical evidence being presented. Counsel for the parties in
such a case must strive to translate their clients' detailed and ex
pert familiarity with the facts, and counsel's own interpretations
of the law, into clear explanations of the points they wish the
hearing board to grasp and act on.
VI.
CHANGES, CONTROVERSIES, AND CONFUSIONS

A.

Changes

Many of the preceding sections discuss changes in law and
practice concerning California's hearing boards. Three addi
tional changes with broad significance warrant further discussion.
They are the role of the ARB, the functions of the hearing board
chairperson, and the use of outside counsel to the board.
First, the ARB has assumed a more active and influential role.
Although the ARB many years ago presented training sessions
for APCD enforcement personnel, more recently it has regularly
offered training sessions targeted at hearing board members.221
220. See, e.g., Placer County Air Pollution Control District, Rules 308-309. Al
though numerous APCDs have rules mentioning the applicability of CEQA to per
mitting, hardly any have rules specifically addressing administrative appeals of
CEQA determinations. An unusual exception, placing jurisdiction in the district's
governing board rather than its hearing board, is Siskiyou County APCD Rule 2.14,
which states, "The Control Officer's determination regarding compliance with
CEQA may be appealed by any affected party . . . . Any appeal shall be made to the
APCD Board . . . . Any appeal of the Control Officer's CEQA determination for a
project shall be heard and decided by the Air Pollution Control Board prior to any
decision by the Hearing Board regarding an appeal, if applicable, of a permit for the
same project made pursuant to Regulation V." In effect, this regulation places
CEQA appeals before the governing board, but permit appeals on other grounds
before the hearing board, even if both proceedings derive from the same permit.
221. ARB's "Variance Oversight Program" is described at www.arb.ca.gov/enfl
variance/variance.htm. The ARB's "Basic Course" and "Advanced Course" work-
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This is a welcome development, for as hearing board work has
become more complex, it has become more important for mem
bers to have well-focused preparation for their duties. They need
to understand the scope of their responsibilities under the law, as
well as the types of procedures their predecessors have devel
oped for handling different kinds of cases.
In conducting these sessions, and in intermittently distributing
written guidance to hearing boards about significant questions
that arise, the ARB staff serves as a clearinghouse through which
hearing board members from different parts of the state can
learn from each other, as well as from ARB personnel and staff
experts from various APCDs.222 If the ARB maintains its com
mitment to dedicating qualified staff and adequate resources to
fulfill this support and "quality control" role for the hearing
boards, the caliber of hearing board work can only be enhanced.
Additionally, as earlier mentioned, ARB is statutorily empow
ered to perform a key backstopping role in variance cases.223
The possibility that ARB will exercise its authority to revoke or
modify variance orders can be a strong inducement for hearing
boards to make sure their procedures and orders are in accord
with statutory requirements.224
A second change in hearing board practices revolves around
the role of the chairperson.225 As the variety and complexity of
shops for hearing board members are summarized at www.arb.ca.gov/enflvariance/
avhb.htm.
222. Additionally, representatives of industry occasionally attend these training
sessions, allowing them to understand hearing board functions better as well. Inter
view with Judy Lewis and Leslie Krinsk, California Air Resources Board, Sacra
mento, California (June 16, 2004).
223. See supra text at notes 72-73.
224. In a case before the South Coast AQMD Hearing Board, ARB enforcement
officials' attempt to persuade the hearing board to alter the anticipated outcome of
its hearings was strongly objected to because "CARB's proper role in reviewing
decisions of the Hearing Board does not arise [under Health & Safety Code Sections
42360-42363] until after an order is issued by the Hearing Board. No order has yet
been issued in this case and, hence, CARB has no jurisdiction or authority to be
involved at this stage of the proceedings." Letter from Lawrence Straw, Jr., to James
Morgester, California Air Resources Board, re Security Environmental Systems,
Inc., SCAQMD Hearing Board Case No. 1958-8, (March 13, 1980) (on file with au
thor). The author assisted in the preparation of this objection.
225. Section 40806 of the California Health & Safety Code requires each hearing
board to "select a chairman from its members." In some districts, the masculine
statutory term is modified to "chairperson" or "chair." See, e.g., Bay Area Air Qual
ity Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 5.6, (using "Chairperson") and Bay Area Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Board Rules § 10.4, (using "Chair"), available at http://
www.baaqmd.gov/brd/hearingboard/hb_mles.pdf (effective Dec. 5, 2005).
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cases have grown, the chair's duties have also tended to expand
and diversify. Thus, in addition to presiding over hearings, the
chair often has other duties. For example, in the Lake County
AQMD, "The Hearing Board Chairperson approves hearing
date/times, runs meetings, signs orders, and may sit alone for
emergency hearings. "226 The chair of the South Coast AQMD
Hearing Board "conducts up to three or four pre-hearing confer
ences on some days. Prehearing conferences are used to discuss
any issues relevant to the proceedings, including witnesses, sub
poenas, exhibits, discovery matters, legal issues and the length of
time needed to complete the proceeding. "227 In the Mojave De
sert AQMD, "[t]he Chair runs the meetings and also is the first
person called to hear emergency and/or interim petitions."228 In
the El Dorado County AQMD Hearing Board, " [t]he chairper
son may be designated as a single reviewer/signatory on a final
ized document. "229 Often these types of duties are set forth
individually in specific hearing board rules, and in some districts
a separate rule also attempts to lists all the chairperson's
responsibilities.230
This type of expansion of the role of the chairperson recog
nizes the need for delegation of specific tasks in order to pro
mote more efficient discharge of boards' responsibilities. As the
chair's responsibilities increase, however, there is a risk that the
power of that individual may come to be seen as greater than it
really is, especially in the eyes of the individual enjoying that po
sition. Even though the spotlight in hearing board matters usu
ally is on the chairperson, it must be remembered that each of
the five members has equal responsibility for hearing the case

226. Letter from Robert L. Reynolds, Air Pollution Control Officer, Lake County
Air Quality Management District, to author (Apr. 15, 2004), supra note 19.
227. SCAQMD QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 11, at 4.
228. Memorandum from Karen Nowak, Mojave Desert Air Quality Management
District, to author (May 2, 2004) (on file with author).
229. Letter from Thomas Fashinell, Acting Chairperson, EI Dorado County Air
Quality Management District Hearing Board, to author (Apr. 27, 2004) (on file with
author).
230. See, e.g., Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 5.18 ("Au
thority for scheduling cases before the Hearing Board or continuing cases before the
Hearing Board rests with the Chair of the Hearing Board . . . ."), and Bay Area Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 13.2, (listing twelve "Duties of the Chair")
available at http://www.baaqmd.govlbrd/hearingboard/hb_rules.pdf (effective Dec. 5,
2005).
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and casting his or her vote on its resolution.231 A corollary of
this responsibility is the need for each member to be free to air
his or her relevant concerns during the hearings, and to ask ques
tions bearing on the way he or she ultimately will vote. When
the chairperson presides with too heavy a hand, taking center
stage to the exclusion of full participation by other members, the
process has gone awry.
Conversely, the chairperson does haye a responsibility to en
sure that the proceedings are efficient and orderly, and at times
this duty is problematic because of the inclination of one or an
other member to engage in excessive, time-consuming statements
or questions. The chairperson is then challenged to find a way, as
diplomatically yet effectively as possible, to rein in his or her col- .
league and get the proceeding back on a relevant, expeditious
track.
At times even a bigger challenge is to maintain calm and order
in the hearing room itself. Parties, and sometimes their lawyers,
can become quite vocal and exercised when things are not going
their way, and the chairperson bears the burden of restraining
outbursts they may be inclined to make. Even more challenging
is the maintenance of decorum when the audience at a hearing is
agitated about how a proceeding is unfolding. There have been
cases before hearing boards in which residents of a neighbor
hood, citizen group representatives, labor union representatives,
or others have attended the hearings and found it difficult to re
main quiet during the proceedings.
In these disruptive circumstances, the chairperson should be
respectful of the concerns animating the outbursts, yet firm in
restraining them. Interested members of the public should be re
minded, repeatedly if necessary, that they will have "a reasonable
opportunity to testify with regards to the matter under considera
tion," as required by Health and Safety Code Section 40828.232
231. As discussed supra text at note 12, Section 40820 predicates hearing board
action "upon the affirmative vote of a majority of. the members of the hearing
board."
232. The "management and control of contentious hearings, especially those
where there is participation by the public," is identified by the South Coast AQMD
Hearing Board as one of the most challenging aspects of its activities. That board
has identified "four key factors that are important in the maintenance of an orderly
process in contentious hearings." They are the formal setting of the hearing, the
demeanor of the members, security, and the opening remarks by the Chair, which
are described as "[p]erhaps the most important factor when there are potentially
volatile members of the public." Explaining this last factor, the board has stated:
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Even in the public testimony phase of the proceedings, however,
members of the public may be intemperate or unfocused in their
statements. The chairperson then may decide it is necessary to
call for restraint and perhaps to impose a time limit on each
speaker. Nevertheless, so long as the public testimony is relevant
to the issues before the board, the chairperson and members
should be indulgent and attentive so that the public truly has a
fair opportunity to be heard.
A chairperson who is unsure about his or her responsibility for
decorum, and who lets a proceeding become disorderly at the
instance of either the parties or the audience, is not doing the job
properly. That chairperson creates serious risks that the board
will be unable to clearly hear and understand the evidence that is
relevant and, therefore, that the parties to the case will not be
given a fair hearing. Those risks may lead not only to unwise
resolution of cases, but to judicial reversals as well.
A third important change in hearing board practice is in
creased use of outside counsel to the hearing board. As earlier
noted,233 j udicial challenges to some abatement orders have ne
cessitated the retention of outside counsel to defend hearing
board orders. In addition to these instances, some hearing
boards have found it necessary, either for specific cases or as a
matter of regular practice, to have the advice of counsel. This
advice is in addition to input provided by the attorney member of
the hearing board and by attorneys for the parties to the pro
ceedings, including the attorney for the APCD staff. Resort to a
separate source of legal advice apparently has come to be seen as
necessary because of the increasing difficulty of hearing board
work.
In recognition of this need, at the suggestion of the Monterey
Bay Unified APCD, Section 40809 was added to the Health and
Safety Code in 1986. It provides that the county counsel's office
"may represent both the district and the hearing board on a mat
ter relating to a hearing before the hearing board as long as the
same individual attorney does not represent both the district and
In this situation, it is important to identify the participants, tell them that this is not
an open forum, that it is like a court proceeding, what the procedure will be, that
they will have an opportunity to testify under oath, that they may be cross ex
amined and that the Hearing Board will deliberate in public, make its decision in
public and state the reasons for its decision.
SCAQMD QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 11, at 6.
233. Supra note 190.
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the hearing board."234 This provision does not apply, however,
to the Bay Area AQMD or the South Coast AQMD.235 Assum
ing that the designated lawyers within a county counsel's office
can construct and respect an ethical wall as contemplated by this
provision, Section 40809 is a workable response to the occasional
need for outside legal advice for a hearing board.
There are some risks associated with this access to indepen
dent legal advice, even from the county counsel's office. Particu
larly with a hearing board that meets very infrequently, and
whose members are not well versed in their duties and the intri
cacies of the Health and Safety Code, there may be a tendency to
rely too heavily on counsel's advice. For example, there may be
an inclination to seek counsel's views on the merits of a case
before the hearing board, rather than limiting the advice to back
ground legal and procedural matters. The injection of such views
into the proceedings is not proper, in view of basic procedural
requirements governing hearing board matters, including re
quirements that the members themselves make the decisions and
that decisions be based on sworn testimony.
The risks associated with outside counsel's role are magnified
when that attorney does not approach the proceedings in an un
biased fashion, or at least appears to have some conflicting inter
est. This risk is much less likely when the county counsel's office
provides the attorney than when a private firm does, as can occur
in the Bay Area or South Coast districts.236 A private attorney
rendering independent legal advice to a hearing board should not
234. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40809(a) (West 2006). At originally intro
duced, the bill which became Section 40809 would have authorized a district's gov
erning board to "contract to employ legal counsel to advise the hearing board
concerning matters of law and administrative procedure." See S.B. 854, as intro
duced by Sen. Mello, March 5, 1985. The Monterey Bay district previously had con
tracted with private counsel to provide ."Iegal guidance services," including sitting
with the hearing board during regular meetings and conferring "with the Chair as
needed." Memorandum from Larry Odie, Air Pollution Control Officer, Monterey
Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District, to the Air Pollution Control Board (July
19, 1984) (on file with author). While retaining the option to continue to use private
counsel, the Monterey Bay district staff sought the new provision in order to reduce
costs by being able "to utilize the Monterey County Counsel's office to provide
these services."
235. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40809(b) (West 2006).
236. "Legal questions regarding substantive matters before the [South Coast
AQMD] Hearing Board (e.g., the interpretation of provisions of the Health and
Safety Code setting out the fact findings for variances) are handled by the legal
member of the Hearing Board. Other questions involving the Hearing Board's au
thority or procedures may be directed to outside counsel." SCAQMD QUESTION
NAIRE, supra note 1 1 , at 5.
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have any of the types of conflicts of interest that would taint or
disqualify a hearing board member in the proceeding.237
B.

Controversies

A dispute arose in the late 1980s over the applicability of the
Ralph M. Brown Act238 to hearing board proceedings. The
Brown Act is the open meetings law applicable to local govern
ment agencies. For many years, almost all hearing boards have
assumed-usually without serious analysis of the question-that
the Brown Act applies to them. In the Bay Area AQMD and the
Monterey B ay Unified APeD, however, staff attorneys had
reached the contrary conclusion. In 1986 this departure from
majority practice was questioned. Through a rather protracted
and, at times, contentious process, the issue was presented to the
ARB, which in turn requested and received a formal legal opin
ion from the Attorney General. 239
The specific question before the Attorney General was
whether a hearing board is required to conduct its deliberations
in public after it has concluded public hearings on a matter but
not yet reached and "announce[d] its decision in writing," as re
quired by statute.240 The Bay Area and Monterey Bay boards
believed that the Brown Act was not applicable because its terms
focused on legislative bodies, rather than purely adjudicatory
237. Conflict of interest issues related to hearing board members are discussed
infra at Section VI(B). An objection to a hearing board's use of a particular private
firm as outside counsel in a permit case arose in Appeal of Contra Costa Carbon
Plant, No. 3402 (Hearing Board, Bay Area AQMD). See Letter from Kenneth A.
Manaster, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, to Thomas Dailey, Chairperson, Bay Area Air
Quality Management District Hearing Board (Nov. 14, 2002) (objecting to hearing
board's choice of outside counsel "presently representing an environmental organi
zation that is suing Tosco Corporation, the owner and operator of the carbon plant
which is the subject of this appeal. This involvement presents a conflict of interest
for [the attorney] and, more importantly, compromises the appearance of impartial
ity of the Hearing Board's proceedings if he participates in them."). See also Appeal
of the City of Morgan Hill, No. 3350 (Hearing Board, Bay Area Air Quality Man
agement District, Minute Order Denying Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration)
(Mar. 11, 2002) ("The Board voted 3-1 to deny Appellants' request to disqualify
outside counsel. . . . The reason for the Board's decision was that Appellants had
failed to show any violation of due process.").
238. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 54950 et seq. (West 2006).
239. See Dale Champion, Bay's Smog Board Guards Its Secrets, S. F. CHRON·.,
Aug. 30, 1988, at B6; Dale Champion, Appeals Panel Under Fire: Smog Board Punts
on Secrecy Issue, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 8, 1988, at A6; and Editorial, A Defiant Board
Should Obey Law, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1988, at A16.
240. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40860 (West 2006) .
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bodies.241 Additionally, those boards believed that the Health
and Safety's Code requirements for public hearings, public testi
mony, and written decisions provided more than adequately for
public access, both to provide relevant input into decisions and to
receive information about evidence received and decisions made.
Somewhat surprisingly, as these two hearing boards reviewed
the issue and the implications of open deliberations, lawyers
from both environmental groups and industry joined in urging
that the Brown Act was not applicable.242 As one attorney
summed up, their view, "There are really good reasons why
judges are able to deliberate in private, and I think they all apply
to [a hearing board]. I cannot think of a distinction."243 Indeed,
probably the principal concern of the Bay Area hearing board
was that the depth, vigor, and candor of deliberations would be
chilled, and the integrity of decisions would suffer, if delibera
tions had to be conducted in pUblic.
Despite the linguistic oddity of treating hearing boards as leg
islative bodies, and despite the serious concerns about the practi
cal impacts of applying the Brown Act, the Attorney General's
opinion concluded:
The Ralph M. Brown Act does require the deliberations of a hear
ing board of an air pollution control district, after it has conducted
a public hearing on a variance, order of abatement or permit ap
peal, to be conducted in pUblic. The act prohibits the hearing
board from conducting such deliberations in private with the
board's counsel or the board's attorney member.244

In the aftermath of this opinion, all hearing boards eventually
acquiesced in following the Attorney General's view.
241. "Interpreting 'legislative body' to also include nonlegislative bodies simply
adds a nonsensical gloss to the statute, which defeats the effort of the Legislature to
plainly delineate the Act's purpose and effect." Memorandum from Ed Kendig,
District Counsel for Enforcement, Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dis
trict, to Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District Hearing Board 8
(Sept. 2, 1987) (on file with author).
242. The great volume of documents generated on this question by various APCD
officials, hearing boards, the ARB, and private attorneys, was supplemented by a
public hearing convened by the Bay Area hearing board. Transcript, Hearing Board
Conference in Re Applicability of Brown Act to Hearing Board Activities (Hearing
Board, Bay Area Air Quality Management District) (Sept. 8, 1987). At that hear
ing, views were presented by ARB counsel, Bay Area AQMD counsel, Monterey
Bay Unified APCD counsel, a former hearing board member, and attorneys for en
vironmental groups and industry.
243. Id. at 31 (statement of Marc Mihaly).
244. 71 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 96 (1988).
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There has been no demonstrable resulting decline in the qual
ity of hearing board decisions, though there are anecdotal obser
vations that hearing board members are more hesitant to express
their opinions and uncertainties in a public forum than they
would be in a closed session. Nonetheless, it is widely considered
helpful to the parties to a case, and to the public generally, for
these discussions to be conducted openly. As the Vice Chair of
the South Coast hearing board opined on compliance with the
Brown Act, "It works. "245
One aspect of Brown Act compliance that may not always
work is the requirement of an opportunity for public com
ment.246 If, as has happened in some districts, this requirement is
construed to allow members of the public to speak about a case
without being under oath and subject to cross-examination, and
perhaps even without identifying themselves, then considerable
confusion and wasted time can be the result.247 Such comments
cannot be any part of the basis for the hearing board's decision,
and yet it is hard to have confidence that a board could "unring
the bell" of having already heard and been influenced by un
sworn and unquestioned statements. When form is elevated over
substance through this application of the Brown Act, the risk of
legally tainting the ultimate decision in the case is considerable.
A far better approach, efficiently and fairly reconciling the
Brown Act's public comment requirement with Health and
Safety Code Section 40828's public testimony requirement, is fol245. Interview with South Coast Air Quality Management District Hearing Board
(June 14, 2005) (statement of Laurine Thleja).
246. Cal. Gov. Code § 54954.3. This provision states, "Every agenda for regular
meetings shall provide an opportunity for members of the public to directly address
the legislative body on any item of interest to the public, before or during the legisla
tive body's consideration of the item, that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the legislative body . . . .
247. This approach was followed, with many hours devoted to public comment, in
a series of hearings in Appeal of Citizens for Review of Medical and Infectious
Waste Imports into Tehama County, No. 05-001 (Hearing Board, Tehama County
Air Pollution Control District), supra note 19. See also Letter from John Hansen,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP to Mel Oldham, Tehama County Air Pollu
tion Control District Hearing Board Chair (Oct. 25, 2005) (on file with author) ("As
you know, many people made comments both on September 8 and October 11 dur
ing the Brown Act public comment periods, which totaled approximately three
hours. . . . Many also spoke numerous times, thus making a mockery of the three
minute limit."). Judicial review of the hearing board's treatment and resolution of
this matter was initiated in February 2006. InEnTec Medical Services California,
LLC v. Hearing Board of the Tehama County Air Pollution Control District, No.
56912, Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus filed February 2, 2006
(Superior Court, Tehama County).
"
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lowed in some districts. In the B ay Area AQMD hearing board,
for example, the following statement is customarily made by the
chairperson at the beginning of each hearing, describing how and
when the public will be heard:
Members of the public are afforded the opportunity to testify on
any docket on the calendar. All calendars for hearings are posted
at District headquarters at least 72 hours in advance of hearings.
At the beginning of the hearings on the calendared dockets, an
opportunity is also provided for the public to speak on items of
interest to the public that are within the hearing board's subject
matter jurisdiction currently not calendared. Speakers will be lim
ited to three minutes each.
With this approach, orderly opportunities are provided for mem
bers of the public to speak at the outset on matters broadly re
lated to the hearing board, and to testify more specifically and
formally at the public testimony phase of the evidentiary hearing.
A second area of controversy, one that is likely to continue to
produce difficulty, concerns the ethical standards of conduct ap
plicable to hearing board members, particularly with regard to
conflicts of interest. Whenever it appears that a member's
outside associations or activities raise doubt about his or her abil
ity to discharge hearing board duties properly, the question arises
as to just what the applicable standards of conduct are.248 The
difficulty in answering this question arises because there is no
single, comprehensive set of standards that clearly applies to
hearing boards.
Instead, there are various different legal sources that either are
directly applicable to hearing board members or are targeted at
248. The range of circumstances raising this question is vast. See, e.g., Letter from
James Lents, Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, to
South Coast Air Quality Management District Hearing Board (June 17, 1987) (on
file with author) ("I believe that the Port's presentation to the Board violated the
spirit of statutes providing for public access to Board hearings. In addition, the
Board's action in allowing its meal to be paid for by an entity closely tied to a party
before the Board appears inappropriate."); Appeal of Citizens for Review of Medi
cal and Infectious Waste Imports into Tehama County, No. 05-001 (Hearing Board,
Tehama County Air Pollution Control District, Notice and Motion Requesting Vol
untary Recusal of Boardmember), supra note 19 (recusal sought because chair "as a
member of the local Kiwanis Club . . . had sat through a presentation given by one of
the parties"); Security Environmental Systems, Inc., No. 1958-8 (Hearing Board,
South Coast Air Quality Management District, Motion to Disqualify) (May 8, 1989)
(disqualification of member sought because District's witness, an enforcement offi
cial, "teaches a class with [the member] at V.C.L.A. on the subject of toxic air con
taminants" and both are "therefore co-participants in a venture to the economic
benefit of both of them. ").
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other kinds of adjudicators analogous to hearing board mem
bers.249 The latter sources can provide useful guidance for hear
ing boards, even if they are not strictly binding on them. 250
There also are numerous judicial precedents, either interpreting
statutory provisions on ethical conduct or applying constitutional
principles of due process of law to require impartial decision
makers in administrative hearings.251
Given this array of sources of law, there remains significant
uncertainty regarding the governing standards. It is beyond the
scope of this article to explore the many levels of this uncertainty
and seek to resolve it. Nonetheless, it should be evident that
proper discharge of hearing board functions requires the type of
objective and unbiased attitude expected of members of the judi
ciary. Fortunately, in some APCDs, there are rules that set forth
this expectation, and some even spell out procedures to be fol
lowed for voluntary or involuntary disqualification of a member
whose impartiality is in question. Borrowing partially from the
Administrative Procedure Act, rules in the Bay Area, Monterey
B ay, and South Coast districts require a member to "disqualify
himself or herself and withdraw from any case" in which the
member "cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or consider
ation."252 The spirit of pronouncements such as these is clear,
and should be heeded by hearing board members in all districts.
Where controversies inevitably will develop is in applying these
rules, and the other directly pertinent or analogous sources of
law, to the facts of individual situations.

249. The ARB has identified such sources as including the Political Reform Act,
§ § 81000 et seq. ; and the Code of Judicial Ethics, particularly
Canons 2A, 2C, 3B(4), 3B(8), and 3E. See OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, CALIFORNIA
AIR RESOURCES BOARD, INFORMATION FOR HEARING BOARD MEMBERS 6-8
(2001). Furthermore, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 87406.1 expressly prohibits a former
hearing board member from engaging in certain activities relating to the Air Pollu
tion Control District for one year after leaving the board.
250. See, e.g., California Administrative Procedure Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 11340-11544 (West 2006), especially § 11512(c) and § 11425.40; CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 170.1 (West 2006).
251. See, e.g., Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 27 Cal. 4th 1017 (2002).
252. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11425.40 (West 2006); Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 5.14, available at http://www.baaqmd.gov/dst/regulations/
index.htm#reg5 (effective Dec. 5, 2005); Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Con
trol Dist., Regulation VI, Rule 7.5.1 available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbul
cur.htm (last revised June 19, 2002); and South Coast Air Quality Mangement Dist.
Rule 1217 (1978), available at http://www. aqmd.gov/rules/reglreg12/r1217.pdf.
CAL. GOV'T CODE
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Confusions

Finally, two relatively minor but persistent areas of confusion
in hearing board practice deserve brief mention. The first is dis
covery, i.e., the use in hearing board proceedings of some of the
methods employed in advance of courtroom trials for the ex
change of information among the parties. These methods include
written interrogatories, witness lists, oral depositions, requests
for admission of facts, and document production requests. Be
cause hearing board proceedings are not governed by the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act, the discovery provisions of that
statute do not automatically apply.253 However, a hearing
board's procedural rules may provide for discovery methods to
be available, including those set forth in the APA, and some dis
tricts have such rules in place.254
As suggested earlier,255 use of these methods can aid the par
ties' preparation and contribute to more efficient, well-focused
hearings. Probably the most obviously constructive method for
use in hearing board cases is the exchange of witness lists. Be
yond this, however, confusion and frustration arise when hearing
boards are called upon to resolve disputes over other discovery
devices. For example, if written interrogatories are submitted, or
a request for admission of facts or production of documents, it is
not unusual for a party to object to some of the requested items.
The hearing board then finds itself obligated to go through a te
dious process of reviewing and evaluating the appropriateness of
each request.
Hearing boards usually are ill-suited to perform this function,
and attempts to resolve discovery disputes tend to be very time
consuming for all concerned.256 It is in part for this reason that
many districts do not allow discovery at all. In those which do
253. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 1 1 507.5-11507.7.
254. See, e.g., Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., Regulation VI,
Rules 6.1-6.2 available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/drdb/mbu/cur.htm (last revised June
19, 2002); San Diego Air Pollution Control District Rule 75 (1985), available at http:/
/www.sdapcd.orgirules/rules/Reg5pdf/R75-75-l.pdf. . In 1981 a superior court ruling
upheld hearing board authority to develop rules allowing broader discovery than is
permitted under the APA. Port of Redwood City v. Hearing Bd. of the Bay Area
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County 1981) (No. 780189).
255. Supra Section III(G).
256. Southeast Alliance for Environmental Justice, supra note 203 (Order Grant
ing Motion to Compel Discovery) (May 2, 2000). In this matter, the Bay Area
AQMD Hearing Board had before it appellants' requests for the District to produce
38 documents and provide 88 admissions, plus requests for the intervenor-real party
in interest to produce 26 documents and provide 66 admissions. Following consulta-
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allow it in one form or another, probably the most efficient way
to perform the daunting task of resolving disputes is to delegate
it to the chairperson or the attorney member of the board.257 For
the multi-member panel to meet in public session, as some
boards have done, to hash through discovery specifics is unwise,
usually contributing no added benefit to the process beyond what
an individual member could accomplish.
In sum, the confusion surrounding discovery can be eliminated
by eliminating discovery altogether, but there is a price to be
paid for ruling out the practical benefits of structured exchanges
of information prior to hearing. If some discovery is to be al
lowed, its potentially disruptive and delaying effects at least can
be reduced by delegating to a single member the responsibility
for resolving discovery disputes.
Another area of confusion that occasionally confronts hearing
boards is requests for rehearing of decisions. Section 40821 says
that a hearing board, "with not fewer than four members present,
may, in its discretion, within 30 days of the effective date of the
decision, rehear any matter."258 Section 40861, a somewhat re
dundant provision, states that a board "may rehear a decision if a
party petitions for a rehearing within 10 days" after the decision
has been mailed to him. Taken together, these provisions clearly
establish that a party to a case may request a rehearing, but what
is less certain is whether the board itself can choose to have a
rehearing even if no party has requested it. That latter option
would seem to make sense, assuming the board has some good
reason to revisit a matter.259
Ordinarily the rehearing prospect arises when a party requests
it. What is confusing to hearing boards at that point is whether
they are required to have a hearing on the rehearing request and
to deliberate publicly on whether to grant it.260 Under this mo
dus operandi, if the decision is then made to grant rehearing,
tion and partial agreement among the parties, "a total of 96 requests for Documents
or Admissions remain unresolved and are thus the subject of this ruling."
257. As mentioned supra text at note 227, in the South Coast AQMD Hearing
Board, the chair addresses discovery matters in prehearing conferences.
258. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40821 (West 2006).
259. The Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules appear to contem
plate this route, allowing that "[a]ny member of the Hearing Board may request a
rehearing within 10 days of the effective date of any decision by filing a Request to
Rehear." Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. Hearing Bd. Rules § 5.14, available at
http://www.baaqmd.gov/dstiregulations/index.htm#regS (effective Dec. 5, 2005).
260. Presumably the same question would arise under the Bay Area rule cited
supra note 259, if a member actually files a "Request to Rehear."
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then the rehearing itself would be scheduled for a subsequent
date, following proper public notice. Alternatively, can the
board or its chairperson, acting without a hearing, decide
whether to grant the rehearing? If the decision is to grant it, then
a properly noticed rehearing would be scheduled. If instead the
board determines to deny the rehearing request, there would be
no hearing at all.
There is no clear statutory answer to this little conundrum.
From a practical standpoint, considering efficiency and expense
to the taxpayers and the parties, it would seem that if the written
request for rehearing appears to present strong grounds for the
board to delve back into the matter, the board should grant the
request without a hearing and schedule the rehearing itself. The
only actual "hearing" then would be the rehearing. If, however,
the rehearing request appears to offer weak bases for reconsider
ing the matter, the more prudent course would seem to be to
schedule the request but only for argument on whether there
later should be a rehearing. Proceeding in this manner seems
fairer than just ruling based on the papers alone, for this ap
proach allows the party who wishes rehearing to have his day "in
court," at least to the extent of being heard about why a rehear
ing is warranted. After hearing such argument, the board can
decide whether a rehearing, including the taking of testimony, is
warranted. If it is, then a further occasion should be scheduled
for the rehearing. Otherwise, the rehearing request would be de
nied, there would be no additional hearing, and the original deci
sion would stand.
VII.
CONCLUSION

This survey of the objectives and major characteristics of hear
ing board work is primarily intended to help lawyers and others
involved in cases to have a clearer perspective as they prepare to
go before hearing boards and as they make their presentations
there. Greatest attention has been given to the variance process
because that is the heart of hearing board work. It also best ex
emplifies the inquiry into equitable considerations which charac
terizes most cases before these boards.
As has been shown, however, the three types of cases generally
have different emphases. In variance cases the question of the
applicant's diligence in seeking to comply frequently dominates
the proceedings. In abatement cases, in contrast, the nature and
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extent of the violations often seem to be of most critical concern.
Lastly, in permit cases techniCal issues of interpretation of the
law and of alternative technological approaches usually control.
In all three formats, and regardless of these varying emphases,
the underlying goal of administrative adjudication by California's
hearing boards is the same. It is to reduce air pollution . as
quickly, greatly, and fairly as possible. If this goal is to be well
served by hearing boards, their members must fully understand
and respect the responsibilities entrusted to them. They must ap
proach their role-whether exercised many times a week or only
once every few years-with respect for the laws that govern their
authority and respect for the concerns and constraints being ex
pressed by the parties and members of the public who come
before them. Hearing board members must recognize that the
district staff's expertise is generally deserving of considerable
deference. Nevertheless, even though that expertise usually is
emphasized in each case through staff reports and testimony, ul
timately the hearing board must be independent of the staff, def
erential to its expertise to a sizable degree, but not a rubber
stamp.261
If a hearing board develops a reputation over time for bias to
ward a particular type of party-whether it be the APCD staff,
industry, or environmental groups-that board is likely to find its
functions drastically diminished. A hearing board's reputation
for bias, or for persistent inefficiency or internal dissension, can
lead to avoidance of the board. District staff will think twice
about bringing abatement actions, instead preferring to take vio
lators directly to court or to exercise prosecutorial discretion to
develop settlements embodied in enforcement agreements. Po
tential variance applicants will choose to run the risk of being
subjected to enforcement proceedings, rather than subject them
selves to the time and expense of variance proceedings with
highly unpredictable, or predictably unfavorable, outcomes.
Even potential challengers to permit decisions may find other av
enues for working out disputes over the APCD's permitting ac261. Although the hearing boards are structured as independent, adjudicatory
arms of the APCDs, there is some risk that a board can become overly reliant on the
opinions and preferences of APCD staff personnel, who regularly appear before the
board and who work full-time on air pollution matters. As one commentary also
implied many years ago, the fact that the district governing board makes APCD
policy and appoints hearing board members may also constrain some members to be
wary of great departures from the views of that board and the district's staff. Willick
& Windle, supra note 5, at 531-32.
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tions. In other words, when a hearing board ceases over a
sustained period of time to be perceived as an impartial forum, it
probably has lost sight of the commitment to fairness that the
statutory scheme contemplates. Moreover, by inducing potential
parties to avoid it, such a hearing board may succeed only in
making itself extraneous.
The complexity of hearing board work, and controversial deci
sions now and then, occasionally spark legislative proposals to
alter or eliminate some hearing board responsibilities. In 2005 ,
for example, a bill was introduced that would drastically reduce
and redistribute hearing board functions.262 Ironically, the types
of cases essentially targeted for removal from hearing boards
under this bill would be variances and abatement orders, leaving
permit disputes unaltered. Although there undoubtedly is room
for reform and improvement in hearing board functions, and it
may be wise for the legislature to take a hard look at how hear
ing boards are constituted and empowered, this bill seems to
have it backwards. Permit disputes are the types of cases for
which hearing boards are least well suited, while variances and
abatement cases make much more sense for resolution by APeD
hearing boards.
Although hearing board members, as noted at the outset of
this article, are usually not air pollution experts, there are good
reasons for entrusting them with the responsibilities hearing
boards have long and admirably discharged, especially in the va
riance and abatement realms. In many instances, of course,
members do bring relevant expertise to their positions. More
commonly, service over the course of some years develops in
most members considerable familiarity, if not expertise, with
many aspects of the air pollution regulatory scheme.
Even beyond these capabilities, as members of the communi
ties their decisions affect, hearing board members apply the type
of common sense and popular wisdom usually expected of jurors.
262. AB. 1231, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005), introduced by Assem
blyman Jerome Horton on February 22, 2005. For an earlier example of a similar,
unsuccessful proposal, see AB. 768, 1991 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991),
which would have allowed any person to require a hearing board to transfer any
matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings for appointment of an administra
tive law judge. In January 2006, AB. 1231 was amended into wholly different provi
sions. As amended, the bill would not alter any hearing board functions. Instead, it
would require APCDs to biennially report to the ARB on variance and abatement
order activities and related emissions. ARB, in turn, would be required to publish
this information on the internet.

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 103 2005-2006

104

JO URNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

Paradoxically, part of the uniqueness of hearing boards, and of
the rationale for them, is that these air pollution "judges" actu
ally are expected to bring to their work many of the attributes of
jurors. As one ARB attorney described it, there is something
"very American" about hearing boards because of this local citi
zen involvement.263
In conclusion, the responsibilities of hearing board members
have grown to be very serious and substantial, and members
should take them on only if they recognize this and are prepared
to act accordingly. Because hearing board members are not the
primary air pollution experts at APCDs, they may occasionally
feel unqualified for the job when faced with the complexities of
modern air pollution law and science. At the same time, pre
cisely because hearing board members are not air pollution ex
perts, and instead are a diverse group of members of the
community, they are extremely well qualified to do what the
Health and Safety Code expects of them. If California's air pol
lution laws are to be applied fairly, to promote just treatment of
both pollution sources and the communities affected by them, it
is up to the hearing boards to make it happen.

263. Interview with Judy Lewis and Leslie Krinsk, California Air Resources
Board, Sacramento, California (June 16, 2004) (statement of Leslie Krinsk).
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